DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 094 483 80 EA 006 329

AUTHOR	Campbell, Roald F.; Mazzoni, Tim L., Jr.
TITLE	State Governance Models for the Public Schools.
INSTITUTION	Ohio State Univ., Columbus. Educational Governance Project.
SPONS AGENCY	Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	Aug 74
GRANT	OEG-0-73-0499
NOTE	228p.; Related documents are ED 090 690, EA 006 272 and EA 006 315 & 316
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.75 HC-$11.40 PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS	Administrator Guides; Educational Policy; *Governance; *Models; Organizational Theories; *Policy Formation; State Boards of Education; *State Departments of Education; *State Government; State Officials
IDENTIFIERS	Elementary Secondary Education Act Title V; ESEA Title V

ABSTRACT

This treatment of State governance models is one of two major reports prepared by the Educational Governance Project. In addition, there are twelve case study reports, each devoted to policymaking for the public schools in a particular State. This report is designed to serve as a point of beginning for any person or group of persons in a State where the structure of State governance is thought to require reexamination. The authors first attempt to picture the current arrangements for the State governance of education, particularly as found in the State education agency; and then three classes of models, seven models in all, are explicated. Options that may be applied to one or more models are described, and the preferences of a wide range of persons who have participated in the State governance of education are shown. Finally, the document suggests some rather specific takeoff points for those who would restructure the governance arrangements for public education in their own States. (Author/JF)

ED 094483

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STATE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

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29 West Woodruff Avenue
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August, 1974

EA 006 329

The activity which is the subject of this report was supported in whole or in part by the U. S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U. S. Office of Education, and no official endorsement by the U. S. Office of Education should be inferred.

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FOREWORD

This treatment of State Governance Models is one of two major reports prepared by the Educational Governance Project. The other major report is the Comparative Analysis. In addition, there are twelve case study reports, each devoted to policy making for the public schools in a particular state. The Governance Project began in January, 1972 and was completed in August, 1974. The work was funded by the U. S. Office of Education under Title V (Section 505) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (OEG-0-73-0499). The Policy Board for the Project was composed of three chief state school officers, with the State of Ohio serving as fiscal agent. An Advisory Committee composed of eleven persons concerned with general and educational governance also served the project. Contract for the work was let to the College of Education, The Ohio State University. Names of principal participants are shown in the preceding directory.

The major purposes of the Educational Governance Project were two in number:

1. To expand our knowledge of how states determine policies for the public schools.
2. To develop alternative models of state educational governance for consideration by policy makers and others.

This report has been prepared as a specific response to the second purpose.

Before such a document could be written, a number of other tasks had to be undertaken. It was necessary to develop a conceptual framework for the examination of the state governance of education, to recruit and train a group of researchers, to collect some information on all 50 states and much more on the 12 selected states, to develop data-gathering instruments to be used in the states, to establish categories and coding procedures for analysis,

to complete the 12 case studies, to conduct a survey of preferences regarding governance options, to hold a number of regional conferences to discuss possible models, and to make a comparative analysis of state governance of education across 12 states. To make full use of this report on State Governance Models considerable reference should be made to at least some of the case studies and particularly to the Comparative Analysis where most of the research data are brought to bear.

It is our hope that this report will serve as a point of beginning for any person or group of persons in a state where the structure of state governance is thought to require reexamination. Chapter I attempts to picture the current arrangements for the state governance of education, particularly as found in the state education agency. In Chapter II three classes of models, seven models in all, are explicated. Options which may be applied to one or more models are described in Chapter III. In Chapter IV the preferences of a wide range of persons who have participated in the state governance of education are shown. Finally, in Chapter V we suggest some rather specific take-off points for those who would restructure the governance arrangements for public education in their own states.

A great many people have given assistance to the Project. While complete acknowledgement is impossible, we do wish to make some specific acknowledgements. In the planning stage Walter Hack, Roy Larmee, and Frederick Staub, all colleagures in the Faculty of Educational Administration at Ohio State University, gave help and encouragement. Sven Lundstedt, Professor of Public Administration at Ohio State University, gave valued assistance with instrumentation. A number of scholars across the nation provided thoughtful criticism of plans, proposed activities, and many segments of writing. Of particular help were Joseph M. Cronin, Secretary of Educational Affairs in

Massachusetts; Kenneth H. Hansen, formerly of Washington State University and now Superintendent of Public Instruction in Nevada; Sam P. Harris, the U. S. Office of Education; Lawrence D. Haskew, University of Texas; Gerald R. Sroufe, Nova University; and Michael D. Usdan, City University of New York.

The National Academy of Education provided a short-term Academy Associateship for David W. O'Shea so that he might assist the Project with his study of preferences. Fortunately, the College of Education at Ohio State University was able to supplement the Academy stipend with a grant from the Fawcett Professorship Fund to help support the O'Shea study. We appreciate the support of the Academy and the College.

The Advisory Committee of the Project was helpful, particularly in the planning stage of the work. In addition, members of the Committee reviewed the preference survey instrument, assisted with the regional conferences, and offered suggestions on some of the reports. Members of the Policy Board of the Project have given generously of their time, have helped provide the general direction of the Project, have offered constructive criticism at every stage, and have been supportive of the purpose and thrust of the work. We also acknowledge the assistance of literally hundreds of persons who provided us with their judgments by responding to interviews, questionnaires, or by participating in conferences.

Grateful as we are for the suggestions of all these persons and more, we take responsibility for what appears in this report.

As a final word of appreciation we also wish to acknowledge the dedicated and skillful secretarial assistance provided by Norma Elliott, Bonnie Williams, and Jeanne Gunter.

Roald F. Campbell
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CHAPTER I

CURRENT STATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE

State governance of education can be viewed from many levels. From the school or school district perspective, in many states, one can note, for instance, that some state agency determines which courses shall be taught, which books shall be used, and which teachers can be legally employed. From the state department of education perspective one can find officials who issue teaching certificates, allocate state money, and conduct state-wide evaluation programs. From still another perspective one can examine the process by which the major policy decisions for education within the state are made. While a consideration of state governance of education from any of these perspectives may well be a productive endeavor, our concern here is from the perspective of policy formation and enactment. In other words, we are limiting our consideration of governance to the policy-making function.

The concept of policy making, as we have shown elsewhere, is not a simple one.[1] The political systems approach, which we have used, posits an interactive model in which demands are converted through the policy-making process into authoritative decisions. For instance, when the legislature adopts a new finance program for the state we see that as a policy decision. Or, when a state board of education adopts a new program for the certification of teachers we see that as a policy decision. In essence, these are basic decisions which affect many implementing decisions.

The policy-making process can be conceived in terms of four steps or functions as follows: (1) issue definition--a demand that members of the political system can deal with; (2) proposal formulation--a specific proposal for change or for maintaining the status quo is set forth; (3) support

mobilization--individuals or groups are activated to support or oppose proposals; and (4) decision enactment--an authoritative governmental choice is made. As these four functions are performed, both formal and informal actors are involved. By formal actors we mean those who hold official positions such as governors, legislators, state board of education members, and chief state school officers. By informal actors we include interest group representatives and other citizens who attempt to influence those who act in an official capacity. In most states education interest groups represent teachers, school administrators, and school board members. Other interest groups often represent organizations of persons interested in business, labor, and agriculture.

Since policy making for education is a product of both general government and special government for education our inquiry could be far ranging and deal with the behavior of many government officials as well as with a host of interest group leaders. We have ruled out such a comprehensive treatment; we have neither the time nor the resources to undertake such a task. Moreover, our purpose is to look quite specifically at the formal governmental arrangements within which the actors work and which presumably affect the policy-making process for education. We think this can be done best by delimiting the inquiry in two ways. First, we shall focus on the state education agency by which we mean the state board of education (SBE), the chief state school officer (CSSO), and the state department of education (SDE). Second, we shall give some consideration to the relationships of the state education agency to the other formal actors in the system, namely governors and legislators.

To expedite this focus we shall give some attention to the development of the state education agency, explicate briefly the organizational arrangements now present in all 50 states and give some additional detail for the 12 states included in the Governance study, note some of the recent structural

changes made in state education agencies, and finally set forth what appear to be some of the major issues having to do with formal structure of the state education agency and with the relationships between the agency and other major actors.

Development of the State Education Agency

Historically, the state education agency had its origin in several of the colonial legislatures. For our purpose here, however, we shall deal only with the period after we became a nation. As is well known, the U.S. Constitution made no mention of education, hence that function, in the language of the Constitution, was left to the states or to the people. Our federal plan for dividing some governmental functions between national and state levels helps explain the omission of education from the Constitution. The fact that schooling was then considered, by many, as more of a private than a public function may also provide part of the explanation.

Even though schooling was often left to individual or to church discretion, nearly every state made some effort to establish or encourage education. Six of the original 13 states had constitutional provisions bearing on education and 11 of the 13 had statutory provisions on the same subject. Only Rhode Island, at the time of the establishment of the Union, had neither constitutional nor statutory provision for education.[2] Most states admitted to the Union since we became a nation have had both constitutional and statutory language bearing on education.

In our early history the governance of education was a part of general governance. Initially, there was little to do at the state level. One exception had to do with school lands. Many states at the time of their admission to the Union had received land which was to be used for school purposes, or the income derived from such land, was to be used for school

purposes. Often the state treasurer was charged with allocating funds derived from these lands. While, as noted above, schools were often private, most states also provided that common schools, at first interpreted as elementary schools, were to be established in each town or district. However, most of the support for such schools was to come from local taxes. This practice led to the strong tradition of local control of schools, an ideology, or at least a rhetoric, that is still with us. As concern for the public schools increased there was a move to create a special structure for their governance. At the local level this led, in Massachusetts for example, to the separation of the school committee from the town selectmen in 1826. At the state level this movement led to the creation of the state education agency, a development to which we now turn.

Early Forms

The first indication of a special structure for educational governance at the state level appears to be the creation of the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York in 1784.[3] However, it should be noted that in the beginning the Board of Regents was given jurisdiction over academies and colleges and it was not until 1904 that supervision of the public schools was placed under its direction. In 1825 North Carolina set up an ex-officio state board known as the President and Directors of the Literary Fund. In 1837 this board was made appointive and was given supervision over the public schools. The most significant early impetus for the establishment of a state board of education for the public schools was the creation of the Massachusetts State Board of Education in 1837. The importance of this body appears to be due in large part to the efforts of Horace Mann who became is first secretary and served in this capacity for 12 years.[4] The Massachusetts Board consisted of the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor, and eight citizens appointed by the Governor for eight-year staggered terms.

The Board was empowered to employ a secretary as their executive officer and they appear to have been fortunate in their initial choice of Horace Mann.

Other states gradually followed these early examples. By 1900, 34 states had established state boards of education.[5] Initially, in many states, such bodies were composed completely or in part of ex-officio members, that is persons elected to other state posts such as the governor, secretary of state, or secretary of the treasury. As time went on, most states removed all or most of the ex-officio members.

Almost concurrent with and in some cases preceding the establishment of state boards of education was the creation of the office of chief state school officer. Again, New York was the first state to establish such a post. In 1812, the legislature provided that a superintendent of common schools should be appointed by the council of appointment. However, the office was displaced in 1821 and was not reestablished until 1854. In the meantime, the Secretary of State acted as ex-officio superintendent.[6] Maryland went through a similar process by establishing the office in 1826, abolishing it in 1828, and reestablishing it in 1868. The superintendent of common schools provided by Michigan law in 1829 and modified to become the superintendent of public instruction in 1836 represents the first such state office to continue to the present time.[7] Between 1830 and 1850 most states established the office of chief state school officer. By 1900, there were 48 chief state school officers even though a few of the states included were still not admitted to the Union. By that time 33 of the states had authorized the office by constitutional provision though four of these states later rescinded the constitutional arrangement and established the office by statute only.[8]

The chief state school officer has been known by a number of titles. The most common is superintendent of public instruction, next is commissioner of education, and there are still other variations in a few states. The method by which he is selected has also varied among the states. In 1896, CSSOs in 31 states were elected by the people, in nine were appointed by the governor, in three appointed by the general assembly, in three appointed by the state board of education, and in two states there was as yet no such office.[9]

Over much of our history the SBE and the CSSO have had relatively few persons serving in the capacity of a professional staff. Beach has suggested that until 1900 state departments of education were engaged chiefly in collecting statistics[10] and under those circumstances a few good clerks seemed to be all that was required. As late as 1900, Beach reports there were a total of 177 professionals, including the CSSOs, in all state departments combined, an average of fewer than four persons per state.

Since 1900

This century has seen many developments in the state education agency. Forty-nine of the 50 states have established state boards of education with jurisdiction over elementary and secondary schools, all states have chief state school officers, and numbers of professional personnel in departments of education have increased enormously. These changes seem to represent a response to the expectations held for the agency. Beach points out that from about 1900 to 1930 state departments were much engaged in inspection or the enforcement of standards. It is interesting to note that this is also the period of the scientific management movement emanating largely from the work of Taylor and first published in 1911.[11] In any case, inspection of practices in local school districts did require more state department personnel than the collection of a few simple statistics from those districts.

About 1930, Beach contends, state departments entered a leadership stage in their development.[12] Again, it is interesting to note that in the 1930s we had the Hawthorne experiments in industry and the advent of so-called democratic administration in education.[13]

To what extent state education agencies have provided leadership in education over the past several decades may be a question, but there is no denying the fact that state agencies have taken on additional functions. In this process the professional staff has been greatly augmented. In Table 1-1 we have shown the increase of professional staff from 1962 to 1972 in the 12 states included in the Governance Project. Per cent of increase over this decade ranges from 151 in California to 505 in Tennessee and for the 12 states the percentage is 220. In terms of numbers the average number of professionals in these 12 states was about 150 in 1962 and 330 in 1972.

Some of the impetus for these staff increases may have come from the state agencies themselves. Most of it, we suspect, came from external sources. In many states there were augmented demands for school finance reform and for accountability. Frequently, the push for accountability meant more information and better analyses, particularly in relating costs to outcomes. Even greater pressure came from the federal level. With the passage of vocational education provisions in 1917 the federal government began the process of extending federal aid to states for categorical programs. That process continued and came to full flower in the 1960s, particularly in the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.[14] Title V of that Act was designed to improve state departments of education. As a result substantial funds were made available to state departments. From 1966 to 1973, $175 million was allocated to state departments for their improvement. Murphy[15] examined the impact of Title V funds on state departments of education and made detailed studies of three states. In two of the

TABLE I-1

NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS IN SELECTED STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, 1962 & 1972

	1962	1972	Per Cent Increase
California	249	375	151
Colorado	52	94	181
Florida	90	401	335
Georgia	160	345	216
Massachusetts	91	303	333
Michigan	65	242	372
Minnesota	100	213	213
Nebraska	45	125	278
New York	271	972	359
Tennessee	55	278	505
Texas	175	466	266
Wisconsin	71	204	287
TOTAL	1824	4018	220

SOURCES: Robert F. Will, State Education--Structure and Organization. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 33; Sam P. Harris, State Department of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers, pp. 42-43.

states the funds had been used rather broadly through the departments to enhance many of the activities that were already underway. In the third case, where the department was less well developed in the beginning, some Title V money was used to set up new programs, particularly in the planning and research areas.

Overall, Title V money and other federal funds appear to have reinforced and augmented customary state department activities more than they have provided the impetus for reform. Nonetheless, we sense that many departments

are doing more by way of planning, research, and evaluation than was once the case. In this whole process, however, one condition must be noted. Many state departments now receive at least half of their annual operating budget from federal sources. Federal money, which is subject to congressional and presidential decision, often late in the fiscal year, produces considerable instability in the funding of state agencies and at times seems to make them more sensitive to federal demands than to state needs. Welcome as federal money has been to most state agencies, we suspect that in the long run they must depend chiefly on state funds if they are to perform effectively for the people of the state.

Present State Agency Arrangements

In looking at present arrangements for the state governance of education, we shall concern ourselves chiefly with the state education agency. As noted above, we use the term state education agency to include the state board of education, the chief state school officer, and the state department of education. Each of these components will be described. The state education agency serves two major functions. In one sense, the agency is an administrative arm of state government. To the agency falls the responsibility for implementing those programs stipulated by the constitution or enacted into law by statute. In another sense, the agency is a policy-making body. Its policy-making role is exercised in two ways: (1) through relationships with the governor and the legislature, and (2) through the actual formulation of policy in those areas lodged with the agency by the constitution or delegated to it by the legislature. The state board of education and the chief state school officer would appear to have major parts to play in policy making. The state department, as the professional arm of the board and the chief, would appear to have a major part in the implementation of policy.

State Boards of Education

Forty-nine of the 50 states have state boards of education for elementary and secondary education. Only Wisconsin has no such board. In Table 1-2 we have shown selected structural arrangements pertaining to these boards. In 15 of the 49 states the members of the state boards are elected, in eight cases in partisan elections, in four cases in nonpartisan elections; in two cases by the legislature or legislative delegation; and in one case by local school directors (boards). In 32 states the governor appoints the state board of education members. In two cases, Florida and Mississippi, the board is composed entirely of ex-officio members.

Membership on the board varies from three in Mississippi to 24 in Texas with 7 to 11 members being the most frequent size. Terms of office range from three years in Delaware to 15 years in New York (recently modified to 7 years) with 4 to 6 years being the most frequent length of term. By way of compensation, 32 states provide a per diem and expenses for board members for attendance at meetings while in 17 states expenses only are paid. Typically, per diem payments are modest, from $10 to $50, for each day spent in board meetings.

In addition to the general supervision of elementary and secondary education, a mandate common to all state boards, the jurisdiction of state boards is frequently extended to other areas. Forty-four of the 49 boards exercise supervision over vocational education, in 29 cases the state board of education is responsible for vocational rehabilitation, and in four cases--Idaho, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island--the state board of education, often called the board of regents, is also responsible for higher education.

For 10 of the 12 states included in the Governance Project we secured considerable data on the demographic characteristics of members of state boards of education. We could not collect data in Wisconsin where there is

TABLE 1-2

STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION, 1972

State	Selection					Compensation		Augmented Jurisdiction		
	Elected	Governor Appointed	Ex Officio	Membership	Term of Office	per diem	exp.	vocational education	vocational rehabilitation	higher education
Alabama	p[a]	-	-	8 + 2X	4	X	X	yes	yes	no
Alaska	-	X	-	7	5	X	X	yes	yes	no
Arizona	-	X	-	8 + 1X	4	-	X	yes	yes	no
Arkansas	-	X	-	9 + 1X	9	X	X	yes	no	no
California	-	X	-	10	4	-	X	yes	yes	no
Colorado	p	-	-	5	6	-	X	no	no	no
Connecticut	-	X	-	9 + 1X	6	-	X	yes	yes	no
Delaware	-	X	-	6 + 2X	3	X	X	yes	no	no
Florida	-	-	X	7X	4	-	X	yes	no	no
Georgia	-	X	-	10	7	X	X	yes	yes[f]	no
Hawaii	p	-	-	11	4	X	X	no	no	no
Idaho	-	X	-	7 + 1X	5	X	X	yes	yes	yes
Illinois	-	X	-	17	6	X	X	yes	no	no
Indiana	-	X	-	18 + 1X	4	X	X	no	no	no
Iowa	-	X	-	9	6	X	X	yes	yes	no
Kansas	p	-	-	10	4	X	X	yes	no	no
Kentucky	-	X	-	7 + 1X	4	X	X	yes	yes	no
Louisiana	p	-	-	11 + 1X	6, 8[b]	X	X	yes	yes	no
Maine	-	X	-	9	5	X	X	yes	no	no
Maryland	-	X	-	7	5	-	X	yes	yes	no
Massachusetts	-	X	-	11 + 3X	5	-	X	yes	no	no
Michigan	p	-	-	8 + 2X	8	X	X	yes	yes	no
Minnesota	-	X	-	9	5	X	X	yes	yes	no
Mississippi	-	-	X	3X	4	-	X	yes	yes	no
Missouri	-	X	-	8	8	X	X	yes	yes	no

TABLE 1-2 (continued)

STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION, 1972

State	Selection				Term of Office	Compensation		Augmented Jurisdiction		
	Elected	Governor Appointed	Ex Officio	Membership		per diem	exp.	vocational education	vocational rehabilitation	higher education
Montana	-	X	-	8 + 3X	8	X	X	yes	yes	no
Nebraska	np	-	-	8	4	-	X	yes	yes	no
Nevada	np	-	-	9	4	-	X	yes	no	no
New Hampshire	-	X	-	7	5	-	X	yes	yes	no
New Jersey	-	X	-	12 + 2X	6	-	X	yes	no	no
New Mexico	p	-	-	10	6	X	X	yes	yes	no
New York	Leg.[c]	-	-	15	15	-	X	yes	yes	yes
North Carolina	-	X	-	11 + 2X	8	X	X	yes	no	no
North Dakota	-	X	-	7 + 1X	6	X	X	yes	yes	no
Ohio	np	-	-	23	6	X	X	yes	yes	no
Oklahoma	np	X	-	6 + 1X	6	X	X	no	no	no
Oregon	-	X	-	7	7	X	X	yes	no	no
Pennsylvania	-	X	-	17	6	-	X	yes	no	yes
Rhode Island	-	X	-	9	4	-	X	yes	no	yes
South Carolina	Leg.[d]	-	-	16	4	X	X	yes	no	no
South Dakota	-	X	-	7	5	X	X	yes	yes	no
Tennessee	-	X	-	12 + 3X	9	X	X	yes	yes	no
Texas	p	-	-	24	6	-	X	yes	yes	no
Utah	np	-	-	11	4	X	X	yes	yes	no
Vermont	-	X	-	7	6	X	X	yes	yes	no
Virginia	-	X	-	9	4	X	X	yes	no	no
Washington	Local boards	-	-	14 + 1X	6	-	X	no	no	no
West Virginia	-	X	-	9 + 2X	9	X	X	yes	yes	no
Wisconsin[e]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wyoming	-	X	-	9 + 1X	6	X	X	yes	no	no

[a] p = partisan election; np = nonpartisan election

[b] Some six and some eight year terms

[c] Elected by legislature

[d] Elected by legislative delegation

[e] No state board for elementary and secondary education

[f] Vocational rehabilitation was recently removed from the board

SOURCES: Most of these data are from Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers. For Illinois recent constitutional and statutory changes were examined.

no state board of education and in Florida all state board members are ex officio, hence we did not include them. In the ten states there were 112 voting members (some ex officio members were not voting members). Questionnaires were sent to all voting members and 64 usable responses, 59 per cent of the population, were returned. Their responses are summarized in Table 1-3. We cannot claim that this is an accurate picture for individual states since the percentage of return varied from state to state. Nor do we insist that all state board members are accurately portrayed by the data in Table 1-3. At the same time we do point out that from the responses of 64 board members in ten states we were able to derive the characteristics shown.

These data suggest that state board members are largely male, almost always white, usually over 40 years of age, half of them have annual incomes of $30,000 or more, nearly always they have graduated from college, generally they live in urban and suburban communities, they divide about evenly between Democrats and Republicans, and almost half of them have had some professional experience in education. While most of these data furnish no surprises, the proportion of board members who have had professional experience in education was higher than we had suspected. Much of the literature on state boards indicates that board members are made up of laymen, not educators. We now suspect that such a proposition is only half true.

The Chief State School Officer

In Table 1-4, we show a number of structural features pertaining to the chief state school officer. In 35 states the office was established by constitutional provision, while in 15 the statutes alone provide the legal basis. In terms of selection, 19 CSSOs are elected, 13 in partisan elections and six in non-partisan elections; 26 are appointed by the state board of education; and five are appointed by the governor. Appointment in 18 cases

TABLE 1-3

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION RESPONDENTS IN TEN STATES, BY PERCENTAGES

State	Number Responding	Male	White	Age 41 or Over	Income 30,000 or more	College Degree	Urban and Sub-Urban	Rural	Democrat	Republican	Professional Educational Experience
California	5	60	100	60	50	100	100	0	20	80	60
Colorado	4	75	100	100	33	100	75	25	0	100	50
Georgia	5	80	100	60	75	40	80	20	60	0	20
Massachusetts	6	50	100	83	40	83	100	0	50	33	17
Michigan	8	75	88	50	17	100	88	13	50	38	100
Minnesota	6	67	83	100	40	67	83	17	83	17	33
Nebraska	5	100	100	100	25	80	60	40	40	60	40
New York	7	86	100	100	86	100	100	0	43	43	29
Tennessee	8	88	75	88	38	100	100	0	0	75	75
Texas	10	70	100	100	78	100	80	20	80	0	30
TOTAL	64	75	94	84	51	92	88	12	45	41	47

SOURCE: Educational Governance Project

is at the pleasure of the state board or the governor. In seven cases appointment by the state board is for a specified term ranging from one year in Delaware to not more than five years in Alaska. Most terms are for four years. In New Jersey, appointment is by the governor and for a five-year term. Other terms of office shown in Table 1-4 pertain to those to which the CSSO is elected. In 17 states the CSSO is an ex-officio member of the state board of education; in 33 states he does not have that status. In Table 1-4 an attempt has been made to characterize briefly the formal relationship of the chief to the state board. In many instances he is simply designated as the secretary and in other cases his designation is executive officer or chief administrative officer of the board. In five states the CSSO is not only a member of the state board but is the official chairman of that body. While formal designation of the relationship of the CSSO to the SBE varies among the states, in practice nearly all chiefs serve as the executive officers of their respective state boards of education and as important professional advisers to the boards.

For the twelve states in the Governance Project we collected some demographic data on the CSSOs. Those data are summarized in Table 1-5. It will be noted that all 12 chiefs were male, that 10 were white and 2 black, that the average age was about 57 years, that the average salary was about $32,000, that seven of the 12 had their K-12 schooling in the same state where they were serving as CSSO, that half of the chiefs had received their K-12 schooling in rural communities, that three-fourths of the chiefs had served as public school teachers, that two-thirds of them had served as public school superintendents, and that in seven of the twelve cases chiefs had served in state departments of education prior to their selection.

We do not contend that these 12 CSSOs are a statistical sample of the 50 in the country. We know for instance, that two women are currently serving

TABLE 1-4

STRUCTURAL FEATURES PERTAINING TO CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, 1972

State	Legal Basis		Method of Selection			Term	Relationship to Board	
	Const	Stat	Elected	Appt SBE	Appt Gov		Ex officio Member	Capacity
Alabama	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	Yes	Secretary and executive officer
Alaska		X	--	X	--	Not to exceed 5 yrs	No	
Arizona	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Executive officer
Arkansas		X	--	X	--	Pleasure-Governor	Yes	Ex officio secretary
California	X		np	--	--	4 years	No	Secretary and executive officer
Colorado	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Secretary
Connecticut		X	--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Secretary
Delaware		X	--	X	--	1 year	No	Executive secretary
Florida	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Secretary and executive officer
Georgia	X		p	--	--	4 years	No	Executive officer
Hawaii	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Secretary
Idaho	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Administrative officer
Illinois	X		--	X	--	3 years	No	Executive officer
Indiana	X		p	--	--	2 years	Yes	Chairman of Board commissions
Iowa		X	--	X	--	4 years	No	Executive officer
Kansas	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Executive officer
Kentucky	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Executive officer
Louisiana	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Secretary and executive officer
Maine		X	--	--	X	Coterminus-Gov	No	Secretary
Maryland		X	--	X	--	4 years	No	Chief executive, secretary, and treasurer
Massachusetts		X	--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Chief executive officer and secretary
Michigan	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	Yes	Chairman
Minnesota		X	--	X	--	4 years	No	Executive officer and secretary
Mississippi	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Chairman
Missouri	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Chief Administrative officer
Montana	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Secretary
Nebraska	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Executive officer and secretary
Nevada	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Secretary
New Hampshire		X	--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Chief executive officer and secretary
New Jersey		X	--	--	X	5 years	No	Official agent and secretary

TABLE 1-4 (continued)

STRUCTURAL FEATURES PERTAINING TO CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, 1972

State	Legal Basis		Method of Selection			Term	Relationship to Board	
	Const	Stat	Elected	Appt SBE	Appt Gov		Ex officio Member	Capacity
New Mexico	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Chief administrative officer
New York	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-Regents	No	Chief administrative officer
North Carolina	X		p	--	--	4 years	No	Secretary and administrative officer
North Dakota	X		np	--	--	4 years	Yes	Executive director and secretary
Ohio	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Secretary, executive and administrative officer
Oklahoma	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	President and executive officer
Oregon	X		np	--	--	4 years	No	Legislative liaison and executive officer
Pennsylvania	X		--	--	X	Pleasure-Gov	No	Chief executive officer
Rhode Island		X	--	X	--	Pleasure-Regents	No	Executive officer
South Carolina	X		p	--	--	4 years	No	Secretary and administrative officer
South Dakota	X		np	--	--	2 years	No	Secretary and executive officer
Tennessee		X	--	--	X	Pleasure-Gov	Yes	Chairman
Texas		X	--	X	--	4 years	No	Executive secretary
Utah	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Executive officer
Vermont		X	--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	No	Chief executive officer and secretary
Virginia	X		--	--	X	Coterminus-Gov	No	Secretary
Washington	X		np	--	--	4 years	Yes	President; administrative officer
West Virginia	X		--	X	--	Pleasure-SBE	Yes	Chief executive officer
Wisconsin	X		np	--	--	4 years	No SBE	No SBE
Wyoming	X		p	--	--	4 years	Yes	Assists board
TOTALS	35	15	19	26	5			

SOURCES: Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers; Recent Constitutional and Statutory Changes in Illinois.

as CSSOs but the fact remains that males are predominant in the post. We also know that the two blacks in the states included in Governance Project are the only two blacks among the 50, hence the group is more predominantly white than the Governance figures suggest. We suspect that in terms of the other demographic characteristics that the 12 CSSOs in the Governance Project are rather representative of the larger group.

The State Department of Education

As noted above, the state department of education is composed largely of professionals in education and related areas. These persons are expected to implement policy decisions in education whether formalized by the legislature or the state board of education. In Table 1-6 we have shown the numbers of full time professionals employed in each of the 50 departments. Three categories are provided: headquarters staff, field office staff. and related staff. The last two categories may require some explanation. Some states have found it desirable to regionalize their staffs, presumably to make them more accessible to local school districts and other clientele of state departments. Staffs in related programs serve in such areas as vocational rehabilitation, state museums, and state libraries.

Headquarters staffs range in size from 46 in Wyoming to 972 in New York with the average being about 200. Regional staffs range in size from zero in many states to over 1200 in Kentucky. We suspect that Kentucky includes many persons in that category which are not included by other states. There is also much variation among the states in terms of staffs in related programs. Much of this is accounted for by the presence or absence of these programs in the state department of education. As noted in Table 1-1, for instance, some state departments include vocational rehabilitation, others do not.

TABLE 1-5

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CSSOS
IN TWELVE STATES, 1973

State	Sex	Race	Age	Salary	K-12 Schooling in Same State	K-12 Schooling Urban or Rural	Experience as Public School Teacher	Experience as Public School Supt.	Prior Experience in State Department
California	M	B	55	$35,000	No	U	Yes	No	Yes
Colorado	M	W	54	35,000	No	U	Yes	Yes	No
Florida	M	W	57	36,000	Yes	R	No	Yes	No
Georgia	M	W	51	28,000	Yes	R	Yes	Yes	Yes
Massachusetts	M	W	61	30,000	Yes	U	Yes	Yes	Yes
Michigan	M	B	41	39,550	No	U	Yes	No	Yes
Minnesota	M	W	46	29,400	Yes	R	Yes	Yes	No
Nebraska	M	W	63	21,900	Yes	U	No	No	Yes
New York	M	W	58	51,275	No	U	No	No	Yes
Tennessee	M	W	64	25,000	No	R	Yes	Yes	No
Texas	M	W	68	31,500	Yes	R	Yes	Yes	No
Wisconsin	M	W	64	27,500	Yes	R	Yes	Yes	Yes
AVERAGE			56.8	31,927					

SOURCE: Educational Governance Project

TABLE 1-6

FULL TIME PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, 1972

State	Head-quarters Staff	Regional Office Staff	Local & Regional staffs in Related Programs
Alabama	124	3	213
Alaska	52	15	42
Arizona	161	16	106
Arkansas	155	307	165
California	375	106	45
Colorado	94	0	6
Connecticut	121	13	112
Delaware	68	0	0
Florida	401	42	0
Georgia	345	42	781
Hawaii	165	92	105
Idaho	49	0	0
Illinois	412	56	Not available
Indiana	110	40	0
Iowa	148	0	289
Kansas	124	0	0
Kentucky	203	1209	294
Louisiana	129	87	2
Maine	101	0	27
Maryland	228	0	296
Massachusetts	303	26	0
Michigan	242	0	455
Minnesota	213	12	210
Mississippi	93	0	0
Missouri	135	183	331
Montana	91	0	0
Nebraska	125	0	96
Nevada	44	3	0
New Hampshire	74	312	63
New Jersey	300	135	64
New Mexico	110	3	142
New York	972	19	430
North Carolina	486	30	0
North Dakota	58	0	0
Ohio	320	30	0
Oklahoma	159	0	0
Oregon	125	0	0
Pennsylvania	410	76	56
Rhode Island	86	208	0
South Carolina	280	0	0

TABLE 1-6 (continued)

FULL TIME PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES OF STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, 1972

State	Head-quarters Staff	Regional Office Staff	Local & Regional staffs in Related Programs
South Dakota	47	10	0
Tennessee	278	135	332
Texas	466	58	0
Utah	86	0	105
Vermont	61	9	0
Virginia	210	43	0
Washington	142	0	0
West Virginia	83	34	392
Wisconsin	204	84	1
Wyoming	46	14	0
TOTAL	10,678	3,940	5,366

SOURCE: Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers.

Ordinarily, personnel in a state department are organized by major divisions such as instruction, administrative services, school finance, and planning and research. Frequently an associate or assistant state superintendent or commissioner will head each of the major divisions. Divisions, in turn, are often divided into bureaus or programs. Thus, there may be such programs as those for elementary education, for special education, for urban education, for experimental programs, and for computer services. Each bureau or program is usually headed by a director. As part of the Governance Project we secured demographic data on state department directors and these data are summarized in Table 1-7. The population of directors shown in Table 1-7 was derived in two ways. If directors in a state department numbered 20 or fewer all such persons were included. If directors numbered more than 20, a 30 per cent random sample was drawn. The sampling procedure was necessary in four states--California, Georgia, New York, and Texas. Following these procedures a total population of 145 was identified and questionnaires

TABLE I-7

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PROGRAM DIRECTORS IN STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION IN TWELVE STATES, 1973

State	Respon-dents	Average Age	Male	White	K-12 Schooling In-State	K-12 Schooling in Rural Community	Under-graduate College In-State	Graduate Work In-State	Doctoral Degree	Experience as Public School Teacher
California	15	49	15	12	3	7	7	10	7	12
Colorado	10	44	9	9	2	2	2	6	2	7
Florida	12	52	12	12	7	7	7	8	4	8
Georgia	9	43	9	9	5	3	5	3	3	5
Massachusetts	11	43	10	11	8	1	6	8	3	4
Michigan	9	48	9	9	4	2	4	5	5	7
Minnesota	8	41	7	6	8	7	6	5	2	5
Nebraska	12	50	11	11	11	8	10	9	2	9
New York	14	49	14	14	9	3	9	8	7	6
Tennessee	12	47	12	12	10	7	11	12	2	6
Texas	8	49	8	7	7	4	6	3	0	1
Wisconsin	11	45	11	11	7	5	11	7	5	6
TOTALS	131	47	127	123	81	56	80	84	42	76
PERCENTAGES	100	--	97	94	62	43	61	64	32	58

SOURCE: Educational Governance Project

were sent to all of these persons. Usable responses were received from 131, or 90 per cent of the directors contacted.

The directors, as shown in Table I-7, have an average age of 47 years, they are 97 per cent male, 94 per cent are white, 62 per cent received their K-12 schooling in the same state as currently employed, 43 per cent of the group went to school in rural communities, 61 per cent did their college undergraduate programs in the same state as currently employed, and for graduate programs the figure was 64 per cent. One-third of them had completed a doctoral program, and about three-fifths of them had at one time served as public school teachers.

In terms of the formal organization of departments, directors are at the third level of the organization with the CSSO and the associate and assistant superintendents exceeding them in terms of formal status. While directors are part of the leadership cadre of a department of education, they may reflect the staffing policy of a department more completely than do the top administrators. If that be the case, it seems clear that in the 12 states, and we suspect in the others as well, that recruitment of staff personnel has focused on males and whites. While the prerequisite of teaching experience in the public schools may not be as common as was once the case in recruiting persons for state departments, a majority of directors still come from that route. For one-third of the directors to have earned a doctorate seems commendable and may suggest that they bring considerable expertise to their positions. At the same time to have two-thirds of the graduate programs done at in-state institutions may suggest some inbreeding.

Relationships to Other Actors

We have dealt above with the formal arrangements for the state governance of education, particularly as reflected in the state education agency.

But the agency does not have an independent life of its own. Its very existence depends on constitutional mandate and statutory provision. In most states the agency can determine policy only in those areas where there is specific delegation. The certification requirements for teachers and administrators is usually one such area. To affect policy in other areas, such as school finance, the agency must influence the governor and the legislature. For the most part, there are few formal mechanisms established for the exercise of such influence. While the relationships between the agency and other actors in the policy system tend to be informal, many of them are rather well established. For instance, most state agencies are called upon by governors and legislators for information about schools, about students, about student achievement, about allocation of money, and a host of other things. In some cases governors seek input from the agency in terms of recommended legislation and budget proposals. In many cases governors and legislators call upon agency representatives, particularly the CSSO, for advice on proposed or pending legislation. In some cases the agency takes the initiative in recommending legislation to the governor and the legislature.

Governors, legislators, and agency officials are official actors in the policy system. As is well known, there are many unofficial actors or interest group representatives in such a system. The most common education interest groups represent the teachers, the school administrators, and the local school boards. Noneducation interest groups, such as those representing business, labor, or agriculture, also take positions on educational policy questions, particularly those involving money and thus the tax structure of the state. We mention interest groups here only to suggest that the relationships of state education agency is with both the official and unofficial actors in the policy system. Our concern is that the formal structure

of the agency be such that the necessary relationships with the other policy actors be facilitated and not constrained.

Recent Reorganizations of State Agencies

The structure of state education agencies is not a static one. Over the entire history of these agencies states have with some frequency given attention to their reorganization. With the increase of state responsibility in education over the past decade or so the dynamic for change in the state structure for the governance of education may have been accelerated. We shall examine these reorganizations in three states as illustrative of what has been going on in many states over the country.

We might have used Rhode Island as an example where a Board of Regents responsible for both lower and higher education has recently been established. We could have looked at Maryland where a gubernatorially appointed commission is midway in its examination of structure for the governance of education. Or, we might have turned to Pennsylvania where the new office, Secretary of Education, is perhaps found in its most complete expression. That development in Pennsylvania is given some attention in Chapter II. Other options were available but we have decided to focus on what has been happening recently in Maine, Kansas, and Illinois.

Reorganization in Maine

Early in 1970 Governor Kenneth M. Curtis issued an Executive Order which announced that the Legislative Research Committee had joined with the Executive Department in preparing proposals for state governmental reform and reorganization to be submitted to the next legislative session. These proposals were completed late in 1970 and were designed to strengthen gubernatorial responsibility, consolidate related state functions, increase the

capability of the legislature to formulate state policy, and reduce duplication of programs.[16] Reorganization bills were passed by the legislature in 1971 and in 1972 and culminated in a cabinet structure of government composed of twelve major departments. Education, as one of the twelve, was placed in the Department of Educational and Cultural Services.

The new Department was to be headed by a Commissioner, to be appointed by the Governor, and was to have jurisdiction over eleven existing agencies. These agencies included the State Board of Education, the Advisory Council of Vocational Education, the Commission for the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1965, the Commission on the Arts and Humanities, the Museum Commission, and the State Library. Members of the State Board of Education were also to be appointed by the Governor. Of particular interest to us is the provision that the State Board of Education is to serve in an advisory capacity to the Commissioner "except in certain specified areas chief of which is the operation of the vocational technical institutes where the Board has full authority."

Even this brief review of reorganization in Maine permits us to note a number of characteristics. The reorganization in education was part of a reorganization in all of state government. The power and responsibility of the Governor has been enhanced. The Governor's appointee, the Commissioner, has also been given extensive power and responsibility including great discretion in the areas of budget and personnel. Without question, the structure has been designed to consolidate many semi-autonomous agencies and to provide far more coordination among governmental agencies. Much of this coordination is apparently to be achieved by means of the Governor's cabinet or Executive Council upon which each of the Commissioners, including the Commission of Educational and Cultural Services, is seated. The place of higher education in the reorganization appears to be somewhat ambiguous. Apparently, the administration of any federal aid for

facilities in higher education is under the direction of the Commissioner. No mention is made of where the Board of Trustees for the University of Maine is to be placed, hence we must assume that it continues on a somewhat autonomous basis. It should be noted, however, that trustees are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Executive Council.

Reorganization in Kansas

As early as 1960 Domian and Keller[17] in their study of education in Kansas noted the weakness of the state-level organization and recommended a board-appointed state superintendent. In 1965 the Legislative Council established and funded an Educational Interim Committee composed of eleven prominent Kansas citizens under the chairmanship of John H. Colburn. This committee submitted a report which focused on amending Article 6 of the Constitution to provide a state board of education, a state board of regents, and a commissioner of education to be appointed by the state board of education.[18]

The 1966 legislature adopted a resolution which placed the constitutional amendment before the voters of Kansas where it was approved. This action cleared the way for the 1968 legislature to enact the necessary statutes to implement the changes.

The principal provisions governing the new state education agency were as follows:

1. Members of the state board of education were to be elected on a nonpartisan ballot for four year terms.
2. The elective office of State Superintendent was abolished and the new state board of education was empowered to appoint a Commissioner of Education as their executive officer.
3. The State Board of Education was given broad powers which included the language, "the general supervision of the public schools."

The new State Board of Education was seated in January, 1969, and by September of that year the Board had selected the new Commissioner of Education.[19]

The reorganization of the state education agency in Kansas had certain distinguishing characteristics. The time required for reorganization seemed to be longer than in some states; beginning with a study of the situation in 1960 and culminating with the new organization in place in 1969. The initiative for the change seems to have come largely from the legislature and not from the governor as was the case in Maine. Again, by way of contrast with Maine, the Kansas reorganization dealt specifically with education and not with the general structure of state government. Even so, two other constitutional amendments, one providing for annual sessions of the legislature and the other a revision of the tax code, were submitted to the voters at the same time as the proposed change in education. Also, the Kansas legislators included under education a concern for both the schools and the colleges and created a new state board for each. The reorganization did clarify and relocate formal power and responsibility by lodging formal power with the board and not with the commissioner. The grant of power to the board actually led to a court case in which the state supreme court declared that:

> the people of this state had no intention of giving up all control of their local schools to the state board of education when they approved the new constitutional article on education. An intention is clearly expressed in the constitution to have the legislators provide the guidelines for general supervision of the schools.[20]

This decision reaffirms the position that plenary power resides in the legislature and that state boards enjoy only power given to them by the constitution or delegated by statute.

Reorganization in Illinois

Not until 1973 did the legislature of Illinois formally establish a state board of education for the general supervision of the elementary and secondary

schools of that state. In the meantime, a number of special purpose boards and agencies, each with limited jurisdiction, came into existence and operated over the years. These bodies included the following: the State Teacher Certification Board, the School Building Commission, the Board of Education for the Blind and Deaf, the Board of Examiners of the Chicago Public Schools, and the School Problems Commission. As of this writing, the new state board members have been named by the Governor and 14 of the 17 have been confirmed by the Senate. While reorganization of the state education agency is still in process in Illinois, most of the major decisions appear to have been made and we shall examine them.

The process of reorganization in Illinois has been long and hard. The special purpose boards and the elected Superintendent of Public Instruction performed most of the functions that more unified state education agencies performed in other states. For many, the School Problems Commission particularly, made up of legisiators from the House and Senate and appointees of the Governor, seemed to be an adequate and a unique way of dealing with many educational problems at the state level. Even so, there were several efforts over the past two or three decades to establish a state board of education and to give that board power to select the state superintendent. Changes of this nature required a constitutional amendment and the voters of the state were not inclined to permit such a modification.

A more comprehensive look at education in Illinois was authorized in the middle 1960s. After much encouragement from many groups in the state, the Governor, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the School Problems Commission became joint sponsors of the Task Force on Education and appointed some 50 persons, including representatives from education, government, business, labor, agriculture, and civic groups, as members of the Task Force. William P.

McLure, Director of the Bureau of Educational Research at the University of Illinois was made chairman of the Task Force and director of the staff employed by the Task Force. The Task Force was divided into work groups, one of which was concerned with reorganization of the educational structure at the state level. The work groups and the Task Force as a body held a number of meetings at which data collected by the staff were considered. In addition, the Task Force sponsored hearings over the state and encouraged citizens to make their input into the process. The report of the Task Force was made in 1966.[21] One part of the report recommended the establishment of a state board of education and that the board be given authority to appoint the state superintendent. This report and the activities which went into its preparation, particularly participation on the part of over 50 Task Force members and the hearings which reached thousands of persons, appear to have been an influence in bringing the problem of state structure to the attention of the people of the state.

It is probably fortuitous that Illinois, after living with its consitution of 1870 for a hundred years, decided that the constitution must be revised and the new version submitted to the people for their approval. The legislature took the steps necessary to set up the constitutional convention, or con-con as it came to be known, which met for six months in 1970. One part of the new constitution, Article X, Section 2, contained the following language:

> Section 2. State Board of Education--Chief State Educational Officer
>
> (a) There is created a State Board of Education to be elected or selected on a regional basis. The number of members, their qualifications, terms of office, and manner of election or selection shall be provided by law. The Board, except as limited by law, may establish goals, determine policies, provide for planning and evaluating educational programs and recommend financing. The Board shall have such other duties and powers as provided by law.
>
> (b) The State Board of Education shall appoint a chief state educational officer.

In December, 1970 in a special election, the new constitution, including the article shown above, was approved by the people of Illinois.[22] A major obstacle to restructuring education at the state level had now been removed. The next move was up to the General Assembly. The bill creating a state board of education and a superintendent of education was approved in June, 1973 and signed by the Governor in August of that year. The Governor did not appoint the board members until April, 1974 and, as noted above, confirmation of some members still waits in the Senate. The Board is to assume full powers in January, 1975.

The new state board of education is to be composed of 17 members to be appointed by the Governor, 16 from the five judicial districts and one at large. Initially, board members are to draw lots for two year, four year, and six year terms, after which all terms shall be for six years. Persons employed by schools or colleges or serving on boards for schools or colleges are not eligible for membership on the board. This provision was contested by the Illinois Education Association and the Illinois Federation of Teachers but was upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois on the grounds that the law was designed "to prevent any potential conflict of interests"...[23] The Court noted that persons previously connected with schools and colleges were not barred from membership on the board.

In setting up the powers of the new board of education the statutes specifically provided that, "the duties of the State Board of Education shall emcompass all duties currently delegated to the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and such other duties as the General Assembly shall designate." (Illinois School Code 122, 1A-4) As to scope, the new board is to be responsible for "educational policies and guidelines for public and private schools, preschool through grade 12 and vocational education." A further provision of the law states that, "The Board shall determine the qualifications of and appoint a

chief education officer to be known as the State Superintendent of Education who shall serve at the pleasure of the Board except that no contract issued for the employment of the State Superintendent...shall be for a term longer than 3 years... The Board shall set the compensation of the chief school officer and establish his duties, powers, and responsibilities.

Most of the characteristics of the Illinois reorganization have already been noted. However, it seems well to emphasize that the process of reorganization was spread over a long period of time, 20 to 30 years and at least eight years since the work of the Task Force. Moreover, a great number of actors were involved. While the impetus in Maine seemed to come chiefly from the Governor and in Kansas largely from legislative leaders, the move to reorganization in Illinois can be ascribed to many persons, professionals in education and interested citizen groups such as the League of Women Voters. These people finally convinced the formal agencies that a Task Force should be established and many of these same persons participated directly in the Constitutional convention.

We should also note that the Illinois reorganization is sensitive to the political realities of the state. Board members are appointed by the Governor and not elected, a decision which obviously gave the current Governor considerable influence in determining the nature of the first board. But the Governor was not to be given complete freedom. Board members must be named from judicial districts, eight of them from the First Judicial District which includes Chicago. Persons named to the Board were subject to Senate approval and that approval is apparently being considered very carefully by the opposition party. As a further indication of party interest in the new board, no more than nine of the seventeen members can be of one political party.

Finally, we should note the specific language of the statutes relative to the duties of the Illinois board. While in Kansas it required a State Supreme Court decision to make clear that the legislature had plenary power and the state board only delegated power in educational matters, in Illinois the law refers specifically to transferring the duties delegated to the office of the State Superintendent "and such other duties as the General Assembly shall delegate."

Some Common Issues in Reorganization

As we have examined the reorganization of the state education agencies in the three states described above, we note that the process has been somewhat unique to each state. By way of initiation, the Governor seemed to provide the chief impetus in Maine, legislative leaders moved the idea forward in Kansas, and a wide variety of actors sponsored the change in Illinois. In terms of time required, Maine seems to have done most of the work in three years, in Kansas the effort covered nine years, and in Illinois we might say decades were required. Apparently, Maine could achieve the reorganization through statutory changes only, while in both Kansas and Illinois a constitutional provision had to be changed by vote of the people before the legislature could effect the necessary statutory changes. In Maine reorganization of the the state education agency was a part of a complete revamping of the structure for all of state government. In Kansas there was some general reorganization of the legislature as well as the changes in the structure for education. In Illinois constitutional authorization for changing the education structure was included in the adoption of a new state constitution which also affected a number of other governmental arrangements. Thus, in all three states reorganization in education was, in some sense, part of a larger process of governmental reorganization.

While the process of reorganizing the structure for education varied somewhat among these three states, many common issues emerged and we shall note some of these. The first issue had to do with the nature of the state board of education. How large should the board be? What should be the length of term for board members? Should educators be prohibited from service on the board? Should there be an attempt to balance the party membership of board members? Should board members be selected at large or from divisions of the state? Should board members be paid or reimbursed for expenses only? Finally, and perhaps the biggest question of all, should board members be elected or appointed by the governor? Each of the three states answered all of these questions in somewhat different ways.

A second issue has to do with the scope of the state board jurisdiction and with the nature of the power given to the board. As to scope, should the board have jurisdiction over both higher and lower education? In Kansas and Illinois it was made clear that jurisdiction pertained chiefly to the elementary and secondary schools, while in Maine there is some ambiguity on this point as we shall note below. Another question of scope has to do with vocational education; is this function to be under the state board of education, or a special purpose board created for that function only? All three of our states moved toward a common agency for vocational and general education. Still a question of scope is whether the state education agency shall have jurisdiction over cultural affairs such as museums, libraries, and other institutions having to do with the arts and humanities, or should jurisdiction be limited to formal schools as such? Maine moved toward the more comprehensive view, while Kansas and Illinois tended to accept the more traditional position.

Fully as important as the scope of the boards' jurisdiction is the nature of that jurisdiction or the formal power delegated to the board. In Maine the

board, with some exceptions, is explicitly cast in an advisory role to the Commissioner of Education, an appointee of the Governor. In both Kansas and Illinois the sovereignty of the state is reposed in the board and the chief state school officer serves as the board's executive but not as its superior. In these two states, the boards obviously have more independence than is the case in Maine. The Kansas board, where members are elected, appears to have even more autonomy than the Illinois board where members are appointed by the governor.

The third issue has to do with the chief state school officer. Is he to be elected by the people or appointed? If appointed, by whom --the governor or the state board of education? Both Kansas and Illinois rejected election as a method of selecting the chief state school officer and made appointment by the state board of education mandatory. Maine moved from board selection to gubernatorial appointment as a way of selecting the CSSO.

Another aspect of this situation was alluded to above as we discussed the Board. Is the CSSO to be superordinate or subordinate to the state board of education? In terms of formal power Maine made the chief superordinate to the board, while Kansas and Illinois made him subordinate to the board. In none of the three states does the chief have the independence that popular election, still a practice in several states, would have provided him.

The power of the governor in education emerges as a fourth issue. While most governors have become more active in the education arena, we speak here of formal structure which places more power with the governor. In Maine the reorganization of state government into a cabinet structure was designed to give the governor more power and correspondingly more responsibility in all areas, including education. A logical extension of that position is appointment of the CSSO by the governor. In Kansas, on the other hand, there was a deliberate

attempt to place power in a state board of education and not in the governor's office. In Illinois the formal arrangements are midway between Maine and Kansas. The Illinois board is to have considerable power but members to the board are to be appointed by the governor with the approval of the Senate. In a sense, we forecast in these three states the models which are explicated in Chapter II.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

[1]Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1974, Chapter 1.

[2]Elwood P. Cubberley and Edward C. Elliott, State and County School Administration. New York: Macmillan, 1915, pp. 12-15.

[3]Elwood P. Cubberly, State School Administration. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927, p. 282.

[4]Ibid., p. 283.

[5]Ward W. Keesecker, State Boards of Education and Chief State School Officers. Bulletin, 1950, No. 12. Federal Security Agency, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 12.

[6]Elwood P. Cubberley, op. cit., p. 271.

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[10]Fred F. Beach and Andrew H. Gibbs, Personnel of State Departments of Education. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.

[11]See Frederick W. Taylor, Shop Management. New York: Harper and Bros., 1911.

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[13]See Roald F. Campbell, et. al. Introduction to Educational Administration. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971, Chapter 4.

[14]Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968.

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[16]State Planning Office, State of Maine, Governmental Reorganization. Augusta, Maine, 1973, p. 7.

[17]Otto E. Domian and Robert J. Keller, Comprehensive Educational Survey of Kansas. Topeka: Kansas Legislative Council, 1960.

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[19]Dewey Wahl, Problems of Transition: Changing a State Department of Education from a Partisan to a Nonpartisan Political Structure, Department of Public Instruction, Madison, Wisconsin, 1973, Chapter 2.

[20]State ex. rel. v. Board of Education. 212 Kansas 482 (1973), p. 499.

[21]William P. McLure and Paul J. Misner, Education for the Future of Illinois. Task Force on Education, State of Illinois, Springfield, 1966.

[22]See Janet Cornelius, Constitution Making in Illinois, 1818-1970. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972, Chapter 7.

[23] Haskins et. al. v. Daniel J. Walker, May 16, 1974. (citation not yet available)

CHAPTER II

ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR STATE SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

Introduction

Our purpose in this chapter is to consider alternative structures for state governance of elementary and secondary education. To do this, the chapter has been divided into three sections. In each of these sections we examine a different class of models for establishing school governance arrangements at the state level: (1) centralized executive models, (2) separate agency models, and (3) models that combine essential features of the preceding two. The examination of each class of models begins with a discussion of competing values. Following this, there are brief descriptions and diagrammatic representations of the alternative models. Finally, research recently completed by the Educational Governance Project (EGP) is drawn upon to provide evidence and insights into the operation of the various arrangements.

Focus and Limitations

Before turning to the centralized executive models, we should comment briefly on the emphases and limitations of our approach. Beginning with terms, we use "model" to refer to a simplified representation of formal governmental arrangements. And by "governance" we have chiefly in mind the function of making policy decisions (i.e., setting goals and fixing priorities) as distinguished from the administering of such decisions.

Most of the models that are presented do conform, at least in broad outline, to "what is," but a few represent only "what might be." All, of course, are someone's version of "what should be." The focus in each model is on the policy-making components of the state education agency (SEA)--the state

board of education (SBE) and the chief state school officer (CSSO)--and on the formal linkages between this agency and the governor's office and the legislature. Other aspects of the state structure are treated as "givens," as are relationships between SEAs and both federal and local agencies involved with school policy making. This delimitation is necessitated by our data. Still, we do wish to call attention to it and to suggest that implementation of any model would require careful examination of these other structural aspects.

We have deliberately chosen to characterize our models in terms of a few selected variables. (A number of structural options relevant to all the models are considered in Chapter III.) To have developed models that were both detailed and valid would have meant an in-depth investigation of state constitutional and statutory provisions. This task would have exceeded our resources and resulted in products of narrowly limited applicability. So we took the advice of participants in EGP-sponsored regional conferences that a more general approach be employed.* We heeded, in particular, the recommendation that "the models be presented as were the early Ford Mustangs... one can select a basic model and then add on a considerable number of features to meet the needs or concerns of a particular state system."[1] Such an approach, it should be said, is consistent with our conviction that there is no one model which is appropriate for all states at all times. States vary enormously in their political, as well as their educational, needs and stages of development; no model, therefore, should be adopted without thorough analysis of state-specific conditions.

To decide upon the variables used to characterize the models, we assumed that the basic structural dimensions involved the separation of the SEA from

*Regional conferences were held in late 1973 in Denver, Chicago, New York, and Atlanta. A total of over 250 educational and political leaders attended.

general government and, related to this, the control of the SEA. The two central questions thus become:

1. How much and what kind of formal separation should there be between the SEA and the general governance structure? For example, should this agency be simply another executive department or should it have considerable autonomy?

2. Who should have governing authority with regard to the SEA? For example, should the formal control structure emphasize the governor, a lay state board, or the CSSO?

In our judgment, the variables most directly relevant to answering these questions are the breadth of education policy-making authority assigned by law to the SEA, and the different formal procedures employed by states to select the state board and the CSSO. For this reason, policy-making authority and selection procedure variables constitute the basis for nearly all of the models; other variables are included only when necessary to elucidate a particular model.

It is essential in assessing a governmental arrangement to think about not only what the structure is, but also what its consequences are and for whom it works. Structures, intentionally or not, are never neutral. Each makes it easier for some values to be realized rather than others, and for some persons to influence policy decisions rather than others. Assessments of such consequences by both advocates and critics are presented by us for each class of models. In addition, we offer some evidence and our judgments, along with those of informed observers, about the consequences of the different governance arrangements found in the states studied by the EGP.

Two final points need to be made about the treatment in this chapter of model consequences. First, these consequences should be thought of as the tendencies or probabilities that can be attributed to a particular model and not as the necessary concomitants of its adoption. Factors like the socioeconomic development and political culture of a state, or the abilities

and intentions of its public officials, condition perhaps decisively the impact of a governance structure. Second, the model consequences we discuss are usually process, rather than output, characteristics. No statements are made by us about the linkage between a given model and changes in such areas as teacher performance or student achievement. Though we personally believe that structure can affect policy outcomes of this sort, the many intervening variables and the limitations of our data preclude any but the most speculative comment.

SECTION I: CENTRALIZED EXECUTIVE MODELS

Competing Values

The doctrine of public administration that Kaufman terms "executive leadership" has long been favored by political scientists and governmental reformers. Since the mid-1960s it has received impetus from several sources, including an infusion of federal funds from officials anxious to have strong governors with whom the federal agencies could deal. Those who espouse this doctrine have sought through its implementation to make state government

> more orderly, rational, and visible. Their strategy was to try to reduce the autonomy of government agencies by consolidating them into great functional departments, each to be headed by an appointee of, and both legally and politically responsible to, the chief executive...Constitutional and statutory sources of agency independence were to be eliminated, or at least curtailed as far as possible. The executive branch was to be turned into an administrative pyramid, with the governor at the top--and in charge.[2]

As can be surmised from this description, executive leadership applied specifically to the organization of school governance at the state level calls for ending the autonomy of the SEA and for expanding gubernatorial authority in its control structure through the power of appointment and

removal of agency officials. The objectives that supporters of a centralized state structure for education hope to achieve are many, but the most important can be set forth in relation to four general goals: (1) accountability and responsiveness, (2) comprehensive planning and decision-making, (d) administrative efficiency, and (4) access to gubernatorial influence.

Accountability in a large democratic polity typically depends on two kinds of relationships. First, there is the relationship of elected officials to constituents; second, there is the relationship of public bureaucracies to elected officials. According to the doctrine of executive leadership, these relationships are only likely to be effective in holding the appropriate persons to account when responsibility to the electorate is through a highly visible, well-known political leader such as the governor; and when this leader is granted sufficient authority to hold accountable the various agencies for which he is responsible. Such a set of accountability linkages, so advocates claim, is essential to the responsiveness of state government; for if its public officials and agency administrators cannot be held accountable, they will not be responsive to public needs and desires. "The point," Pitkin writes, "of holding [the representative] to account after he acts is to make him act in a certain way--look after his constituents, or do what they want."[3]

The "fragmentation" of state governmental structure is seen by centralization supporters not only as undermining accountability and responsiveness, but also as preventing policy makers from taking an overall view of social problems, developing a broad-based plan to confront them, or utilizing efficiently state resources. It is often observed, in this connection, that there seems to be little coordination among state educational programs, notably between those in higher and in K-12 education, and that there is even less

articulation with non-educational but related state services. Indeed, some centralized governance proponents urge their approach primarily because it encourages educational concerns being dealt with "realistically" in the context of total state needs and resources, as opposed to the isolated fashion fostered by a semi-autonomous SEA. A centralized executive, it is asserted, facilitates the claims of education being compared rationally with those of other public services, as well as those of taxpayers, in comprehensive planning and in the formulation of state policy. And a coordinated structure employing principles of hierarchical management will permit economies and promote cost-benefit efficiency in the expenditure of state resources.

A final argument for integrating SEAs into the executive branch of state government has more to do with an analysis of the current political status of education than with values of the sort mentioned above. As one knowledgeable observer predicts:

> Education simply costs too much and is too volatile and visible to stay insulated and out of the political mainstream for much longer in most states...the major question for the future is not whether but how education is to be linked with the general governmental and political system.[4]

A centralized model is attractive to some who believe that education has become a "gut-level issue" in the body politic and who are apprehensive about how well the schools will succeed in competition for dollars with other public services and with the demands of taxpayers. If adequate resources for education increasingly depend on executive political influence and if such influence is most likely to be attained through effective access to the governor's office, then a state structure that binds the SEA and the governor to each other has about it a considerable logic, even if the value sought is simply the economic welfare of education.

While an integrated structure with the governor as the center of state government has many adherents among political scientists and students of

public administration, it has generally been condemned by educators, including those most involved with the policy-making institutions and governmental relationships of SEAs. Many such persons attended the EGP-sponsored regional conferences and their reactions to a centralized model were predictably critical. To begin with, most participants rejected the contention that the governor is the appropriate focus of an education accountability system. Some saw "lay control" as being best realized through an elected state board of education; a few emphasized an elected chief state school officer. Even those who opted for a governor-appointed state board tended to hedge this power with restrictions--lengthy tenure and overlapping terms for board members as well as prohibiting gubernatorial appointment of the CSSO--designed to curtail the influence of the chief executive.

Another weakness of a centralized executive model, according to detractors, is its lack of concern for "education as such" and its inability to guarantee effective state-level advocacy for educational programs. The contention here is that the end of a semi-autonomous status for SEAs, through education becoming "simply another undistinguishable function of state government," will discourage both adequate attention being given to school needs and the kind of leadership necessary to "provide any real forward thrust to educational thinking."[5] Even more disturbing to schoolmen is the specter that some governors will decline to act as "a public voice for education;" that they will be disinterested or hostile to its development.

A third objection voiced frequently by our conference participants stemmed from their fears about the schools becoming too much enmeshed in "politics." As they saw it, a structure that closely links the SEA to the governor is vulnerable to "excessive partisanship," "patronage rather than professionalism," and "political indoctrination." One participant echoed

the sentiments of most when he asked, rhetorically, "Does anyone really trust politicians?" Along with the desire that education be shielded by structural barriers from political manipulation, there was the belief, expressed by many conference participants, that policy making in this area would experience a lack of continuity and, perhaps, "chronic instability" if change in state education leadership accompanied every new governor.

Two other values were often cited by conference critics of centralization: (1) checks and balances, and (2) professional competence. That the institutions of state government, are in Sharkansky's words, "more divided and beset with internal checks than the national government" was evidently considered by most conference participants to be, on the whole, a good thing.[6] Constraints on gubernatorial power, especially with regard to education, were argued to be necessary to prevent "too much authority concentrated in the hands of too few people" and to maintain widespread access to the policy-making machinery. While the primacy of "lay control" was repeatedly stressed by conference participants, many contended that the state governance structure had to be especially responsive to the information and proposals of professionals. "Schools will suffer if educators are not heeded" was a common prediction. Along with being opposed to "political interference" in what they perceived to be the domain of professional competence, conference participants indicated that the enhancement of SEA professionalism should have a much higher priority than the integration of executive branch departments.

Structural Variations and Examples

Basic Model

In what might be called its basic form, the centralized executive model gives the SEA the status of an executive department, just like any other, with its head appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. This CSSO has no constitutional empowerment. Acting as the governor's cabinet officer he is responsible for the implementation of K-12 education policy, authority for which remains with the governor. A state board of education is not an integral feature of this model. If such a body is established, consistency with a centralized executive approach suggests that the SBE be confined to an advisory role or to the exercise of a narrow range of delegated powers compared with those lodged with most existing state boards. A diagram of key authority relationships is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1--Basic Centralized Executive Model

In spite of the enthusiasm with which many political scientists and governmental reformers have embraced a centralized structure, not a single state employs a model exactly like that in Figure 1 to govern its schools. There are, however, a few states where the chief executive does appoint both the state board and the CSSO, and gubernatorial authority clearly is stressed in the structural arrangements for education. One state studied

by the EGP currently uses such a modified version of the centralized executive model (see Figure 2) and that is Tennessee.[7]

Modified Version

In Tennessee the 12 members of the State Board of Education are appointed by the Governor.* Gubernatorial power in this respect is constrained by the lengthy terms of Board officials (nine years), and by the legal stipulation that each of the three geographic-political divisions of the state ("grand divisions") be represented by four members and that each of the two leading political parties have at least three Board appointees. Moreover, while the Tennessee State Board has no constitutional foundation, it does possess statutory authority to undertake policy making and regulatory action for K-12 education (these same officials also constitute the State Board for Vocational Education).[8]



Figure 2--Modified Centralized Executive Model (Tennessee Version)

Statutory authority, coupled with restrictions on gubernatorial appointments, does give the Tennessee State Board of Education more independence than that envisioned in the centralized executive model, but not a great deal more. The Governor, along with making appointments to the Board, serves on that body as an ex officio member. More important, it is the Governor and not the State Board who appoints and holds responsible the Commissioner of

*In addition to these 12 members there are three ex officio representatives on the Tennessee State Board of Education.

Education. And the Governor's man, the Commissioner, is not only a voting member of the State Board, but also by law is its chairman.

While the Commissioner does have the statutory authority to carry out a wide variety of administrative duties, the central role of the Governor is evident even in these statutes. For example, the Commissioner is empowered to appoint most heads and subordinates in the State Department of Education, but these appointments are "subject to the Governor's approval." The Commissioner can, in certain circumstances, request that appropriate authorities "protect, recover, or force collection" of school funds, "provided the Governor shall first give his approval to such action."[9] As such statutes indicate, in Tennessee it is the Governor who ultimately controls the State Department of Education. Department programs must be consistent with the Governor's priorities for he has the power to modify the programs or replace the administrators who direct them. Thus, it seems fair to say that the State Department of Education in Tennessee "works for" the Governor's Office, not "in cooperation with" as is the case in most states.

There operates in Tennessee, then, a modified version of the centralized executive model. Clearly, it is very difficult to say what the consequences are of such a governance structure, for countless other factors also are at work. Nonetheless, our case study data do cause us to make at least three observations. The first, and most obvious, is that a centralized approach offers an effective mechanism--hierarchical authority--by which Governor-CSSO conflict can be resolved and by which the values presumed to exist in a cooperative relationship between these two officials can be maintained. During the time of our study in Tennessee there erupted an angry controversy between Governor Winfield Dunn and Commissioner E. C. Stimbert, a controversy that led directly to Stimbert's resignation. And despite the Commissioner

taking his case to the press and the people, the dispute remained settled, for that official in the end served "at the pleasure of the Governor."[10] In a centralized structure it is difficult, although not impossible as Stimbert's immediate predecessor demonstrated, for a CSSO to acquire an independent base of power to sustain his position; consequently, when he is at odds with the governor's priorities, the CSSO has little choice publicly but to accede to them or resign.

A second impression that we have of educational governance in Tennessee has to do with the politicalness of the State Department of Education. Murphy, in his 1971 study,[11] described the Department as having a "pre-bureaucratic, political and personal orientation," an orientation he attributed, in part, to the extensive use of patronage in staffing. "Governors in the past," he wrote, "apparently exercised their discretion by appointing political friends to SEA jobs."[12] Many of our case study respondents also believed that the State Department had been the object of Democratic party patronage over the years and that when Republicans took control of the Governor's office in 1971 (the first time in 50 years) they were no more prepared than their rivals to discount entirely party affiliation in approving SDE appointments. Traditional expectations were well captured by a former Democratic leader when he remarked: "If my party had the governorship, I would not expect my governor to keep commissioners or weedcutters--that I didn't think were loyal to my administration."[13]

The dispute alluded to earlier between Governor Dunn and Commissioner Stimbert had as a principal cause the issue of patronage. Without getting into the barrage of charges and countercharges that surrounded the Commissioner's leaving office, it would appear that the Governor's view was that political direction had to continue to be a factor in the operation of the

SDE. This was both customary practice and compatible with the state's governance structure. On the other hand, the Commissioner evidently saw the SDE from a professional's standpoint, one that had little room for political considerations. The difference in values--one that reflects a basic conflict between proponents and opponents of a centralized executive--contributed to Stimbert's forced resignation. It should be added, however, that new Commissioner Benjamin Carmichael, according to some close observers, has been encouraged by the Governor to continue upgrading the SDE and has been given a "free hand" in filling department positions.

A final observation that we would make about Tennessee is that the State Board of Education is widely perceived as being a very marginal actor in state school policy making. No doubt there are many reasons for this weakness, not the least of which are deficiencies that afflict virtually all lay boards--lack of time, information, and expertise. Yet it is hard to believe that the centralized structure is not among the causal conditions. As one long-time legislator reasoned, the Tennessee "system is a strong executive-type organization dominated from the top and this relegates the Board to a relatively minor role."[14] There were signs in the early 1970s of the State Board's seeking an enlarged policy-making role, but it remains doubtful whether a governmental arrangement like that in Tennessee permits, much less facilitates, the emergence of a strong state board of education.

Secretary of Education Approach

Another variant of the centralized executive approach has just recently come into being, a model in which all levels of public education are under the office of one gubernatorial appointee-the secretary of education. Four states, at the time of this writing, are using the secretary model--Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Dakota--and it is being given

serious consideration in several others. Because this appears to mark the beginning of a broader trend, given the politicizing forces at work in education, we included Massachusetts among our case study states. We also obtained documents for the other three states, and conducted informal interviews with informants in Pennsylvania and Virginia.[15]

The secretary of education approach as implemented in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Virginia does exhibit some similar characteristics. The secretary of education (in Massachusetts the title is "Secretary of Educational Affairs") always is a member of the governor's cabinet, and is appointed and serves at the pleasure of the chief executive. The secretary's responsibilities in each state embrace the full spectrum of public education--institutions of higher learning, elementary-secondary schools, and diverse other agencies having a direct relationship to public education. Also, there are general functions that appear to be common to gubernatorial expectations for this position. Among these functions are: (1) reporting and recommending needed changes to the governor, (2) providing statewide advocacy for education, (3) serving as a two-way communication channel between the governor and the education agencies, (4) winning legislative support for gubernatorial proposals in education, (5) articulating education with the other state services represented on the governor's cabinet, (6) coordinating the activities of the various education agencies, (7) conducting studies, developing information systems, and disseminating findings, (8) reviewing agency budgets, and (9) promoting efficiency and economy in education agency programs. These functions, it should be added, are undertaken in a governmental structure where education policy is enacted by a state board of education as well as by the legislature and the governor's office. A governor-appointed state board is found in each of the states having a secretary of

education and this body has formal powers comparable to those of most other state boards. (In Pennsylvania a single board has had responsibility for all publicly supported education since 1963.)

Though there are some common elements, there also are many differences in the way that states have implemented the secretary of education model, chiefly in the authority and staffing of the office. The Secretary of Education in Pennsylvania clearly has the strongest office, for, plus being since 1969 the Cabinet officer for education, he exercises all the prerogatives of the CSSO position. In this capacity the Pennsylvania Secretary is empowered to act as the chief executive officer of the State Board of Education (see Figure 3). As a result, like other CSSOs, he has the opportunity to play the central role in the policy deliberations of his board and to exert line authority over the resources of a large state agency. As long as the confidence of the Governor is retained, the Secretary of Education in Pennsylvania commands an unusually powerful position. In this connection, the current Pennsylvania Secretary, John C. Pittenger, has stated that:

> In Pennsylvania's system, if the governor and the secretary of education are on good terms--and the system makes it likely that they will be--the secretary has access to the governor's political power. He can get the governor's support for legislative and budgetary initiatives. He can, when necessary, enlist the governor's assistance in persuading other cabinet officers to do what has to be done. And he can exercise some influence over the governor's policies in fields relating to education, to see to it that they are not inconsistent with his own.[16]



Figure 3--Secretary of Education Model (Pennsylvania Version)

In marked contrast to its Pennsylvania counterpart, the Secretary of Education in Virginia--created in 1972 as one of six Cabinet posts to improve management efficiency in the executive branch--seems to be a rather tenuous position. Though called upon in a guideline to undertake, among other duties, "close scrutiny of the manner and effectiveness" of the operation of all agencies under his jurisdiction,[17] the Virginia Secretary is not involved in their administrative direction. ("No effort shall be made to operate the agencies assigned to the Office of Education," reads another part of this guideline for the position.)[18] Nor does the Secretary have a CSSO's standing with the State Board of Education; this is enjoyed by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Virginia Secretary, compared with this official in Pennsylvania, has less access to the information and expertise in the Department of Education and in the other education agencies. Yet the Secretary has no choice but to rely heavily on these sources, for he has virtually no staff resources of his own. Coordination, not control or even supervision, appears to be the main objective of the cabinet-level education post in Virginia. Its marginal status is further suggested by the reluctance of current Governor Mills Godwin to fill the position and by the absence of concern displayed by other education policy actors toward this delay.[19]

In its structural outline the secretary's office in Massachusetts is not unlike that found in Virginia (see Figure 4), but the Massachusetts Secretary has, we think, a significantly stronger position. First, he has specific statutory authority to perform several major duties including the power to (1) "conduct comprehensive planning with respect to the functions of said office and coordinate the activities and programs of the state agencies therein," (2) "conduct studies of the operations of said agencies," (3) "recommend to the Governor such changes as he shall deem desirable in the laws relating to the organization, structure, efficiency or administrative

functions, services, procedures, and practice of any such agency," and (4) "review and act upon budgetary and other financial matters concerning said agencies."[20] This last power gives the Secretary of Educational Affairs, like other Cabinet secretaries, the authority to examine, add, delete, or modify budget requests coming from the agencies within his jurisdiction, a power of budget control that formerly was lodged in Massachusetts state government in the Office of Administration and Finance.*



Figure 4--Secretary of Education Model (Massachusetts Version)

Second, to bolster his statutory authority, the Massachusetts Secretary has been provided with staff support. This first Secretary of Educational Affairs was appointed in January, 1972 (the act establishing a Governor's Cabinet had actually been passed in 1969), and within a year a staff of some 20 persons was involved in carrying out the tasks of the office.[21] Central among these, in accord with Massachusetts Governor Sargent's broader thrust to institute executive branch reorganization, was the formulation of a plan to restructure the governance of education in the state.[22]

The 1973 plan for educational reorganization in Massachusetts--a plan that proposes sweeping changes in both the state and the regional levels of educational governance--recommends the Secretary's position (to be renamed "Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs") have substantially enlarged authority.[23] Besides a greater capacity to act on agency budgets

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*The Office of Administration and Finance continues to exercise a general budget review function.

and on management and coordination matters, the Secretary would play a major recruitment role for state board and regional council members; would sit as a member of the two proposed state policy boards--one for K-12 and one for higher education; and would approve, as the Governor's representative, board appointments to the two top administrative positions--Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education and Chancellor of Post-Secondary Education. Along with these new responsibilities, the Secretary would be empowered to call for the investigation of educational problems at all levels, and to design systems to improve citizen participation in education decision making at all levels.

Using an analogy made by Governor Sargent, the Education Secretary in the proposed reorganization plan occupies a "middle position" between a "kind of mild-mannered manager...a Clark Kent" and one who "sets staffing ratios for all local school districts...a Superman-figure." The plan, in the Governor's words, "tries to keep the policy-control in lay boards" and "the supervision and coordination of all the levels of education in the hands of a Cabinet Secretary." In the same vein, the Governor declared that, unlike all his other reorganized Cabinet posts, the Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs would have "supervision" but not "control" over education; that "control is a key function left to the governing boards, and to an extent by regional councils."[24]

Despite substantial variation in the way that the secretary of education model has been put into practice, there can be no doubt that the values of centralization are being sought in this approach. In each of the three states there is concern expressed for comprehensive planning and decision making, for coordination among educational programs and between these programs and other public services, for efficiency and economies in program administration, and for effective working relationships between the education

agencies and the governor's office. Yet it must be pointed out that all of these states have also continued the governance structure which preceded the creation of a cabinet secretary for education, including a policy-making state board of education.

Retention of the old decentralized state structure probably reflects, perhaps to a large degree, the estimate made by centralized executive supporters of political realities. Even so, the "blend" between new and old, between secretary of education and lay governing boards, can be justified in terms of benefits to be achieved through such a hybrid structure. According to this rationale, best articulated in Massachusetts, the values of a centralized structure are augmented, or made more acceptable, by those associated with lay boards--namely, continuity, representativeness, checks and balances, and insulation against "politics." A strong cabinet secretary, it is argued, does not preclude, rather it contributes to, a strong state board and a strong chief state school officer. The secretary's role is primarily to assist the others in forging an effective and efficient state partnership in areas like planning, priority-setting, evaluation, and securing resources. Governmental power, these advocates maintain, is not a zero-sum game in which one party gains only if the others lose. And they predict that a mutual strengthening of the different state-level governance components will be one outcome of a secretary of education model.[25]

Opponents of the secretary approach forecast a much different set of consequences. They contend that executive branch centralization is the obvious dynamic in this approach; that its long-run effect will be to diminish the authority of lay boards and their professional administrators. "Centralized authority and governance," writes Ginger, "even in education, will, once permitted, make gradual and inevitable encroachments on the representative decision-making process."[26] Critics also point to the high

risks they see of "political tampering," enervating conflict between secretary and SBE and/or CSSO, and destruction of an "independent" power base for education.

That the secretary of education model embodies a centralizing thrust is clear. In fact, the primary initiative in each state for its adoption came from the governor's office. Because of this emphasis we felt that the model is most appropriately classified under the centralized executive heading. Nevertheless, it is far from certain that instituting a cabinet secretary leads "inevitably" to the demise of the state board and the unchecked concentration of power. It may well be, as Cook suggests, that a secretary of education can help overcome the inherent weaknesses of state boards by assuming functions that they do poorly--for instance, monitoring the effectiveness of agency management--while freeing these bodies to engage actively in a policy-making role.[27] In any event, since the model is relatively new, established in just a few states, and not completely implemented in all of these, persuasive evidence on consequences is not yet available. There is no research-based reason to accept Ginger's negative judgment that "the secretary systems now existing have not brought to those states the changes and improvements it was hoped they would bring."[28] Yet neither can a secretary's recital of his accomplishments be taken as a balanced assessment of effects.[29]

Summary

To sum up, the rationale for centralized executive models being applied to state educational governance is that they promote such general decision-making values as accountability, responsiveness, comprehensiveness, and efficiency, along with the more pragmatic contention that the best point of access for education, if it is to secure necessary resources, lies in a close

relationship with the governor's office. Opponents of this approach deny that it is consonant with "lay control", makes adequate provision for the state-level advocacy of educational programs, or maintains stability in education policy making. Furthermore, so critics argue, a centralized structure opens the door to "politics," restricts accessibility to the decision-making process, and retards the professionalism of the SEA.

Not a single state employs a fully centralized model to govern its schools. In several, though, the chief executive does appoint the CSSO as well as state board members. One such state, Tennessee, was studied by the EGP. Our impressions of state educational governance in Tennessee, based on this case study, are (1) the Governor has greater control over the State Education Agency than in other states we investigated; (2) there exists a mechanism--hierarchical authority--to prevent prolonged Governor-CSSO conflict; (3) the SEA, historically, has been a politicized agency, being a source of party patronage; and (4) the State Board of Education occupies an unusually weak position.

Another variant of the centralized executive approach has recently emerged, it being a model in which all public education is under one gubernatorial appointee--the secretary of education. Where this office has been instituted there are some commonalities. The secretary is a member of the governor's cabinet, the responsibilities of the position embrace higher as well as K-12 education, and there are gubernatorial expectations for such functions as reviewing, coordinating, and advocating with respect to state educational programs. Still, there are significant differences in the way that states have established the secretary model, especially in the authority and staffing of the office. In Pennsylvania the Secretary of Education is also the CSSO and top state department personnel are directly responsible to him. By way of contrast, the Virginia Secretary does not hold the

position of CSSO, nor has he been provided with staff support. Coordination, not control, is the function emphasized in Virginia. The Secretary of Educational Affairs in Massachusetts, though not exercising the prerogatives of a CSSO, does occupy a more powerful position than his Virginia counterpart. And the Massachusetts Secretary will be even stronger if a proposed plan for the reorganization of educational governance in that state is adopted. As for consequences of the secretary approach, since the model has recently been established and exists in only four states, evidence on this score is not available, or at least was not at the time of our study.

SECTION II: SEPARATE AGENCY MODELS

Competing Values

The values that advocates maintain are realized in a semi-autonomous status for SEAs have already been set forth as part of the discussion of centralized models. These values, to repeat, include "lay control," educational program emphasis, insulation from partisan politics, policy-making continuity, and professional competence. But even among those who wish to separate education from the general government structure there are fundamental disagreements, particularly over who should control the SEA. The control question, as typically framed, is twofold: (1) Who should be represented on state boards of education? (2) What authority should state boards have over the chief state school officer?

That there is a prevailing ideology of state board representation is obvious from both the normative literature and the comments of educational leaders like those who attended the EGP regional conferences. There are two core beliefs in the ideology. The first is that the duty of a representative is to attend to the general interest; not to those of a parochial

nature.[30] This Burkean philosophy translates into repeated injunctions that state boards renounce "special interest" representation and act instead as spokesmen for the "people of the state."[31] Related to this is a second belief--namely, that state board officials should be "better" in some ways than those whom they represent, rather than simply mirroring their constituents. It is a constant theme in the prescriptive writings, and was repeatedly voiced by conference participants, that any state board selection procedure is acceptable provided it brings to office the "right sort of people"--that is, "people with outstanding ability," "distinguished citizens," "highly competent and dedicated members," "the public spirited," etc. Such people, so the argument goes, are the best qualified, with the aid of professionals, to understand the "real" educational needs of the state and to deal constructively with them.

While the aforementioned beliefs appear to have been widely shared by our conference participants, there were some who took issue with the "philosopher king" ideal they saw embodied in these beliefs. And a few participants vocally condemned them as "anti-democratic." These critics interpreted the underrepresentation of various social groups on state boards of education as proof of the elitism of these boards and of the fraudulence of their claims to be "representative bodies." As Sroufe has put it:

> How can the boards hope to represent Mexican-Americans, immigrants, blacks, parochial schools, students, and urban systems when its membership includes few of these persons, and more important, when the experiences of these persons are foreign to the backgrounds of the state board men?[32]

Rejecting the position that a select group of board officials--their competence or virtue notwithstanding--can adequately "represent" the different educational interests in a state, some conference participants urged that these bodies incorporate a diversity of perspectives and a broad base of representation. Particular concern was expressed by these participants

about the need that disadvantaged and "non-mainstream" persons had for effective spokesmen. Implicit in these contentions was the doctrine of representation which holds that a social group will have its interests protected and advanced in the governance process only to the extent that it has "actual representation" (as opposed to "virtual representation") among the decision makers.

Those who wanted the state board to be a forum for the articulation and accommodation of the education needs of diverse groups also were disturbed by what they perceived as its lack of accessibility to the electorate. Lengthy terms for board members, along with their narrowly constricted and near-invisible recruitment process, were looked upon by some conference participants as major obstacles to state boards' being responsive to constituents. Other participants, however, declared that there were important values to be realized in having these bodies insulated from the electorate. Continuity in policy making was cited in this regard as was the likelihood that a protected board would be willing to take innovative and forward-looking positions on unpopular issues. Indeed, just as two theories of representation were pitted against each other by conference participants, their remarks also pointed to a possible conflict between a board's being responsive to its public and a board's taking innovative positions in sensitive areas.

The question of who gives direction to SEAs is partially answered by the approach to the representativeness of state boards that is adopted. But it depends, too, on the relationship between these bodies and chief state school officers. For a majority of our conference participants, "lay control" had as its key structural manifestation a state board of education. And, in their view, a board could exercise this responsibility to the people only if it had the power to appoint and remove the CSSO. Any other relationship, it was argued, would result in divided authority and the prospect

of state board-CSSO conflict, a disunity that would undermine the effectiveness of the education agency with other policy actors. Many conference participants also expressed dismay over the "politics" they attributed to an independently elected CSSO. In the words of one, "election causes the CSSO to be a fulltime politician who would have to worry about the political ramifications of each of his actions."

Giving the CSSO an independent base of power to act as spokesman for education was championed by a few of our conference participants. Strengthening the CSSO's position, they contended, would fix accountability on a "highly visible figure;" not on unknown board officials. Additionally, it would guarantee, as much as any structure could, that education would have an effective advocate "to ensure that the state's responsibility for education is fulfilled." Denying the assertion that a popularly elected CSSO, because of his political sensitivities, is incapable of offering leadership, proponents claimed that an elected official has the political "clout" required to advance state educational programs. These participants evidently shared the assessment made by California's Wilson Riles, an elected CSSO, at a seminar on educational governance. In Riles' estimation:

> Being elected gives a man a constituency. When I talk to the governor, it's as a peer. I got 54% of the vote, just as he did--and he understands that. We don't have to belabor that point. And when I'm talking to legislators or appearing before legislative committees, they understand where I'm coming from.[33]

Unlike the critics, the advocates of an independent CSSO saw responsiveness to the electorate as providing both a "mandate for change" and an essential influence resource ("a constituency"), and not as a leadership inhibiting relationship.

Structural Variations and Examples

Whatever the state structure, a SEA does not have the autonomy of a local school district and its governing board. All SEAs must depend on general governance institutions for laws and budgets. Still, the press to set education apart structurally from other public services has been strongly felt at the state level. Based on their 12-state survey in the late 1960s, Usdan and his colleagues concluded that even though there were "various basic structures" of state governance,

> they seem to represent different ways of seeking some common objectives, especially the isolation of education from the broader arena of politics, the relief of legislatures and executives from educational responsibility, and the reinforcement and preservation of the influence of the profession in control of the educational system.[34]

In this section, we will discuss three separate agency models: (1) independent regents, (2) elected state board, and (3) elected CSSO. Though distinct in some important ways, these models are alike in that the key education officials, whether state board members or the CSSO, have a base of authority independent of the governor.

Independent Regents Model

Education as a "fourth branch of government" is most closely approximated structurally at the state level by the New York Board of Regents. Both the regents and their chief administrative officer, the Commissioner of Education, are constitutionally established and, by statute, have extensive policy-making, administrative, and judicial authority with respect to all educational services, pre-school through senior citizen. The State Education Department (SED), which these officials direct, exists as an "independent body separate and apart" from the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Comptroller, the only other constitutional officers. Although party

connection does play a part in the "election" of Regents by the legislature--as one Regent described it, "you become a Regent like a judge, because you know a politician"--the overriding criterion in recruitment has been that the nominated persons have distinguished themselves in public service; that they be "citizens with honor."[35] Once elected, Regents are protected from political and public pressures by 15-year terms of office, as well as by an apolitical tradition and informal board norms that encourage independence of action.* The New York structure is outlined in Figure 5.



Figure 5--Independent Regents Model (New York Version)

It is evident from our case study that the Board of Regents, together with the Commissioner of Education, continues to play a central role in state education policy making in New York, though recently there have been "cracks in their pedestal."[36] Further, both friend and foe alike attribute the independence and power of these officials, at least in part, to structural characteristics--the recruitment process for Regents, their long terms of office, and the vast legal authority lodged with the Board and the Commissioner.

Speaking very generally, it appears to us that the most basic effect

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*In 1974 the legislature reduced the term of office for newly elected Regents to seven years.

of the New York structure, operating in conjunction with a long established tradition of being "above politics," has been the insulation of much state education policy making from external pressure. The Regents, Commissioner, and Education Department have typically enjoyed great freedom in their exercise of authority, including the freedom to take controversial and sometimes unpopular positions on sensitive social-educational issues like school funding and racial desegregation. Such positions in the broader context of a rapid politicalization of education have fueled the demand coming from many state legislators, as well as from the Governor's Office, that the autonomy of the Regents and Education Department be restricted. Even among the Regents, themselves, there were discussions of possible structural modifications such as shortening their terms of office.[37]

Defenders of the Regents maintain that an independent agency, one that is shielded from both partisan politics and transitory shifts in public opinion, is in the best position to identify and articulate state education needs, and to act on these needs in a courageous and forward-looking manner. As evidence for this contention, these supporters often point to the innovative record of education policy making in New York. While many factors, in our opinion, have contributed to this pacesetter status, we do believe that the state's governance arrangements have fostered independent, comprehensive, and effective advocacy of education, along with a disposition to address policy questions in educational and moral, more than in political, terms. With respect to the latter, we would speculate that some insulation of the sort afforded the Board of Regents is a necessary condition for public officials to confront volatile issues and to undertake unpopular courses of action. This has been most apparent in New York in the determined efforts made by the Commissioner of Education, strongly backed by the Regents, to advance the cause of school desegregation, efforts that at times have aroused intense public controversy.

What to advocates is hailed as the structural capacity for detached, deliberative, and innovative policy making is perceived by critics as promoting an irresponsible "elitism," one that lacks responsiveness to the education public, adaptability to changing needs, and cooperative relationships with other governmental institutions. Certainly, it is true that Regents and the Commissioner are not directly accountable to constituents as are elected officials, and lengthy board terms do work against these officials holding the education agency accountable for its policy actions. Moreover, the Regents historically have relied upon a closed style of policy making--deliberations take place in private sessions; the decisions reached are then announced in public meetings--that has narrowly constricted visibility and tended to limit access to infrequent formal presentations and the use of established SED channels.[38]

Despite various attempts by the Education Department and even by the Regents to improve their relationships with elected state officeholders, these relationships are strained, a condition that reflects more basic causes than just communication difficulties, though the latter do exist. Judging from our case study data, state legislators have been antagonized not only by the pro-desegregation stance of the Regents and the Commissioner, but also by the recommendations for increased state funding put forward by the education officials.[39] From the perspective of tax-conscious lawmakers, the programs proposed by the Regents are excessively costly and create "unrealistic" expectations on the part of the education public. And many legislators clearly resent being prodded on the school finance issue by the well-publicized "pronouncements" of the Board of Regents. These same concerns, it would seem, have also motivated the Governor to seek to extend his influence over educational expenditures. While Governor Rockefeller was forced

to abandon his proposal of an Inspector General for elementary-secondary education, a State Office of Education Performance Review was established in 1973.[40]

As long as elected leaders in New York saw little political currency to be had in extensive involvement with education and had little technical capability to deal with the school issues that confronted them, the autonomy and power of the Regents and Education Department were viewed with widespread approval, not condemnation. But in the last decade this situation had undergone dramatic, and perhaps fundamental, change. Education has become politicized and politicians have acquired staff support. Though it can be argued that the advantages of an insulated policy-making body are now even more necessary to offset the interest-calculating, short-run perspectives endemic to a highly political milieu, the press for a more responsive and accountable structure of state educational governance in New York appears to be inexorable. Some reduction of Regental independence has already occurred as legislators have begun to scrutinize closely the political ideology of candidates, especially on the busing issue, and have restricted by law (1974) the term of new appointees to seven years. And further erosion as a consequence of further politicalization of education might be anticipated.[41]

Elected State Board Model

An independent regents model for the governance of elementary-secondary education exists only in New York and even in that state, as we have described, the model is under increasing attack. A much more prevalent version of the separate agency approach is one in which considerable policy-making authority is delegated to the SEA, this authority being exercised by a popularly elected state board and a chief state school officer whom the board selects. This model, which parallels the structural arrangement of most local school districts, is depicted in Figure 6.



Figure 6--Elected State Board Model

Since World War II there has been a marked trend toward using popular election as the device for board member recruitment and having these officials empowered to appoint and to remove the CSSO. Surprisingly enough, in 1948 not one state was following this pattern; by 1972 it had become established in 11 states.[42] Giving support to this movement was the policy position adopted by the Council of Chief State School Officers in 1944, a position maintained until 1965 when that organization reverted to being neutral on the subject. The Council's position during this 20 year period called for a state educational governance structure where:

> there should be a nonpartisan lay state board of education of seven to twelve able citizens, broadly representative of the general public and unselfishly interested in public education, elected by the people...for long overlapping terms without pay. It is desirable that the boards select the chief state school officer...and determine his compensation and his term of office.[43]

It might be mentioned that while nonpartisan election was proposed by the Council, in most states where this model is currently employed members of the state board are chosen on a partisan ballot.

In assessing the elected state board model, it is instructive to examine comparative data; rather than relying, as we have done to this point, on observations and judgments confined to single state examples. Specifically, we will consider evidence relevant to the question of whether formal selection

method--popular election versus gubernatorial appointment--makes a difference for board member behavior. Most commentators who have provided normative answers to this question have assumed that selection method does make such a difference. Yet the research that has been done, including our own, casts doubt upon this assumption.

Data were collected in the EGP research so as to permit comparisons between elected state boards and appointed state boards on an array of variables. In the EGP sample there are four boards whose members are popularly elected, five boards where these officials are appointed by the governor, and one where the legislature selects the members of the state board. Information on the number of board officials from each state who responded to our interview guide and who returned a completed questionnaire are contained in Table 2-1. Since the data provided by these and other classes of respondents are quantifiable, considerable use is made in this section of tabular presentation, with the accompanying narrative being to highlight or to summarize.

We were most concerned with elected-appointed state board comparisons with respect to (1) representativeness, (2) decision style, and (3) policy-making influence. Before presenting evidence relative to these concerns, however, we would like to comment briefly on the proposition, often suggested by the literature, that an elected state board is more insulated from political interference than one whose members are appointed by the governor. Neither our investigation of specific decision processes, nor our questioning of board members bore out this contention. We asked, for example, our board member interviewees whether "political figures ever became involved in school issues in which the state board had the authority to make the decision." Some 58 per cent of the elected board respondents answered "yes," but so did a nearly identical percentage (57) of appointed officials. When asked to

TABLE 2-1

STATE BOARD RESPONDENTS IN THE EGP RESEARCH
(PERCENTAGES IN PARENTHESIS)

State Board	Members On Board (Not Ex Officio)	SBE Members Interviewed	SBE Members Completing Questionnaire
Popularly Elected			
Colorado	5	4 (80)	4 (80)
Michigan	8	6 (75)	8 (100)*
Nebraska	8	5 (63)	5 (63)
Texas	24	11 (46)	10 (42)
Total	45	26 (58)	27 (60)
Appointed by Governor			
California	10	10 (100)	5 (50)
Georgia	10	7 (70)	5 (50)
Massachusetts	11	7 (64)	6 (55)
Minnesota	9	6 (67)	6 (67)
Tennessee	12	8 (67)	8 (67)
Total	52	38 (73)	30 (58)
Elected by Legislature			
New York	15	9 (60)	7 (47)
Total	15	9 (60)	7 (47
TOTAL	112	73 (65)	64 (57)

*Two members who were not interviewed completed the questionnaire.

identify the political figures who became so involved, 58 per cent of the elected members as against 52 per cent of the appointed members named state legislators. In our data, then, board member perceptions of political interference do not vary by selection method. Instead, they seem to depend primarily on whether a state has a legislature that has become, for whatever reason, active in school policy making. In states like Colorado, Michigan, Massachusetts, and California the common complaint of board officials is that "the legislature is always threatening to pass bills, or actually passing them, in areas of legitimate board action." For these board members the legislature as the "big school board" is an ever-present reality.

Representativeness of State Boards. In her analysis of the concept of representation, Pitkin defines a representative body as one "acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them."[44] As to the first--"acting in the interests of the represented"--the social background of state board officials, regardless of their selection method, is so homogeneous and upper-middle class that their capacity to represent different segments of the public is suspect. Data on selected demographic characteristics of state board members are reported in Table 2-2. They show the typical board official among our respondents to be white (94 per cent), male (75 per cent), and middle-aged (84 per cent are 41 years or older). His occupation is to be found in business or the professions (70 per cent). He is affluent (51 per cent earn in excess of $30,000 annually) and is almost certain to be well educated (92 per cent are college graduates; 58 per cent hold an advanced degree). Elected board members do not differ appreciably on any of these attributes from appointed board members.

That state boards of education should be composed of lay persons is a point accepted without dispute by those who have written about these bodies. But, as is shown in Table 2-2, such a prescription is at odds with the background of nearly half (47 per cent) of the board members in our sample, for these officials indicated that classroom teaching, school administration, or some other professional educator experience has been part of their career pattern. This is somewhat more true of the elected board members (55 per cent) than the appointed board members (43 per cent).

Whatever else may be said about the representative nature of state boards of education, it is obvious that the demographic characteristics of board members do not come close to mirroring those of their publics. Of course, there is no reason to believe that they would. Studies have long since invalidated the "log cabin" theory of political recruitment.[45]

TABLE 2-2

SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE BOARD RESPONDENTS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Characteristics	SBE Respondents		
	Total (N=64)*	Appointed (N=30)	Elected (N=27)
Personal			
Male	75	70	78
White	94	90	96
Age 41 or above	84	80	85
Income			
15,000 or more	91	92	86
30,000 or more	51	46	45
Education			
College degree	92	87	96
Graduate degree	58	57	59
Occupation			
Business Owners, Officials, and Managers	28	29	23
Professionals	42	39	45
Professional Education Experience			
Yes	47	43	55
No	53	57	45

*Includes seven respondents from the New York Board of Regents.

Still, state board members do seem to be more disproportionately drawn from the upper strata of American society than, say, local school board members.[46] While the mere categorical representation of a group by a public official should not be taken to mean that he or she will automatically be an advocate for its values, it is hard to believe that such affiliations do not count at all, and that state boards are not more accessible and responsive to those of similar socioeconomic backgrounds than they are to those who are the product of vastly different life experiences.[47]

Turning now to the second part of Pitkin's definition--"acting...in a manner responsive to them [i.e., constituents]"--the research that has been done on local school boards indicates that these bodies do not represent the public so much as they legitimate administrator policies. Local board members, Zeigler concludes from a survey of a national sample of school districts, "lacking a meaningful relationship to an external political constituency, fall easy prey to the superintendent's claim for 'expertise.'"[48] This deference, Zeigler argues, is augmented by the fact that local board officials are recruited largely from the civic and business world where efficiency and conflict avoidance are central values.

To examine state board members' conception of their representational role we included three Likert-type items in the questionnaire that our interviewees were asked to complete. The three items, the replies indicating an external constituency orientation, and the percentage of board members who gave these replies--all are shown in Table 2-3.

TABLE 2-3

STATE BOARD RESPONDENTS REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATION (IN PERCENTAGES)

Statement	Constituency Oriented Response	SBE Respondents		
		Total (N=64)*	Appointed (N=30)	Elected (N=27)
"A public official's first duty is to work for what most of his constituents want even though this may not agree with his personal views."	Agree	49	53	48
"The central task of a policy maker is to seek compromises among conflicting interests."	Agree	51	33	67
"Whenever possible, a policy maker should follow the advice of acknowledged experts in the making of important decisions."	Disagree	21	17	19

*Includes seven respondents from the New York Board of Regents.

As can be seen from Table 2-3, approximately half (49 per cent) of all board respondents agreed that a public official should work for what his constituents want, even if this were in conflict with the official's own views. The other board members (51 per cent) signified by their disagreement that a representative's personal convictions ought to have priority. On whether the advice of experts should be followed in making policy, the board member respondents were much more in accord. Only one out of five (21 per cent) reacted negatively to this statement. A brokerage role for state boards--that is, seeking compromises among competing interests--again divided our respondents; 51 per cent seeing this as their "central task" and 49 per cent rejecting this role prescription. The brokerage role statement did produce a substantial difference in responses between elected board members and appointed board members. Some two-thirds (67 per cent) of the first group agreed with the statement compared with only one-third (33 per cent) of the appointed officials. This differential response is what one would predict from democratic theory in which elections are assumed to be related to responsiveness. But the other two statements, it should be noted, did not elicit such a division.

Does the decision-making behavior of state boards of education reflect interest representation--that is, a responsiveness to the particularistic demands of geographic sections, social classes, or organized groups? Or, does this behavior reflect conformity, at least outwardly, to the norm that a state's officials should attempt to represent equally all the people in that jurisdiction? The Board members we interviewed were questioned as to whether any person on their board acted as the spokesman for geographic sections or racial-ethnic groups. Board member responses to this question (see Table 2-4) indicate that more than half (53 per cent) believed that none of their colleagues engaged in this form of representational behavior; 26 per

cent said that "just a few" did so; and only 21 per cent saw this kind of representation being acted upon by "most" (8 per cent) or "nearly all" (13 per cent) of the members of their boards. Although elected boards and appointed boards were almost identical in the large percentage of their officials who denied the occurrence of interest representation, and in the small percentage who replied that it involved nearly all board members, there were minor differences in the other categories of response--the elected boards being slightly higher than the appointed boards.

TABLE 2-4

STATE BOARD RESPONDENTS PERCEPTIONS OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION (IN PERCENTAGES)

Question and Response Categories	SBE Respondents Total (N=72)*	Appointed (N=38)	Elected (N=26)
"Are there members of the state board who feel that they should be the spokesman on the board for particular geographic sections or racial-ethnic groups in the state?"			
"No" (None)	53	55	54
"Just a few"	26	29	19
"Most"	8	3	12
"Nearly all"	13	13	15

*Includes eight respondents from the New York Board of Regents.

It is usually assumed that the method of selection for a public office is linked to the representational behavior of its incumbent. Specifically, it is assumed that elections "are crucial processes for insuring that political leaders will be somewhat responsive to the preferences of some ordinary

citizens."[49] Yet our data on attitudes toward external constituencies, as well as on perceptions of actual interest representation, suggest that elected board members are not much more responsive than appointed board members, though the former did embrace in substantially larger numbers (by 34 percentage points) the importance of the brokerage role in policy making.

One important reason, we think, why elected state boards do not differ greatly from appointed state boards in their representational role is to be found in the process by which the elected officials are actually recruited to office. There is considerable evidence to the effect that school board elections, whether state or local, are bland, non-competitive affairs in which policy issues are avoided, public involvement is slight, and candidate exertions are minimal.[50] If this is the case, then the election mechanism is not likely to have the results predicted by democratic theory, including that of board members being attentive to external constituencies.

Decision Style of State Boards. Previous research on state boards has revealed only a few behavioral differences between elected members and those who are appointed. Nonetheless, there has been one rather constant finding--elected state boards experience more conflict in decision making than appointed state boards. Sroufe, in the late 1960s, conducted a national survey of state board members (67 per cent responded to his mailed questionnaire), focusing on the self-role expectations of these officials. In his data,

> the only statistically significant differences between elected and appointed board members were that elected board men assumed greater responsibility for establishing maximum standards as opposed to minimum standards, and elected members anticipate less unanimity regarding board decisions than appointed members.[51]

Cox, in his 1971 study, compared an elected state board (New Mexico) with an appointed one (Arizona) with respect to the number of decisions by function enacted by these bodies over a six-year period. He found that the percentage distributions of decisions over the functional categories were about the same for both boards, causing him to conclude that "method of selection...apparently had little or no effect on the functioning of these boards." Yet Cox also discovered, consistent with one of Sroufe's findings, that the decision process of the two boards differed markedly. "It appears," he observed, "that a board selected by the people is much more prone to have split decisions..." [52]

To pursue further the relationship between election as the means of state board selection and the presence of conflict in state board decision making we asked our board member interviewees about the extent of agreement on their state board when it confronted a major policy issue. Our question, the five response categories, and the distribution of board member replies are presented in Table 2-5.

The data reported in Table 2-5 disclose some contrasts between elected board members and appointed board members. Some 69 per cent of the appointed members, as against 42 per cent of those who were elected, checked one of the first two alternatives, indicating that their boards employed a basically consensual approach to policy issues. Conversely, exactly one-half of the elected officials said issue-by-issue disagreements prevailed on their boards. Such a pluralistic pattern of issue cleavages was pointed to by less than one-quarter (21 per cent) of the appointed board members. The two groups were quite similar in their perceptions of factional alignments, only 8 per cent of the elected respondents compared with 11 per cent of the appointed respondents saw such a division on their board.

TABLE 2-5

STATE BOARD RESPONDENTS ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT OF AGREEMENT ON THEIR STATE BOARD (IN PERCENTAGES)

Question and Response Categories	SBE Respondents Total (N=73)*	Appointed (N=38)	Elected (N=26)
"Which one of these statements comes closest to describing the agreement on your board when it decides a major policy issue?"			
Board is harmonious, little serious disagreement.	7	8	7
Board is usually in agreement, but there are board members who sometimes dissent.	53	61	35
Board often is divided but the lines of division depend on the issue that is confronting the Board.	33	21	50
Board tends to divide into rival factions of nearly equal strength.	5	11	0
Board tends to divide into rival factions, but there's a clear working majority on the Board.	3	0	8

*Includes nine respondents from the New York Board of Regents.

If appointed state boards experience more agreement and less conflict than do elected state boards in dealing with policy issues, as our data along with Sroufe's and Cox's suggest, then what implication does this have for the decision-making process? A consensual style does enable a state board to move expeditiously through crowded agendas, and to do so in a manner that reduces controversy and vulnerability to external groups. Additionally, it permits a state board to act in a unified manner in advancing a policy proposal in the legislature. The state boards in our sample that were most divided--Nebraska, California, and Michigan--were perceived by numerous lawmakers in these states as being hampered by their disunity in effectively advocating a board position on education legislation. But while clearly an

influence resource in some ways, a stress on internal cohesion and on a consensual decision-making style does have its shortcomings in others. Because it seeks to avoid or suppress conflict, such a style does not encourage the generation or searching examination of policy options, at least at the state board level. Consequently, it is not a style, by its nature, that is conducive to board member control, as opposed to bureaucratic control, of policy making.[53]

Policy-Making Influence of State Boards. Along with being concerned with the representativeness and, related to this, the decision style of state boards of education, we also wanted to compare elected and appointed boards as to their influence in policy making. To do this, a twofold procedure was employed to measure influence. First, we asked both policy-making participants and observers about how much "influence" (or "importance" or "leadership") they attributed to their state board. Second, EGP staff investigated in each state a common set of issue areas--finance, desegregation, certification, and program improvement--in order to ascertain the policy-making role of various actors. Since the issue area approach proved to have serious limitations, the comparative assessments presented here are based primarily on the attribution of influence, or non-influence, to state boards by legislative leaders, governors' staffs, and educational interest group spokesmen, as well as by the board officials themselves.

On the basis of our analysis, we concluded that state boards of education, notwithstanding their impressive legal prerogatives and their rhetoric of leadership, are only marginal policy actors in the legislative arena and are largely overshadowed by the CSSO in the state education arena.[54] There are, however, a number of noteworthy differences (defined as 10 or more percentage points) between elected and appointed boards in our sample in the way that they were perceived. In the first place, elected state boards were

viewed as being considerably more influential in their legislative arenas than appointed state boards were in theirs. These differences in percentage terms (the figure for elected boards being indicated first) are:

37 per cent to 19 per cent--Legislative leaders' rating of the state board as being "important" in education legislation

55 per cent to 33 per cent--Legislative leaders' reports of personal contacts with individual state board members

36 per cent to 16 per cent--Educational interest group spokesmen' perceptions of the state board "taking the lead" in education legislation

58 per cent to 37 per cent--Board members' perceptions of their having a "direct working relationship" with the governor's office

46 per cent to 36 per cent--Governors' staff assessment of the state board as being an "important" source of "ideas and advice" to the governor's office

As for relationships with the chief state school officers, elected boards were generally seen as giving a little more direction to the CSSO than appointed boards. Here the percentage differences (elected boards shown first) are:

35 per cent to 23 per cent--Board members' perceptions of the CSSO as "often" taking their "ideas or suggestions"

43 per cent to 11 per cent--Educational interest group spokesmen' perceptions of the state board giving "real direction" to the CSSO

At first glance, data such as these seem to mean that, while state boards typically are minor policy actors, the use of election as the selection device does increase board influence, notably in legislative policy making. Nor is it difficult to advance reasons why this should be the case--for example, the greater political orientation of elected board members and the claim they can make to having a constituency. Furthermore, our two

groups of boards, elected and appointed, are fairly well "matched" on various state background characteristics, such as demographic patterns, socioeconomic development, and political culture. And the similarity among the two groups considered as aggregates does strengthen the presumption that a large difference between elected board behavior and appointed board behavior is due to selection method, not to background characteristics of their states. Even so, there is one confounding variable that we think is of overriding significance, this being whether or not the state board appoints the CSSO.

All four of the elected boards in our sample have the authority to appoint and to remove the chief state school officer. On the other hand, three of the five appointed boards lack this authority. In the case of California and Georgia the CSSO is popularly elected, whereas in Tennessee this official is selected by the governor. And when boards that appoint their CSSO were compared with boards that do not, we found that the former were evaluated much more positively on virtually all of our measures. The perceptions on which the percentage point difference is 10 or greater are these (the percentage for the boards that can appoint their chiefs are shown first):

49 per cent to 29 per cent--Legislative leaders' reports of personal contacts with individual board members

44 per cent to 0 per cent--Educational interest group spokesmen' perceptions of the state board "taking the lead" on educational legislation

62 per cent to 32 per cent--Board members' perceptions of their having a "direct working relationship" with the governor's office

45 per cent to 29 per cent--Governors' staff rating of the state board as being an "important" source of ideas and advice" to the governor's office

35 per cent to 18 per cent--Board members' rating of the CSSO as "often" taking their "ideas or suggestions"

40 per cent to 0 per cent--Educational interest group spokesmen' perceptions of the state board giving "real direction" to the CSSO

Is a state board's legal authority over the CSSO a more critical factor in its policy-making influence than how its members are selected? Two findings from our data support such an inference. First, the index of statistical association that we computed is somewhat larger for the relationship between the state board-CSSO control variable and the state board policy-making influence variable than it is for the relationship between the latter and the state board selection method variable. Dichotomizing each of the three variables, we found the index of association phi (Ø) to be .66 for the first relationship and to be .55 for the second.[55] Second, and more important, the perceived influence of the appointed state boards that selected their CSSO is considerably higher than the appointed state boards where the CSSO is selected by other means. The influence scores we assigned to the former are nearly equal to those of the elected state boards, though there is still a gap in the legislative arena (see Table 2-6).

TABLE 2-6

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN THREE SELECTION MODELS AND POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE SCORES*

Selection Model for SBE and CSSO	Number of States in Sample Using Selection Model	Legislative Influence Score	State Agency Influence Score	Overall Influence Score
SBE is popularly elected; it appoints CSSO	4	2.75	3.00	5.75
SBE is appointed; it appoints CSSO	2	2.30	3.00	5.30
SBE is appointed; it does not appoint CSSO	3	2.13	2.06	4.20

*Details on these scores are found in our report, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis.

To review our findings on elected versus appointed boards, there are positive relationships in the data between the election method of selection and the constituency orientation, interest representation, and conflictual decision making of state boards. None of these relationships, though, is very strong. And the finding that our four elected boards were widely viewed as being more influential in their policy systems than were our five appointed boards is probably accounted for by the fact that three of the latter lack control over their CSSO. In all, the differences we found that might reasonably be ascribed to selection method seem small, almost inconsequential, when compared to the similarity between most elected and most appointed state boards, especially their similarity in social class composition and perceived lack of influence as education policy makers.

Elected Chief Model

There is one additional model that should be included under the separate agency classification, even though it normally has a governor-appointed state board as a component, and that is the state governance structure where the key education official is a constitutionally established and popularly elected chief state school officer. In the early 1900s this was the most popular approach (in 1920, 34 states had elected CSSOs); by 1972 the number of states employing the model had dropped to 19. In its most prevalent form, a policy-making state board of education, appointed by the governor, is a part of this arrangement (see Figure 7).



Figure 7--Elected Chief Model

But in five states board members are chosen by other means, and in one state there is no state board. In all cases, however, constitutional status and popular election give the CSSO an independent base of policy-making influence.

In the EGP sample there are four states with an elected chief: California, Florida, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Of these, California and Georgia have governor-appointed state boards. In Florida this body is comprised of ex officio members and there is no state board in Wisconsin. The EGP sample contains eight states where the CSSO is an appointed official: Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Tennessee, and Texas. In seven of these the state board selects the chief, but in Tennessee the CSSO is appointed by and is responsible to the Governor. The chief state school officer in each of the 12 states was interviewed by the EGP staff. And we also questioned our other respondents about the CSSO, respondents such as legislative leaders, governors' staffs, state board members, and educational interest group representatives. Unlike the situation with state boards, there is no previous empirical research that can be drawn upon to discuss CSSOs. Still, among the analyses we conducted are a number of comparisons involving elected versus appointed chiefs. Two of these comparisons, one focused on selected characteristics of CSSOs and the second having to do with their policy-making influence, seem especially germane to a consideration of the elected chief model.

Personal and Professional Characteristics.[56] All 12 incumbents at the time of our study were male, 10 were white and two were black (the only blacks, it should be noted, among all 50 CSSOs). The average age was 46.8 years. There was no appreciable difference on sex, ethnicity, and age between the elected and the appointed officials considered as groups. This is not the case when it comes to the in-state and rural identification of CSSOs. In Table 2-7 are reported the percentages of elected and appointed

chiefs who gave in-state responses, in our judgment, to questions of birth, K-12 schooling, undergraduate education, graduate training, permanent address, and position prior to becoming CSSO; and who gave what we identified as rural responses to questions of K-12 schooling and prior job experience. We also developed overall measures for each type of identification and the percentages for these are shown in Table 2-7. It is readily apparent from comparing the elected CSSO column with the column for appointed CSSOs that the elected officials consistently indicated somewhat greater in-state identification (an overall percentage of 71 as against 54) and rural identification (an overall percentage of 75 as against 44) than did their appointed counterparts.

TABLE 2-7

IN-STATE AND RURAL IDENTIFICATION OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Characteristics	All CSSOs (N=12)	Elected CSSOs (N=4)	Appointed CSSOs (N=8)
In-State:			
Birth	50	50	50
K-12 Schooling	58	75	50
Undergraduate Education	67	75	63
Graduate Training	50	75	38
Only Permanent Address	42	50	38
Position Prior to CSSO	92	100	88
Overall Score	60	71	54
Rural:			
K-12 Schooling	50	75	38
Prior Job Experience	58	75	50
Overall Score	54	75	44

We also gathered data on the recruitment routes to the position of chief state school officer. Some of these data are presented in Table 2-8. It

will be noted that nine of our 12 CSSOs had been public school teachers, seven had been public school principals, four had served as subordinate administrators in a district central office, eight had been public school superintendents, and four had held positions in higher education. The most marked difference between elected and appointed CSSOs is that none of the former had served either as a central office administrator (other than superintendent) or in higher education compared with 50 per cent of the appointed officials for each of these positions. In analyzing our data further we found that only two of the 12 CSSOs had ever held non-public school positions as part of their career pattern, and both of these had also been teachers and principals at one time. Recent attempts to recruit administrative talent from such fields as business, law, and public administration to top education posts were not reflected in the recruitment routes of our CSSOs, regardless of selection method.

TABLE 2-8

EDUCATIONAL POSITIONS HELD BY CSSO PRIOR TO SDE APPOINTMENT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Positions	All CSSOs (N=12)	Elected CSSOs (N=4)	Appointed CSSOs (N=8)
Public School Teacher	75	75	75
Public School Principal	58	50	63
Central Office Administrator	30	0	50
Public School Superintendent	67	75	63
Higher Education	33	0	50
Other	17	25	13

Besides obtaining some general information on the careers of the 12 CSSOs, attention was directed to the position each held immediately prior

to his selection as chief. In seven states we found that the CSSO had been recruited from within the state department of education. In three of the other five cases the state board had sought persons outside the department who were or had been district superintendents. In the last two cases governors had become involved, one reportedly encouraging a CSSO candidate to run for that office and the other who had the power of appointment selecting a district superintendent. Thus, it would appear that there are two main career routes to becoming a CSSO: state department service and/or a public school superintendency. Moreover, in only one state was the new CSSO recruited from beyond state boundaries. Seven at the time of their selection were true insiders being recruited from the state department staff and the remaining four were insiders in the sense of holding a superintendency in the same state. While appointment as the CSSO selection method may permit, as its sponsors claim, a nationwide search for the best qualified person, this search in our eight states using this method nearly always culminated in the choice of someone close to home.

Policy-Making Influence. We have already discussed one important finding having to do with CSSO selection method and policy-making influence--the fact that in our data state boards which do not appoint the chief are all near the bottom with respect to influence. This does not mean that weak boards automatically make for strong CSSOs or vice versa. As we will later describe, the statistical association between state board influence and CSSO influence, to the extent one appears to exist, is not an inverse one. But before making such a test it was necessary for us to devise a way to measure the policy-making influence of chief state school officers. The approach we used was similar to that employed with state boards. We obtained the perceptions that various actors in the state education policy system had

about the influence of the CSSO in that system, supplementing these perceptions with insights derived from the case studies. Just as with state boards, our measures constructed from such data are judgmental and relative.

Of central interest to us is whether elected CSSOs are more influential in education policy making, especially with elected officials like legislators and governors, than appointed CSSOs. The argument for an elected chief, it will be recalled, banks heavily on the contention that a CSSO selected in this manner, because he speaks for a voting constituency, is likely to be a more effective advocate for education than one who is appointed. To assess the influence of chiefs in their respective legislative arenas, we sought the judgments of the other major actors in these arenas: legislative leaders, governors and their staffs, and educational interest group spokesmen. More precisely, we asked legislative leaders and education interest spokesmen to rate how successful their CSSO had been in getting his program approved by the legislature. And we asked governors, as well as their personal staffs, about how important the CSSO was to them as a source of ideas and advice, and about the power of the CSSO to block legislation to which he was opposed. Some of the replies that were used to develop legislature influence scores for the CSSOs are reported in Table 2-9 along with average rankings on the legislative influence index that we created.

Inspection of the data in Table 2-9 discloses that elected CSSOs are seen by other actors in their legislative arenas as more influential than the comparable perceptions for appointed CSSOs. And the elected officials have a higher average ranking, 4.25 as against 7.00, than those who are appointed. Even so, these differences are not of great magnitude. And of the four CSSOs that we ranked at the top in overall legislative influence, two had been appointed by the state board and two had been popularly elected.

We should point out, though, that all chiefs holding the bottom four positions in this rank order had been selected through appointment.

Along with the CSSOs' influence on educational legislation, we also examined their influence on policies enacted by the state education agency. Unlike the legislative arena, where some chiefs are perceived to be powerful actors but others are seen as having only marginal impact, the CSSO is nearly always the dominant figure in the agency arena. State board members

TABLE 2-9

POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE OF CSSOs IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

Influence Measure	All CSSOs (N=11)[a]	Elected CSSOs (N=4)	Appointed CSSOs (N=7)[a]
Percentage of Legislative Leaders (N=158)[b] Rating CSSO as Successful "Most of the Time" or "Almost Always" in Having His Program Approved by the Legislature	62	72	49
Percentage of Educational Interest Group Spokesmen (N=78)[c] Rating CSSO as Successful "Most of the Time" or "Almost Always" in Having His Program Approved by the Legislature	51	69	46.5
Percentage of Governors/Personal Staffs (N=29) Rating CSSO as "Most" or "Among Most" Important Sources of Ideas and Advice	83	83	83
Percentage of Governors/Personal Staffs (N=29) Rating CSSO as Having Power to Block Legislation	72	100	65
Overall Rank (Based on Above Perceptions and Case Study Data)[d]	--	4.25	7.0

[a]Does not include Tennessee.

[b]Includes staff in several states.

[c]Includes more than the four major state-level groups and more than one spokesman per group.

[d]A full discussion of the ranking procedure is contained in Chapter III of our report, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis.

expect the chief to provide leadership on policy questions. He sets the agenda and controls the information going to the board. Board members seldom oppose the CSSO on major issues. Indeed, the typical board gives the chief little direction, and the direction that is given appears to be gentle and infrequent. In short, while formal empowerment to determine education policy is usually lodged with the state board and the CSSO is dependent on that body for most of his authority, the actual flow of dependence and influence in policy making tends to be just the reverse of that posited in law.

Based on the perceptions of state board members, CSSOs, and educational interest group leaders--plus the case study data--we constructed an index of the policy-making influence of chiefs in the state education agency arena and ranked our CSSOs with respect to this index (see Table 2-10). Upon doing so, we observed that there is only a slight correlation between CSSO selection method and agency influence, a correlation that favors the appointment method. The average ranking for appointed chiefs, as is shown in Table 2-10, is 5.5; that for the elected officials is 7.3. We did discover, and this came as a surprise, that there is no statistical relationship ($r_s = -.02$) between a chief's legislative influence and his influence in the education agency. That is, a CSSO may have great influence in both arenas, in neither arena, some influence in both, or great influence in one but little in the other. There simply is no association in our data between the two types of influence.

As was pointed out previously, we did find that the three state boards in our sample which lacked the authority to appoint the CSSO were particularly weak in their perceived policy-making influence. But, as we also mentioned, this does not mean that such boards are always associated with powerful chiefs. On the contrary, we discovered that there is a positive correlation of moderate size ($r_s = .45$) between the rank order of states

based on board policy-making influence and their rank order based on CSSO influence in the agency arena. This suggests to us that both boards and chiefs can have influence and does not sustain the notion that a strong board will have a weak chief, or that a strong chief will have a weak board. To be sure, we do seem to have examples of both in our data. Still, these do not reflect the typical relationship. Influence in the state education arena does not exist in some fixed amount so that one actor gains only at the expense of another; many actors may exert influence in this arena. Finally, it can be argued from some of our other data that one way to help the board, as well as the chief, become an important policy actor is to let the board select its own chief. We found, for example, that appointive chiefs more frequently solicit ideas from board members.[57] Also, our data indicate that appointed CSSOs more frequently have freedom to select and discharge

TABLE 2-10

POLICY-MAKING INFLUENCE OF CSSOs
IN THE STATE EDUCATION AGENCY ARENA

Influence Measure	All CSSOs (N=11)	Elected CSSOs[a] (N=3)	Appointed CSSOs (N=8)
Percentage of SBE Members Rating CSSO as Being "Very Important" to Their Understanding of Policy Issues	74	61	79
Composite Rating by SBE Members and CSSO of Extent of Opposition on SBE to CSSO's Proposals. (Some = 2; Little = 1; None = 0)	.64	1.00	.50
Percentage of Educational Interest Group Leaders Rating SBE as Giving "Real Direction" to CSSO	25	00	35
Overall Influence Ranking (Based on Above Perceptions and Case Study Data)[b]	--	7.3	5.5

[a]Does not include Wisconsin because it has no state board.

[b]A full discussion of the ranking procedure is contained in Chapter III of our report, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis.

their own staff members, a condition essential to an effective organization. Evidently, state boards are most disposed to give a chief the freedom to form his own team when he is a person of their selection.[58]

Summary

To summarize our discussion in this section, we began by observing that even among those who contend that the state education agency should be separated structurally from other executive departments there is fundamental disagreement about who shall control education at the state level. The prevailing view of state board representation conceives of this body as a deliberative one where the "most competent people" act for all segments of the public. Consistent with this view is the belief that the state board should be insulated not only from general governance institutions but also from the electorate. The counter philosophy is that the diverse education interests of a state should be "actually" represented on state boards; that these bodies should be forums where competing interests can be articulated and accommodated in the policy-making process. The responsiveness of board officials to constituent sentiments, as opposed to acting upon their own or a professional's definition of educational need, is an integral part of this philosophy. A second aspect of agency control involves the authority relationship between the state board and the CSSO. Most conference participants, like most commentators in the literature, wanted the board to be able to appoint and remove the chief, this power to be exercised in the name of "lay control," organizational efficiency, education leadership, and removing the SEA from "politics." Yet, an independent CSSO had its proponents who argued that an elected status creates both appropriate agency responsiveness to the public and the political "clout" necessary to wield effective influence in decision-making arenas like the legislature and governor's office.

The first separate agency model that we described is the independent regents approach as exemplified by the state structure in New York. This structure, headed by a powerful Board of Regents and Commissioner of Education, has over the years shielded education policy making from constituency and politician pressure; and has encouraged an independent, comprehensive, and apolitical response to educational issues. But the rapid politicalization of education in New York has been accompanied by mounting criticism of the Regents by elected state officials, who contend with some reason that this structure discourages accountability and responsiveness, limits accessibility to the public, and retards adaptability to changing conditions. Regental "pronouncements" on school finance and vigorous enforcement actions by the Commissioner, backed by Regents, on school desegregation have particularly aroused the ire of elected officials. As of this writing, the legislature has begun to give close scrutiny to the political viewpoints of nominees to the Board of Regents and in 1974 it reduced the term of newly elected members from 15 to 7 years. In the meantime, the Governor established an Office of Education Performance Review to provide an outside assessment of state expenditures and performance in education. Clearly, there is increased conflict in the state structure for educational governance in New York and the independent regents model is under attack.

The next separate agency model that we presented has as its essential feature an elected state board. Comparative data were drawn upon to provide evidence on the consequences of this model. In particular, elected versus appointed board comparisons were made with respect to (1) representativeness, (2) decision style, and (3) policy-making influence. Reviewing representativeness first, we found that appointment and election procedures had almost identical results in producing board members with the

following personal characteristics: white, middle-aged or older, business or professional occupation, high income, and extensive formal education. Stated differently, neither selection method led to state boards that in their demographic composition represented more than a narrow spectrum of the public. Both did, though, recruit to these "lay" bodies a substantial number of persons with professional educator experience: 43 per cent of our elected board respondents and 57 per cent of those who were appointed had such experience. In examining biographical data, as well as state board behavior, we saw nothing that would indicate that able persons are more likely to be obtained through one selection method rather than another. Both seemed to have the same effect in terms of the kind of people that are recruited to state board offices.

We did find some differences between elected and appointed boards in their perceived responsiveness to external constituents. Elected officials were slightly more likely to be perceived as speaking for particular geographic or racial-ethnic groups; but most board member interviewees, regardless of mode of selection, denied that this sort of interest representation characterized their board. Twice as many elected board member respondents as appointed board member respondents (67 per cent to 33 per cent) agreed with the role description that their central task was to seek accommodations among conflicting interests. Such findings hardly constitute strong evidence. Yet, taken together, they point to that conclusion that elected state boards are somewhat more responsive to external constituencies than their appointed counterparts. This difference, however, is far smaller than would be predicted from democratic theory, a condition that might be explained in part by the lack of competitiveness in state board election campaigns.

Turning to state board decision style, we discovered, consistent with the earlier findings of Sroufe and Cox, that our elected boards were rated by their members as having a lower level of agreement than the comparable rating provided by appointed board members, though a consensual style tended to prevail on both kinds of boards. Elected boards, if our respondents are to be believed, experience somewhat more issue-by-issue conflict in the enactment of policy than do appointed boards. Such conflict, while reducing a board's capacity to move efficiently through agenda items and increasing its vulnerability to external groups, probably does give board members a greater voice in the policy-making process than does a consensual style of decision making.

As for the policy-making influence of our ten state boards, we found that these bodies, whether elected or appointed, were typically minor participants in this process. They were perceived as having little influence in the legislative arena and were overshadowed by the CSSO in agency policy making. The elected boards, as a group, were given considerably higher influence ratings by other actors in their policy systems than were the appointed boards. But the reason for this seemed to be that three of our five appointed state boards lacked the authority to appoint their chief, rather than the difference in influence between elected and appointed boards being attributable directly to selection method.

The final model that we considered under the separate agency classification features a constitutionally established and popularly elected chief state school officer. Again, we compared the election and appointment methods of selection, this time in relation to (1) selected biographical data about the CSSOs and (2) the chiefs' policy-making influence in both the legislative and the state education agency arenas. Reviewing the biographical differences that we found between elected and appointed CSSOs,

it should first be reiterated that there were some--notably, elected chiefs indicated more in-state and rural identification than did the appointed chiefs. The differences, nevertheless, do not loom large in comparison with the similarities in personal and professional characteristics between the two groups of officials in our sample. The "typical" CSSO was male (100 per cent), white (83 per cent), and middle-aged (average age was 46.8 years). He had served in either public school teaching and/or administration (92 per cent) and the position he held immediately prior to becoming CSSO was in the state department of education (58 per cent) or a local district superintendency (33 per cent). At the time of his selection he was serving within the state (92 per cent). Indeed, in-state identification in general was quite strong (67 per cent took their undergraduate education in the state in which they later served as CSSO), as was rural identification (58 per cent had prior job experience in rural schools).

As for policy-making influence, we would conclude from our different findings about elected versus appointed chiefs that election does give a CSSO a means of influence in the legislative arena--a voting constituency--that cannot be claimed by an appointed official. Even so, this resource does not in itself ensure influence. Much depends on the energy and the skill of the chief. Not all of the elected CSSOs in our sample had substantial influence in legislative policy making for the public schools, but some clearly did. On the other hand, so did a few appointed chiefs, indicating that other resources are important besides an elected status, resources such as formal authority, information-generating capacity, and the ability to inspire trust. As for CSSO influence in the state education agency arena, influence that we found to be quite distinct from the commanded in the legislative arena, this bore little relationship to selection method. We did find that where CSSOs are selected in a fashion--gubernatorial

appointment or popular election--independent of state board control, these bodies are in an even weaker influence position than usual, and their usual position in policy making is hardly a strong one. Yet we did not find that a powerful chief necessitates an impotent board. Quite the contrary, our data show a positive relationship between the influence of the board and the chief, suggesting that both can play an important role in the education policy system.

SECTION III: COMBINATION MODEL

Competing Values

The values attributed to a centralized executive, as well as those attributed to a SEA having a semi-autonomous status, have already been discussed. A combination model that many of our regional conference participants saw as a "good compromise" among these competing values is one in which the governor's appointive power extends to state board members, but not to the CSSO, an official who is responsible only to the board.

In the estimation of proponents, such a combination of features ensures the governor a "voice" in the school policies determined by agency officials. And the appointment link between the state board and the governor's office is seen as contributing to the attainment of the objectives associated with centralization, objectives such as comprehensive planning, coordination among state services, and access to gubernatorial resources. Yet progress is to be made toward these objectives, so the argument goes, without the SEA coming "under the governor's thumb." Rather, the intent of the combination model is to bring education "close to the governor but not too close." Supporters believe that enough separation can be built into this governance structure--for example, by constitutional

as well as statutory provision for the state board, by lengthy and overlapping terms for board members, and by their formal control over the CSSO--to establish the SEA as its own policy-making arena, one that is shielded to a substantial degree from both politician and constituency pressure. Such insulation, according to several conference participants, enables the state board and its chief to make "courageous decisions" on controversial policy questions. Moreover, the presence of an authoritative state board in this structure was pointed to by these participants as promoting continuity of membership, "lay" involvement in decision making, and a check on excessive executive influence.

In addition to a best-of-both-worlds kind of argument, supporters of the combination model maintained that "governors tend to pick higher quality people for appointments, and these officials are usually better qualified than those we elect." The belief that appointment, as opposed to election, yields able and disinterested board members was frequently voiced during our regional conferences. Correspondingly, a good deal of political negativism was directed toward the electoral process as the device for state board selection. "Good" candidates, it was said, could not be induced to run for this office. Instead, "special pleaders" and "defenders of particular interests" would be recruited to the state board, with the "welfare of the state as a whole" being neglected.

Predictably, sharp criticism of this combination approach was expressed by both separate agency and centralized executive advocates. From the viewpoint of the former, the inclusion of gubernatorial appointive power in the model rendered it vulnerable to political intrusions. Governors, it was asserted, often choose "party hacks" and political campaigners for top posts; a few participants went so far as to claim that gubernatorial appointment

must result "ultimately" in gubernatorial control of state board policy. Participants who espoused the election of board members attacked the combination model primarily because it did not have, in their judgment, any "direct line of accountability" between the SEA and the public, and hence was unlikely to be responsive to public concerns. "When accountability becomes diffuse, it is lost," remarked one critic.

On the other side, several central executive advocates contended that merely to grant governors appointive power in state board selection is far from sufficient to cope with the problems of policy-making fragmentation, duplication of effort, and absence of political accountability. One prominent state education official detailed his objections to a "sanitized" combination model as follows:

> *duplication of planning effort (also of computers, printing units, etc.);
>
> *possible resistance to efforts of the governor's office to link education with health and other human resources agencies;
>
> *legislative program may be competitive with governor's;
>
> *may resist reform efforts of either governor or legislature.[59]

From the perspective of this official, the secretary of education model, not the combination model, represents the true compromise between the competing values of a centralized executive and lay governing boards.

Structural Example

In earlier sections of this chapter we described two models where a combination of structural features is readily apparent. But one of these--the secretary of education model--is best seen, we believe, as having a centralized executive emphasis, while the second--the elected chief model--meets our criterion for a separate agency classification. As a consequence of these decisions, we will discuss only the one combination model in this section.

Governor-Appointed Authoritative Board Model

As of 1972, the most commonly used (in 14 states) structure for state education governance reflected a combination approach that might be called the "governor-appointed authoritative board model."[60] As we have said, this model features a governor-appointed state board of education, this board having substantial policy-making authority and the power to select and remove the CSSO (see Figure 8). It should be added that the governor's authority to make board appointments is usually subject to restrictions. Board members are to serve fixed terms, terms that in practice are always staggered and often exceed in length that of the governor. Confirmation of state board appointments by one or both houses of the legislature is a frequent requirement. Furthermore, stipulations in law usually call for geographic representation and sometimes for party balance. The thrust of this model, judging from these features, is to link structurally the governor's office with the SEA, but to design this linkage in a way that curtails gubernatorial influence in agency policy making.



Figure 8--Governor-Appointed Authoritative Board Model

Appointed versus elected board comparisons have been described and summarized in previous sections of this chapter and they will not be restated here. Two additional points do warrant some discussion, one having to do with the responsiveness and innovative capacity of appointed state boards and the second dealing with the influence that such boards have with governors.

Responsiveness and Innovation. Insight into the relationship between responsiveness and selection method is afforded by our case study data on the desegregation issue. These data suggest that board officials whose security of tenure is protected by very lengthy terms and/or appointed status are the most willing to take unpopular actions. The willingness on the part of insulated boards to undertake what supporters proclaim to be "morally right" positions is evident in the way that school desegregation has been confronted in the states we studied. The four state boards--in New York, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and California (until the last reversed its policy in 1970)--that have taken definite steps over the years to establish or at least to support a state-level desegregation policy are all insulated to some degree from the electorate. The protected status of the New York Board of Regents has been described and the other three, it will be recalled, are all appointed bodies. It should not be concluded, of course, that insulation ensures innovative policy in controversial areas. A structure that shields board members from external pressures does, if the desegregation issue is a valid test, increase the probability of such policy. But in the end it is the board and the chief who must decide what is to be done.

Zeigler, after examining efforts to reform local school governance arrangements, observed that: "for those who want responsiveness, it is taken on faith that a school which is responsive to client demands will, at the same time, be experimental and innovative, thus leading to an improvement in the quality of education." Reacting to the optimism of these reformers, Zeigler raised the specter that "the demand of innovation and responsiveness may be in conflict."[61] Our data suggest that a dilemma of this sort confronts those who seek to design state structures for educational governance.

Influence with Governor. In our findings on state board influence there is one big surprise, this being that governor-appointed boards were seen as having less influence with the chief executive than boards which were popularly elected. Because this finding runs contrary to one of the principal arguments for an appointed board, it merits some explication.

Perceptions of board members toward state board-governor relationships are contained in Table 2-11. We would note that only about half (51 per cent) of all board member respondents looked upon their state board as having any sort of "direct working relationship with the governor or his staff." In defiance of the conventional wisdom on this subject, 58 per cent of the elected board officials compared with 37 per cent of those who were gubernatorial appointees indicated such a relationship. Just 38 per cent of the board members we interviewed believed that they had "any means" to influence the governor. Again, the percentage is higher for the elected officials than for the appointed officials (41 per cent as against 24 per cent).

Governor's office respondents also were questioned about their assessment of the state board. They were asked to compare board members with other persons as a "source of ideas and advice for the governor's office." Their replies, also reported in Table 2-11, show that less than 40 per cent considered the state board to be an "important source." And, as with the other perceptions, elected boards were evaluated somewhat more positively than appointed boards, 46 per cent of the interviewees rating the former as important versus 36 per cent for the boards that the governors had appointed. Clearly, gubernatorial appointment of state board members does not guarantee a close association between this body and the governor's office; in our ten states the contrary was more nearly the case.

TABLE 2-11

STATE BOARD-GOVERNOR RELATIONSHIPS AS PERCEIVED BY BOARD MEMBER RESPONDENTS AND PERSONS IN THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE (IN PERCENTAGES)

Relationship Measure	All State Boards[a] (N=10)	Elected State Boards (N=4)	Appointed State Boards (N=5)
Board members (N=72) responding that their board had a "direct working relationship" with the governor or his staff	51	58	37
Board members (N=71) who believed they had a "means of influence" with the governor.	38	41	24
Governors/personal staff (N=29)[b] rating the state board as an "important source of ideas and advice" for the governor's office	38	46	36

[a] Includes New York in addition to the four elected and five appointed boards.

[b] Includes the governor in six states.

That appointment by the governor and access to that official were not related for the ten state boards we examined is an unexpected finding. Persons on the governor's staff were widely perceived by both board members and outside observers as the key influentials in recommending nominees to the chief executive for board appointment. Once the appointment had been made, however, the governor traditionally took a "hands off" policy toward the state board, a reflection undoubtedly of its lack of saliency to him or the risks involved in challenging the societal norm that the schools should be kept free from "politics." Yet just as the governor did not seek to exert much influence in state board affairs, so the members of this body had little access to his office. As one board member put it, "we go our separate ways after the appointment." And for these officials this

meant that their influence with the governor, as with other political leaders, tended to mirror their isolation.

Just as we were concluding our field work (early 1973) there were signs of expanded governor-state board contacts in several states, one with an elected board (Colorado) and two with appointed boards (Georgia and Minnesota). The politicalization of educational issues had encouraged, or pushed, the governor into taking a more active hand in school policy making and apparently had enhanced the saliency of the state board for the chief executives. Further, in each of these states a majority on the state board shared the governor's party affiliation, facilitating a mutuality of viewpoint and interest that promoted enlarged contacts. We think that such trends and conditions, if they become general, will increase the amount of interaction between governors and state boards. This will be especially true in states where political party congruence is found, a condition that does seem most likely to be met by gubernatorial appointment of the board.

Summary

To sum up, a number of our conference participants saw a structure in which the governor appointed the state board and the state board appointed the CSSO as being a workable compromise between the competing values of a centralized executive and a separate agency. It is a model that, in the judgment of these participants, brings education "close to the governor but not too close." Additionally, many conference participants asserted that appointment results in better board members than does election. Some critics of this combination model denounced it for being too political. Others argued that it lacks accountability to the electorate. And still others, reflecting the centralized executive perspective, denied that it adequately addresses the many problems of a fragmented governance structure.

Two findings derived from our elected versus appointed state board comparisons received additional comment in this section. (Most of these findings, it will be recalled, were reported in Section II.) First, we found some evidence in our case study investigation of school desegregation policy making that appointed boards are more likely than elected boards to act on volatile issues and to adopt unpopular positions. This finding suggests that architects of state governance structures may face a real dilemma in trying to foster both responsiveness and innovativeness. Second, we presented data that indicate, surprisingly, that elected boards at the time of the EGP inquiry were more widely perceived as having influence with governors than were appointed boards, albeit neither kind of board was generally seen as having much influence. But we also noted, in this regard, that expanded governor-state board contacts are occurring in several states; that this increase in contacts is encouraged by political party congruence between the governor and the board majority; and, thus, that gubernatorial appointment of board members is likely to have, in time, the results in the form of governor-state board interaction predicted for it.

Concluding Comments

In this chapter we have discussed the values that opinion leaders, such as EGP regional conference participants, expect to attain by structuring state-level school governance in different ways; we have presented seven alternative governance models, classified under three headings; and we have brought to bear relevant research findings. Since a summary appears at the end of each section, we will conclude here with only two brief comments on the kinds of choices that confront persons interested in changing state structures for educational governance.

In the first place, choices will have to be made as to the values that the governance structure should attempt to realize and, conversely, the values that will have to be given up, or at least de-emphasized, by the adoption of a particular structure. Is the structure to stress coordination and efficiency, or is it to strive for representativeness and multiple points of public access? Is the structure to promote state-level advocacy for education, or is the articulation of education with other human services a more important goal? Is priority to be given to the structure's capacity to be responsive to constituents, or is the structure to insulate policy making from external pressures? These and many other questions indicating possible value conflicts can be posed. And, whether these conflicts in some cases prove to be more apparent than real, hard choices as to values are going to have to be made by those who design educational governance structures.

Second, after the values are chosen and the kind of compromise desired is selected, decisions must be made about the structural means most likely to achieve these ends. We hope that our treatment of models has exposed a useful range of alternatives and suggested some of their consequences. But we recognize that our evidence is quite limited, even at the general level of analysis. As for the state-specific consequences of a model's adoption, it is clear that anticipation of these requires a thorough understanding of the particular situation, including political traditions, organizational norms and interests, and the personalities involved. The choice to investigate systematically these factors is one that we think is imperative to the restructuring effort.[62] To undertake a major structural change in state educational governance without such a study is to invite disappointment and failure.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II

[1]Written communication from EGP conference participant, December 10, 1973.

[2]Herbert Kaufman, Politics and Policies in State and Local Government, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 41.

[3]Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 57.

[4]Written communication from EGP conference participant, November 20, 1973.

[5]Written communication from EGP conference participant, March 26, 1973.

[6]Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 86.

[7]Gary V. Branson and Donald J. Steele, Jr., State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Tennessee (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, February, 1974).

[8]Ibid., p. 25.

[9]Tennessee Code Annotated, Sec. 49-103; 49-105.

[10]Branson and Steele, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

[11]Jerome T. Murphy, "Grease the Squeaky Wheel" (Report for the Center for Educational Policy Research, Harvard Graduate School of Education, February, 1973), p. 362.

[12]Ibid., p. 361.

[13]Branson and Steele, op. cit., p. 64.

[14]Ibid., p. 80; 96-98.

[15]Interviews with four respondents in Pennsylvania and three respondents in Virginia were conducted on March 7-9 of 1974.

[16]John C. Pittenger, "Should the States Have Secretaries of Education?--'Yes'," Compact (Education Commission of the States, January-February, 1974), p. 15.

[17]"Mission of the Office of Education (Virginia)," (Unpublished draft memorandum, n.d.), p. 4. (Mimeographed.)

[18]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[19]This was the case as of our staff interviews with Virginia respondents, March 8, 1974.

[20]General Laws, Chapter 6A, Section 4 of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

[21]Peggy M. Siegel, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Massachusetts, (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, February, 1974), p. 76.

[22]Ibid., pp. 67-86.

[23]"Summary of the Educational and Cultural Affairs Reorganization Act (Massachusetts)," (Unpublished document, June, 1973), 1-1H of Section 15. (Mimeographed.)

[24]"Testimony of Governor Francis W. Sargent on the Reorganization of Educational Affairs," June 21, 1973, pp. 4 and 6. (Mimeographed.)

[25]The most reasoned statement of this philosophy is in Paul W. Cook, et al., "The Job of the Secretary for Educational Affairs," (A Report Prepared for the Massachusetts Educational Conference Board, September, 1970). (Mimeographed.) For other arguments in favor of the secretary model, see particularly Pittenger, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[26]Lyman V. Ginger, "Should the States Have Secretaries of Education--'No'," Compact, (Education Commission of the States, January-February, 1974), p. 17.

[27]Cook, op. cit., VII-4.

[28]Ginger, op. cit., p. 18.

[29]See, for example, the list of "accomplishments of the Executive Office of Educational Affairs" in Massachusetts as reported in Joseph M. Cronin, "Plan for Reorganization" (Report by the Executive Office of Educational Affairs, January, 1973), pp. 59-61. (Mimeographed.) A much less impressive recital of accomplishments is contained in "Secretary of Education Calls Job 'Exciting, Challenging, Rewarding'," Public Education in Virginia (Virginia State Department of Education, Winter, 1973), pp. 2-4. (Reprint)

[30]The classic statement that the "general good" not "local purposes" ought to guide the representative was made by Edmund Burke in reference to the British Parliament. See his "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (1774), Works, II, p. 12.

[31]According to Will and his colleagues, the usual recommendation of students of state educational administration is that: "The Board truly represents the people of the state...This is intended to preclude any special interest representation on the Board." Robert F. Will, et al., State Education Structure and Organization. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 8-9.

[32]Gerald R. Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," Planning and Changing, (April, 1971), p. 21.

[33]Remarks made by Wilson Riles at educational governance seminar.

[34]Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr., Education and State Politics (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1969), p. 170.

[35]Edward R. Hines, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of New York (Educational Governance Project, February, 1974), p. 90.

[36]Ibid., pp. 89-103.

[37]Ibid., p. 103.

[38]Ibid., p. 91.

[39]Ibid., p. 99.

[40]Ibid., p. 144-145.

[41]For an insightful assessment of these events, see Michael Usdan, "Elementary and Secondary Education" in Robert H. Connery and Gerald Benjamin (eds.), Governing New York State: The Rockefeller Years (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1974), pp. 230-238.

[42]Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 60-71; 76-77.

[43]Quoted in Lerue W. Winget, et al., "State Departments of Education Within State Governments," in Edgar Fuller and Jim B. Pearson (eds.), Education in the States (Washington: NEA, 1969), II, p. 79.

[44]Pitkin, op. cit., p. 209.

[45]See, for example, the discussion of the social characteristics of state legislators in Thomas R. Dye, "State Legislative Politics" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd edition, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), pp. 176-180.

[46]M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "Interest Representation in School Governance," Urban Affairs Annual Review (1972).

[47]On the importance of social status to gaining access, see L. Harmon Zeigler and Hendrik Van Dalen, "Interest Groups in the States," in Jacob and Vines, op. cit., pp. 150-153.

[48]Harmon Zeigler, "Creating Responsive Schools," The Urban Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1973), p. 40.

[49]Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 31.

[50]Zeigler, op. cit., p. 40; Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," p. 20.

[51]Gerald Sroufe, "An Examination of the Relationship Between Methods of Selection and the Characteristics and Self-Role Expectations of State School Board Members" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, September, 1970), p. 163.

[52]Rodney Cox, Jr., and Waldo Anderson, "Shall State Boards of Education be Elected or Appointed?" (Report by Bureau of Educational Research and Service, University of Arizona, May, 1972), pp. 15-16. (Mimeographed.)

[53]See the argument in Herbert Simon, et al., "Dividing the Work: Specialization Among Organization Units" in Edward V. Schneier, Policy Making in American Government (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), pp. 218-221.

[54]For a more complete analysis of state board influence in education policy making, see Chapter II of Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., (eds.), State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, August, 1974).

[55]Ibid., Chapter II.

[56]Selected characteristics of state administrators are discussed more fully in Chapter IV, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis.

[57]Ibid., Chapter III.

[58]Ibid., Chapter III.

[59]Written communication from conference participant , November 27, 1973.

[60]Harris, op. cit., pp. 60-71; 76-77.

[61]Zeigler, op. cit., p. 43.

[62]A revealing analysis of the interaction of "formal structural factors" with "non-formal structural factors" is in Thomas R. Williams and David K. Wiles, "The Analysis of Two-Tiered Systems of Education Governance," Planning and Changing (Summer, 1973), pp. 67-78.

CHAPTER III

STRUCTURAL OPTIONS

Introduction

Our presentation of models has been deliberately focused on a few variables--extent of policy-making authority delegated to the education agency and selection methods for the state board and the chief state school officer. While these variables seem most essential to the design of state governance arrangements for the public schools, other structural features also must be considered in elaborating on a basic model. In this chapter we will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of these features, citing when possible research findings and indicating in some cases our own preferences. (The preferences of the political and educational leaders who responded to the EGP survey questionnaire are described in Chapter IV.) The structural options to be discussed have to do with (1) state board characteristics, (2) CSSO characteristics, (3) scope of SEA authority, and (4) SEA-general governance linkages. One or more of these options might be applied to any of the models set forth in Chapter II.

State Board Characteristics

Five characteristics of state boards of education merit attention: (1) term of office, (2) size, (3) staffing, (4) service and compensation, and (5) partisan affiliation.

Term of Office

There are two considerations regarding term of office for state board members--first, whether members' terms are to be concurrent or overlapping; second, the length of the term itself. Continuity argues for the use of overlapping terms and nearly all state boards are chosen on this basis.

Length of term, on the other hand, varies among state boards from three years in Delaware to 15 years in New York.* Most board members have lengthy terms of office. As of 1972, 32 of the 48 state boards had provisions for terms of five years or longer (eight years or longer were found in nine states).[1] Given the rate of societal change, terms in excess of three to five years seem questionable if state boards are to be responsive bodies.

We were interested in seeing if among the 10 state boards studied by the EGP there were any strong relationships between term of office and our subjective measures of state board interest representation, external constituency orientation, conflictual decision style, and policy-making influence.** To do this, the states were ranked on each of these variables and correlation coefficients (Spearman rho) were computed. These are reported in Table 3-1.

TABLE 3-1

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN LENGTH OF TERM AND SELECTED MEASURES OF BOARD PERFORMANCE

Selected Performance Measures	Rho Coefficients
Interest Representation	-.56
External Constituency Orientation	.32
Conflictual Decision Style	-.09
Policy-Making Influence	.38

As can be seen, only one of the statistical associations can be classified as even of moderate size, this being the r_s of -.56 between term of office and the degree to which board members are perceived as representing particular geographic or racial-ethnic interests. The longer the term, the

*Reduced to seven years in 1974.
**These variables are discussed in Section II of Chapter II.

less interest representation is seen as occurring, a finding that is consistent with the belief that lengthy terms for public officials reduce their responsiveness to external groups. An alternative interpretation is that officials who serve long terms come to have a broader and less provincial view of policy questions than do those whose tenure is shorter.

Board Size

As of 1972, the size of membership of state boards of education ranged from three in Mississippi to 24 in Texas. The most common sizes were seven members (10 boards) and nine members (10 boards).[2] Much has been written about the supposed virtues of governing boards, or councils, of different size. In this literature smallness is said to foster unity and efficiency, whereas the large board is seen as being more representative and more prone to conflictual decision making. The evidence relevant to these assertions is meager. Still, some inferences of a supporting nature can be derived, as Winter points out, from small group research.[3]

While we were inclined to believe at the outset that a board size of five or fewer was too small to be very representative, at least in a diverse state, and that one in excess of 20 was likely to encounter problems with procedural efficiency, we doubted that the variation between such extremes made much difference for state board performance. Again, we employed rank-order correlations to explore the relationships between board size and our other variables (see Table 3-2). The coefficients reported in Table 3-2 were unexpected in light of the literature. Although size has virtually no statistical association (r_s = .14) with board influence, it is inversely related to our measure of interest representation (-.49), external constituency orientation (-.37), and conflictual decision style (-.12). For our

TABLE 3-2

RELATIONSHIP FOR STATE BOARDS BETWEEN SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTED MEASURES OF BOARD PERFORMANCE

Selected Performance Measures	Rho Coefficients
Interest Representation	-.49
External Constituency Orientation	-.37
Conflictual Decision Style	-.12
Policy-Making Influence	.14

ten state boards, it was the smaller bodies, not the larger ones, that tended to be perceived as being more representative and as experiencing greater conflict. Such findings do not warrant, of course, positive assertions about cause and effect, yet they do challenge the usual presumption about the relationship between the size of the board and its performance.

Staffing

State boards of education, like their local counterparts, do not have their own staffs. Consequently, the state board, having no independent capacity to establish agendas, depends on the CSSO and other department personnel to perform this function. And it relies on these administrators for information on the agenda items. In our data we found that nearly half (47 per cent) of the board member interviewees identified no external source of information on these items. Of those who did cite an external source, most named either one of the state-level education interest groups or local school officials.[4]

The fact that a lay governing board, state or local, is heavily dependent on information selected and interpreted by its chief administrative officer and his staff, organized with regard to agenda priorities usually

established by them, is pointed to by some commentators as contributing to the board's inability to undertake a significant policy-making role. As one observer concluded, "complex decisions are made on the basis of educational realities as delineated by the very people whom the board is supposed to govern."[5] One recommendation that logically flows from such a conclusion is that boards should have their own staffs, staffs that would have the capability to assist board members in knowing what data they need to deal with a policy issue and in analyzing the data they receive from the state department of education.[6]

In the normative literature on state boards it is rare to find a recommendation that independent staffs be provided for these bodies. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, a minority proposal included in the report made by the Citizens Commission on Basic Education in Pennsylvania called for the State Board of Education to have,

> its own staff with particular competence in long-range planning, interpretation of educational research, and evaluation of educational programs. This staff should be kept small and should have no responsibility for administering programs established to carry out Board policies. Its principal function should be to assist the Board in policy determination through providing or securing assessments of the effects of various proposed policies which the Board is considering and to do research regarding emerging issues which the Board may wish to consider.[7]

The discrepancy between what the law stipulates to be the board's governing role and the reality of administrator influence in this process argues that consideration be given to independent board staffs. If the pendulum of policy-making power, as our research suggests, has swung a long way toward the CSSO, then staffing for state boards might help redress the imbalance between professional expertise and public control.

Critics raise many and formidable objections to staffing proposals like that put forward in the Pennsylvania report. Implementing such a proposal,

they contend, will lead to increased operating costs, duplication of effort, communication "gaps" and mistrust between board and CSSO, unproductive conflict with department administrators, and the staff offices' becoming "political tools" for board members. Those who oppose independent board staffs point out that most state boards are authorized now to insist that relevant, balanced, and accurate information be furnished by state departments (in 26 states the CSSO is appointed by and can be removed by the board). In their judgment, therefore, the appropriate remedy for a board that remains dissatisfied with the agenda or the information provided by the state department is to replace its CSSO with a person who will be responsive to board requests.

Board Member Service and Compensation

Service on state boards is done on a part-time basis (most of our board member respondents estimated they spent at least four to six days per month on board work) and these officials receive little compensation (expenses plus, in some states, a modest per diem allowance).[8] Part-time involvement is defended not only as being appropriate to the duties to be performed, but also as guarding against board members "meddling" in administration. "A full-time board," argues one CSSO, "simply cannot stay with policy making; it inevitably gets its fingers into every aspect of the administrative operation."[9] As for the absence of substantial compensation, this is justified on the grounds that financial inducements would attract board aspirants who are more concerned with monetary gain than devotion to public service.

As we have shown, our data portray state board officials as an unusually successful group of Americans; most being affluent, well educated, and engaged in managerial or professional occupations. Obviously, many factors contribute to the demographic composition of state boards. Yet among these

is the fact that board membership is largely uncompensated, a fact that encourages persons who can pursue symbolic rewards like status and the satisfaction of service without paying much heed to financial costs, and that discourages capable low-income candidates from seeking state board office. Thus, it can be maintained that to attach attractive compensation to state board offices, while it may invite the candidacy of persons interested primarily in money, holds promise for expanding the social class membership of these bodies. True, compensation for board members, especially if made available on a per meeting basis, would probably increase their part-time service to this office and their interference in matters perceived as being administrative in nature. Such was the situation with the Los Angeles City School Board which as of 1970 was the highest paid in the country with a remuneration of $75 per meeting and a $750 per month maximum.[10] Nonetheless, as a case study of this board also suggests, a greater time commitment on the part of the board members may lead to greater public involvement in education policy making. Indeed, some risk of board interference in administration may be necessary to get more involvement of this kind.

Political Party Recruitment

A constant theme in the writings on boards of education, and widely voiced by participants in our regional conferences, is that schools and party affiliation do not mix; that there is no Republican or Democratic way to educate children. Nonpartisan recruitment, it is claimed, allows the best qualified people to seek office. And party considerations should not be permitted to get in the way of a rational assessment of the personal attributes and issue positions of candidates. The rebuttal, often advanced by political scientists, is that partisan recruitment, primarily through

the election mechanism, is the best available device to pre-screen candidates, focus on the issues, represent a broader public than interest groups, and make officeholders less vulnerable to personal attack.[11]

Partisan affiliation is a factor in state board member recruitment in a great majority of states. Where these officials are popularly elected it more often than not is on a partisan ballot, and where they are appointed it is by a partisan leader, the governor. Our data on the board recruitment process support two inferences: (1) political parties play a passive role in board elections, and do not perform most of the functions usually ascribed to them in this process, even in states employing a partisan ballot; (2) party leaders, as opposed to education interest group leaders, have more influence in board recruitment where these public officials are appointed than where they are elected.

Three of the state boards we studied--Colorado, Michigan, and Texas--are elected on a partisan ballot and party identification seems to be crucial in influencing voter choice in these states. Bridges, after investigating 1970 voter patterns for both the state board and the governor's office in the three states, observed that,

> apparently, winning or losing the office of state school board is highly related to the performance of the candidate for governor from the same party; this phenomenon is consistent with a partisan explanation of voting behavior.[12]

Several of our board member interviewees expressed the same sentiment. In Michigan, in particular, board members often commented that they were merely "the tail-end of a partisan ticket" and thus that state board election results "had nothing to do with who is running or their qualifications." A board official in Colorado echoed this assessment, saying in reference to his own election that it was a "coat-tail thing--I shouldn't have won."

Although political parties endorse state board candidates in Colorado, Michigan, and Texas--and thereby provide the decisive cue for voters--they evidently do not do much else in the process by which board members reach office. When board member respondents in these states were queried about how they became interested in seeking that office, most (60 per cent) replied that it was their own idea; that they, in effect, were self-recruited. The others named various individuals and groups who had solicited their candidacy, the most frequently mentioned (by 35 per cent) being local school people (i. e., boards and superintendents). As for party involvement in campaigns, this was minimal according to state board respondents. Only two, both from Colorado, mentioned substantial financial support and none viewed the party as supplying workers for his or her campaign.

If state boards rank low among the priorities of political parties--other than providing endorsements they do little to recruit or to elect these education officials--then who does become actively involved in state board campaigns? In the four elected board states we studied, the answer, for the most part, was "educators," particularly the state-level teacher organizations and "local school people." By way of contrast, political leaders were identified most frequently as being influential in the appointive process for board members.

We studied five appointed state boards--Massachusetts, Minnesota, California, Georgia, and Tennessee. Only in Massachusetts is there a formal advisory committee that recommends state board nominees to the governor, the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education (MACE). In the remaining four states the process of state board appointment is unstructured. Board member interviewees were asked to evaluate eight groups in terms of whether each was "very influential," "somewhat influential," or "not influential" in

recommending board candidates to the governor. These assessments were then scored as follows: "very influential" - 3 points, "somewhat influential" - 1 point, and "not influential" - 0 points. The average score for each group is reported in Table 3-3.

TABLE 3-3

STATE BOARD MEMBER ASSESSMENT OF INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT GROUPS IN NOMINATING STATE BOARD CANDIDATES TO THE GOVERNOR

Groups	States				
	Mass.	Minn.	Calif.	Georgia	Tenn.
Governor's Staff	2.57	3.00	3.00	.71	2.50
Party Leaders	.14	2.60	1.50	1.00	2.25
Legislators	.71	3.00	.10	1.29	.75
Chief State School Officer	.83	.60	1.20	.86	1.38
Other SBE Members	1.14	.40	1.50	.43	.25
State Teachers Association	.33	.20	.20	.29	.63
State Administrators Association	.33	.40	.40	.14	.13
Local School Boards	.33	.40	.30	.43	.13

Using the data contained in Table 3-3 and ranking the eight groups by their average influence score across the five states produces this ordering (average influence score in parenthesis):

Governor's Staff	(2.36)
Political Party Leaders (Outside Legislature)	(1.50)
Members of the Legislature	(1.17)
Chief State School Officers	(.97)
Current SBE Members	(.74)
State Teachers Association	(.33)
Local School Boards	(.32)
State Administrators Assn.	(.28)

As is clear from this rank order, state board members saw politicians, such as governors, party leaders, and legislators, as being much more influential in the appointment process than the various educator groups. These groups, on the face of it, have considerably less access to the recruitment process when state board members are chosen by the governor than when these office-holders must bid for support in elections.

Before leaving the subject of state board characteristics we should emphasize that in our data--whether board members are appointed or elected,

partisan or nonpartisan--the role played in state board recruitment by non-educator groups (e.g., labor, business, or civil rights groups) is insignificant. And none of the selection procedure creates much opportunity or much stimulus for broad public involvement. Both Sroufe and Bridges, in explaining why the different selection methods produce similar results, stress the lack of saliency of the state board office for voters, political parties, governors, legislators, and interest groups except for some comprised of schoolmen.[13]

Recently there have been signs of change as the politicalization of education has affected even the apolitical character of state board recruitment. In some of the states we examined board elections have become more vigorously contested. And in a few others governors and their staffs have begun to scrutinize board member appointments with new care. Even so, for state boards to be widely perceived as important institutions in education policy-making--hence, for selection mechanisms to be efficacious in producing well-qualified and representative board members--requires, we believe, that these bodies have more policy-making resources and more willingness to use these resources than exist at present. Unless such a strengthening of both resources and intention takes place, state boards will continue to be marginal actors in the policy process, no matter whether the partisan or nonpartisan recruitment option is employed.

CSSO Characteristics

Three characteristics of the position of chief state school officer will be discussed: (1) term of office, (2) legal requirements, and (3) salary.

Term of Office

In more than half the states CSSOs serve fixed terms of office. In the remaining states chiefs hold their office at the pleasure of the governor

or the state board of education. The usual term for a CSSO, where a fixed term exists, is four years.[14]

Two considerations, we think, are involved in deciding upon the term of office for a chief state school officer. First, does it encourage periodic evaluation of the chief's performance by the appointing official or the electorate. Although CSSOs who serve at the pleasure of a superordinate official have, in a formal sense, their jobs in constant jeopardy, this relationship may not be as likely to ensure a systematic performance evaluation as is a time-definite arrangement. The second consideration importance is that the CSSO be given enough time to develop programs and to carry them out. A term appointment of about four years may be needed to meet this criterion.

Requirements for Office

Most states have established legal requirements for the position of chief state school officer. In our sample of 12 CSSOs, all the elected chiefs had to meet a residency requirement, whereas most of the appointed chiefs (63 per cent) had to have certain kinds of educational experience. A majority of both elected CSSOs (75 per cent) and appointed CSSOs (63 per cent) had to have professional training in education. The presence of such legally stipulated requirements contributes toward chief state school officers being recruited from within the states in which they serve and having a strong professional education background. Only one of our 12 chiefs was not an in-state choice. All but one had held a teaching or administrative position, usually both, in the public schools, and the lone exception had experience in higher education.

Although these requirements may seem reasonable, it should be recognized that any legal requirement for an office limits the pool of potential

candidates. In the case of those for the CSSO many of the statutory constraints do not seem highly relevant to the central tasks of that position, tasks that involve playing an important role in education policy making and managing a large public bureaucracy. While we only examined the policy-making role of the CSSO, our data suggest that every effort should be made to find persons who can exert appropriate influence in both arenas where education policy is determined--the legislative arena as well as the education agency arena. For the state agency, professional expertise and some political skill is needed. But for legislators and governors, the necessary attributes must be posed in reverse order, political skill and professional expertise.[15] These criteria appear to be more significant than place of residence or a particular pattern of experience.

Salary

Past studies of CSSO salaries found that they tended to be low when compared to other administrative positions in education with similar responsibilities.[16] And since in most states the salary of the chief sets the ceiling for the professional personnel in the education department, the lack of attractiveness of the CSSO's salary has broad and probably negative ramifications for agency recruitment.

The average salary in 1972 for the 12 CSSOs in our sample was $31,927, ranging from $51,275 in New York to $21,000 in Wisconsin. We have no way of knowing just how much CSSOs should be paid, but one useful comparison is possible. In 1969-70, Knezevich collected comprehensive data on the salary of local school district superintendents.[17] Since his data were obtained about two years earlier than the CSSO data, we have revised the district superintendent salary figures upward by 10 per cent in order to compare them with the CSSO salary figures. If we may assume that the

average salary for CSSOs ought to match that of district superintendents in the 112 largest districts of the country, then $33,000 (average salary in 1969-70 plus upward adjustment of 10 per cent) seems a fair yardstick. By applying such a yardstick we found that only five of our 12 CSSOs had salaries equal to or exceeding that amount. And if applied to the 50 states there were only 15 CSSOs above that amount in 1972.[18] Hence, one might conclude, as have previous studies, that most chiefs are paid rather modest salaries relative to their duties and responsibilities.

Scope of SEA Authority

Three issues involving the scope of SEA authority seem to be of particular concern in the 1970s: (1) the inclusion of higher education, (2) the inclusion of vocational education, and (3) the removal of teacher certification and preparation.

Inclusion of Higher Education

While the focus of the Educational Governance Project was on elementary and secondary education, the question of the relationship of the state education agency to higher education continues to be raised. Thus, as a part of the option having to do with the scope of the authority of the SEA, we suggest three possible positions. We have little research data bearing on these positions but we shall try to set forth the logic in each of them.

The first possible answer to the inclusion of higher education as part of the jurisdiction of the SEA is a negative one; leave higher education out. This position represents the practice found in 46 of the 50 states. Moreover, in two of the three recent reorganizations described in Chapter I there was a deliberate attempt to separate the state governance of higher and K-12 education. Kansas created a board for higher education at the

same time that it created its present state board of education. Illinois in the formation of its first state board of education apparently felt that it should not disturb the board for higher education, an instrumentality brought into existence about a decade earlier.

Aside from prevailing practice, two arguments are frequently used for keeping the governance of higher education out of the SEA. The first of these is the question of time. Many people believe that when the state board of education is concerned with policy questions for both higher and K-12 education that lower education will get little attention. Since board members serve on a part-time basis, frequently with little or no compensation, their agendas must be limited. Most board members are thought to attach greater prestige to colleges than they do to schools, therefore in any selection of agenda items higher education tends to be preferred to K-12 education. We found that this line of argument was used recently in Tennessee when jurisdiction for higher education was taken from the State Board of Education and a new board for higher education was created. Yet we should also note that in New York where the Board of Regents has responsibility for both higher and lower education, there has been no move to divide its jurisdiction.

One other condition apparently affects the time demands on board members. In New York the Board of Regents deals with major policy questions only and does not serve as the operating board for any of the colleges and universities in the state. In 1948 the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York was created to serve as the governing board for all of the state colleges.[19] This action apparently relieved the Regents from the need to consider many operating questions and seemed to make their overall function more viable. The situation in Idaho is quite another picture. The Board

of Regents of the University of Idaho actually serves as the operating board for four institutions of higher education as well as the state board for elementary and secondary education. Some persons in Idaho are convinced that the Board allocates most of its time and energy to higher education.

A second argument for keeping the governance of higher and lower education separated is based on their distinctive traditions. In a number of respects the beliefs and practices applied to elementary and secondary schools vary significantly from those applied to colleges and universities. For instance, schools are subject to much state governance; a body of statutory law provided by the legislature and a body of administrative regulations authorized by the state board of education. By way of contrast, colleges and particularly major universities, in most states, have been accorded great institutional autonomy. These differences also extend to the student bodies of the schools and colleges. Compulsory education laws apply to most of the students in the schools. The youngsters are made to attend and since they are not yet adults their hours at school are well regulated. College students, on the other hand, are in attendance by choice, their daily schedules are flexible, and more and more institutions do not control their personal lives. Even the financial support of these two institutions differs appreciably. Schools are almost completely supported by local and state tax revenues, but colleges may supplement their state appropriations with student fees, foundation and federal government grants, and private gifts. In short, the traditions surrounding schools and colleges do differ and may pose problems for any agency with a penchant for standardization. The recognition of these differences appears to have influenced the development of Wayne State University, once a teachers college under the jurisdiction of the Detroit Board of Education; and the establishment

of a separate Junior College District in Chicago, once under the jurisdiction of the Chicago Board of Education.

Although time limitations of board members and differential traditions for higher and K-12 education seem to argue for keeping higher education out of the SEA, these arguments, as we indicated, have not prevailed in New York and Idaho. Nor has separation of governance for higher and K-12 education been acceptable to Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In the latter two states the state education agency has been reorganized recently and in both instances the new agency has jurisdiction over higher and K-12 education. In Pennsylvania the consolidation was part of the reorganization which created the Secretary of Education, discussed in Chapter II. In Rhode Island the focus was on the creation of a Board of Regents with broad powers and with a statutory mandate to organize into three "sub-boards": one for elementary and secondary education, a second for post-secondary education, and a third for "special populations and types" such as the handicapped and the use of the electronic media.[20]

There appear to be educational, managerial, and political arguments for placing both higher education and K-12 education under the jurisdiction of a single state education agency. The educational arguments suggest that there is no sharp break between lower and higher education, hence the formal policy-making structure should not be divided. There is much to be said for this position. In terms of academic programs, the argument goes, there should be articulation between secondary and higher education. And, articulation arrangements should remain flexible so that such programs as advanced placement which affect both schools and colleges can be easily adjusted. In terms of vocational, adult, or continuing education there should be ways of reducing unnecessary overlap between schools and colleges. The case for a single state agency in education is even more persuasive when it is

recognized that education goes on in many settings in addition to traditional schools and colleges. The comprehensive state education agency in New York has apparently been more successful than most state agencies in recognizing the non-traditional ways of learning as exemplified in the high school equivalency diploma and the external college degree program. Presumably, policy for the total education program can be more easily and appropriately coordinated by one agency than by multiple agencies.

The managerial argument stresses the efficiency of a single agency approach to all of education. The argument suggests that one agency can eliminate costly and unneeded duplications which often characterize programs developed by two agencies. Again, much of this duplication may characterize programs in vocational and continuing education. For instance, some high schools and community colleges in the same community offer programs with little regard for possible overlap.

The political argument for a single education agency seems to be an extension of the managerial argument but it also grows out of the movement to rationalize state government, particularly to lodge more power and responsibility with the governor. At least partial application of this concept was described in Chapter I in the case of Maine. An attempt was made to place scores of state agencies in ten or twelve departments, each headed by a commissioner appointed by and responsible to the governor. In such an arrangement the governor, and presumably the legislature, would prefer to deal with broad categories of functions such as welfare, natural resources, and education. In the case of education a comprehensive definition to include all kinds of programs and institutions and under the direction of a single state education agency is sought.

To this point we have dealt with two options: exclusion or inclusion of higher education from the jurisdiction of the state education agency. There is a third possibility which includes some features of both of the above plans. We refer to what has sometimes been called the education super board.[21] Such a plan could be superimposed upon agencies already in existence for lower and higher education. Thus, in most of the states where separate state agencies for elementary and secondary and for higher education already exist (at least 26 states),[22] both agencies might be required to report to the super board. Such an arrangement would seem to remove some of the policy-making responsibilities from the state board of education and the state board for higher education and place these responsibilities with the super board. The subordinate boards would be cast more in the role of operating or implementing boards. Though this arrangement might promote coordination of educational programs, it obviously raises the question of how many layers of government are needed.

As the super board concept is examined it may be that political leaders will opt for a super office in place of a board. In a sense, the development of the office of secretary of education in four states, noted in Chapter II, is a move toward such an office without the encumbrance of a super board. Since a super officer or secretary of education is a creature of the governor, the whole question of how much power to place in the governor's office is raised once again.

The options represented by the discussion above are in essence simple ones. Should there be one state education agency with jurisdiction over both lower and higher education? Or, should there be two state education agencies, one for lower education and one for higher education? Or, assuming two agencies, as is now the case in a majority of the states, should a super

board for education be created? If a state chooses the first option, it does appear desirable to create some kind of linking mechanism between the two agencies to give specific attention to coordination problems. As an example, in the recent reorganization in Illinois such a mechanism was created. The statutes require the establishment of a standing Joint Education Committee to be composed of three members appointed by the State Board of Education and three members appointed by the State Board for Higher Education. The Committee is charged with developing policy on matters of mutual concern to both boards. The Committee is to meet at least quarterly and to report annually its findings and recommendations to the State Board of Education, the State Board for Higher Education, and the General Assembly.

Inclusion of Vocational Education

Another option having to do with the scope of authority of the SEA involves the question of where to place responsibility for vocational education. In 44 states vocational education is under the direction of the general SEA, while in six states a special board and staff have been created for vocational education. Historically, a state board for vocational education came at the behest of the federal government when the Smith-Hughes Act was passed by the Congress in 1917. At that time most states decided to make the state board of education also serve as the state board for vocational education. Some states had no state board of education, notably Illinois and Wisconsin, and other states apparently found their state boards unsuited for this new responsibility, hence special boards were created. Some of them persist to this day.

In 1917 there was another condition which provided some argument for a special board. Most high schools were still selective in terms of the academic ability of students and tended to stress preparation for college

much more than preparation for work. Political leaders sometimes responded to the beliefs of persons in business, labor, and agriculture that school people, whether lay or professional, had little capacity to look at the nature of vocational training.

In the half century since that time there have been a number of changes. High schools now enroll nearly all youth. For many school people the high school must now concern itself with both preparation for work as well as preparation for living. While some students may choose to emphasize the academic and others the vocational, most youth 14 to 18 years of age need to give some time to each. These developments have not satisfied some who see vocational education as quite distinctive and often shortchanged by general educators. We suspect, however, that there is little evidence that the regular state agency has discriminated against the vocational education program.

Teacher Preparation and Certification

A critical policy-making area that for many years has been delegated to the state education agency is teacher preparation and certification. All 11 of the state boards studied by Schweickhard in the mid-1960s were empowered to set general requirements for elementary and secondary teachers and had the authority to issue, renew, and revoke certificates.[23] While state boards were authorized to determine policy in the area, nearly all states had created advisory councils on teacher preparation and certification. Most were extra-legal--that is, they were established by state boards using their implied power--or were voluntary. Eleven, however, had been created by statute. Generally speaking, the composition of these advisory councils included representatives from teacher and administrator organizations along with spokesmen from the teacher training units of colleges and universities.[24]

With the emergence of "teacher power" as a significant new reality in state education politics, traditional arrangements for policy making in the certification area have been vigorously challenged in several states. At the time of our study the issue was particularly salient in Minnesota.[25] (In California a commission to administer teacher certification had been established in 1970.) As set up by the legislature, the Minnesota Teacher Standards and Certification Commission has fifteen members: four elementary teachers; four secondary teachers; three higher education representatives; one school administrator; two members representing the public; and one person having the responsibility of a counselor, vocational teacher, school nurse, remedial reading teacher, speech therapist, librarian, or psychologist. The Commission members are appointed by the Governor for four-year terms. Except for the college members and the public representatives, all persons on the Commission have to be certificated and have five years teaching experience in Minnesota, including the two years immediately preceding their appointment.

The new law authorizes the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission to: (1) "develop and create criteria, rules, and regulations for the certification of public school teachers and interns;" (2) "from time to time...revise or supplement the criteria for certification of public school teachers;" and (3) "establish criteria for the approval of teacher education programs." But these empowerments to formulate policy are all qualified by the phrase, "subject to approval by the State Board." If the State Board vetoes a Commission proposal, the Board has to give "written notice of such disapproval within 120 days after the receipt of the proposal, including its reasons."

The Commission--"subject to criteria, rules, and regulations approved by the State Board of Education"--is accorded the exclusive right to issue

all teaching certificates and the corresponding right to revoke them for any one of the five causes specified in the law. There is no provision for teachers to appeal a Commission decision to the State Board. Aside from the usual recourse to the courts, the Commission is vested with authority to certify teachers. This power with regard to school superintendents and principals is retained by the State Board.

Although the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission in Minnesota does possess considerably more legal power than the customary advisory council, having as it does the statutory authority to initiate and to formulate policy, final authorization remains a prerogative of the State Board of Education. Apparently, this limitation is not found in Oregon.[26] In that state the legislature, in 1973, gave to an already established Teacher Standards and Practices Commission extensive legal control over the preparation and licensure of teachers.* Thus, it appears that there are three basic options for state-level governance of the teaching profession: (1) it can continue to be delegated to the SEA, this agency assisted by an advisory council representing different segments of the profession and the teachers training institutions; (2) responsibility for certain policy-making and/or administrative functions can be formally vested in a special commission or board on which educators are heavily represented, but with the power of final approval being retained by the SEA; (3) a fully independent commission can be created by statute to exercise legal jurisdiction over the preparation and licensure of teachers. Even in the last, of course, ultimate authority rests with the state legislature, for it can modify or repeal the law establishing the commission.

Several reasons are advanced for removing, in part or in whole, control of the teaching profession from the state education agency. First, there is

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*But it should be noted that the Oregon Board of Education appoints the Commission members and can remove them "for cause" following a hearing. And the Oregon Board can "request", after a review and a hearing, that a Commission rule or standard be set aside or amended as not in the public interest.

the contention that teachers "are best equipped to make expert judgments" on entry into, continuation in, and exit from the profession and that they have the most interest, being professionals themselves, in developing high standards of preparation and practice. Second, it is argued that only if teachers control their profession can they legitimately be held accountable for performance by the public. As expressed by the Oregon Superintendent of Public Instruction:

> If education is to become a profession, its members must assume responsibility for their actions and for the results they achieve. If we expect the profession to clean its own house, the profession must have the tools to do the job.[27]

Finally, it is contended that having the teaching profession govern itself is not incompatible with the public control of education. "There need not be a fear," to quote a leader of the Minnesota Education Association, "that delegation of such responsibility would cause the public to lose control. To delegate a right is not to relinquish it, but only to fix responsibilities...."[28]

Critics of the movement to divest SEAs of their traditional authority for certification maintain that the establishment of independent governing commissions would only fragment further the state education policy system, a system that is presently beset by a lack of comprehensive planning, articulation among state services, and efficient allocation of resources. Of even greater concern is the prospect of educators extending their influence over state policy making for the public schools. Such influence, in the view of many observers, is already excessive compared with that of other groups. And the formation of educator-dominated teacher standards and certification commissions is seen as accelerating the erosion of public control of education. As for the contention that professionals should make the decisions regarding the membership and standards of their profession, opponents

stress that teachers, unlike most doctors and lawyers, are public employees; and the militancy of organized teachers is interpreted, in the words of one critic, as performing basically a "self-serving guild function."

Whether delegating to educators authority to govern their profession can be made compatible with effective public control of the schools, as advocates claim but opponents deny, is the fundamental question, one that can be answered only by examining operating examples of the different options. At the time of this writing, only a few states have established commissions and they have done so just recently. Therefore, we have no evidence on certification policy making as undertaken by an independent commission compared with the process when undertaken by a state education agency. What we have been able to do here is to note the emergence of the issue as a vital one in educational governance, set forth what appear to be the major structural options, and present some of the contending arguments.

SEA-General Governance Linkages

In every state education is under the jurisdiction of a special structure of governance, a structure that is independent to at least some degree of general state governance arrangements. Put differently, in no state at present is education treated as just another executive department. Events of the past decade, however, have challenged this status and have prompted a concern for linkages between education and general governance institutions. One such event has been the development of state planning agencies.

SEA-State Planning Agency Liaison

In 1960, there was no formal organization for statewide planning in 31 of the states. By the end of the decade this number had been reduced to four.[29] Combining technical capability with, in most cases, ready access

to the governor, the state planning agency is in a position to formulate comprehensive plans to use state resources, including education, to realize state goals. Jennings' argument for increased liaison between this agency and the one that engages in planning in education--the SEA--is persuasive:

> Planners have a good deal in common and the sharing of ideas is beneficial to those who plan for education and those who plan in education. It would seem to be a logical kind of activity through which educators might expand their cooperative relationships. The advantages of working with the state planning agency are prior exploration of joint tasks to be performed, specifications of resources to be provided, and sanctioning of arrangements with an approved plan.... In addition, it is suggested that this liaison would provide an excellent conduit for the continual readjustment of planning to political considerations.[30]

Linkages with Governor and Legislature Leaders

While liaison for the purpose of improving planning had the approval of most of our regional conference participants, and we think that state departments have little choice but to move in this direction, proposals to create formal linkages between the SEA and elected state officeholders evoked much disagreement. The option here is whether a new structure should be established to link the state board and CSSO with the governor and legislature. Watson, among others, has strongly argued for such a linkage as an appropriate response to the politicalization of state education policy making. Indeed, he indicates that the state board might consist of "representatives of the legislative and executive branches, additional prominent citizens, and nominees of professional organizations."[31] This arrangement is seen as not only facilitating "communication flow across what have become internal boundaries," but also giving the state board both the status and political power to be an effective policy-making actor. A few conference participants also were attracted to this approach, proclaiming it to be the "reality model."

These are a number of objections to using the state board itself as the linkage mechanism: (1) It would be extraordinarily cumbersome in composition and hard to implement; (2) It would encourage "unproductive conflict for the reason that it is extremely difficult to pinpoint responsibility or accountability;" (3) It is unlikely that elected political leaders would give adequate time to board work, thus leaving control on most issues with educator groups and agency administrators; and (4) It is being abandoned by the only state--Illinois with its School Problems Commission--that has tried the approach. These objections were cogent enough to us that we did not include a linkage state board structure among our basic models. Still, we are convinced that the problem of linkage with general governance institutions is a serious one for SEAs, a conviction that is supported by our data which show that most state boards and many CSSOs lacked forums for sustained and productive interaction with governors and legislative leaders.

One linkage option that seems worthy of consideration is suggested by Sroufe. He proposes the establishment of a Governor's Council for Education. Its membership would include the president of the state board, the CSSO, the chairmen of the House and Senate education committees, and the chairmen of the relevant appropriations committees. The Council would be advisory to the governor and its primary function would be to bring together the central actors to consider the education needs and resources of the state. It is Sroufe's hope that:

> ....the Governor's Council would secure for education, in some measure, the benefits of a close working relationship with the governor. At least, the Council would provide a legitimate and appropriate forum for the education interests of the state, as represented by the board and the chief state school officer, to be presented to the governor and chief legislative leaders.[32]

Barring the adoption of a fully centralized model for state-level educational governance, it may be that Sroufe's proposed council, or some variation of it,

is necessary for an effective linkage between education and politics in most states.

Summary

The questions underlying the various options that have been discussed in this chapter, and that we think should be of concern to those who seek to design state education governance structures, can be summarized as follows:

1. How long should the term of office be for a state board member? How many members should there be on a state board? Should these bodies have their own independent staffs? Or, should they rely principally on state departments of education? How much time should state board members devote to their duties and what compensation should they receive? Should state board recruitment be partisan or nonpartisan?

2. Should CSSOs serve at the pleasure of an appointing official or should they serve fixed terms? If a fixed term, how long should it be? Should there be any professional or residence requirement for the position of CSSO? What salary should be paid to the CSSO?

3. Should higher education be included under the jurisdiction of the SEA? Or, should it have its own governing board? Or, should there be a super board over both higher and lower education? Should vocational education be included under the jurisdiction of the SEAs or should it have its own governance structure? Should control over teacher preparation and certification remain a prerogative of the SEA or should it be vested, in whole or in part, in an independent commission?

4. Should liaison be established between the SEA and the state planning agency? Should a formal structure be established to link the state board and CSSO with the governor and legislative leaders?

But, to repeat, while these questions must be answered in creating a state structure for education, they are not the crucial ones in deciding upon a basic governance model. The more fundamental considerations, as we said in Chapter II, are the amount of discretionary authority to make education policy that is delegated to the SEA and the selection methods that are used for the state board and CSSO. In the last chapter of this report we will

draw upon all the different variables to explicate the three models that, in our estimation, constitute the most useful points of departure for citizens who are thinking about changes in their state education governance system.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

[1]Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 60-61; 76-77.

[2]Ibid., p. 70. Harris includes American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands in his summary but excluded the ex-officio boards in Florida and Mississippi; hence, his figures are somewhat different than ours.

[3]William O. Winter, The Urban Polity (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1969), pp. 292-293.

[4]For a fuller treatment of state board information, see Chapter II of our report, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis.

[5]Bruce S.Cooper, "A Staff for School Boards," Administrator's Notebook, XXI, No. 3, p. 2.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Citizens Commission on Basic Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Report (November, 1973), p. 175.

[8]Harris, op. cit., p. 70.

[9]Written communication from EGP conference participant.

[10]Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., "Political Capability for Urban School Governance: An Analysis of the Los Angeles City School Board, 1967-1969" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1971), Chapter IX.

[11]Michael D. McCaffrey, "Politics in the Schools: A Case for Partisan Board Elections," Educational Administration Quarterly (Autumn, 1971), pp. 51-63. Also see Willis D. Hawley, Nonpartisan Election and the Case for Party Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1973).

[12]Edwin M. Bridges, "Elected Versus Appointed Boards: The Arguments and the Evidence," (Unpublished paper, 1972), p. 11. (Mimeographed).

[13]Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[14]Harris, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

[15]See the discussion in State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis," Chapter III.

[16]Lerue W. Winget, et al., "State Departments of Education Within State Governments," in Edgar Fuller and Jim B. Pearson (eds.), Education in the States (Washington: NEA, 1969), II, pp. 100-107.

[17]Stephen J. Knezevich (ed.), The American School Superintendency (Arlington, Virginia: AASA, 1971).

[18]Harris, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

[19]M. M. Chambers, Higher Education in the Fifty States (Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers, 1970), p. 255.

[20]M. M. Chambers, Higher Education and State Government, 1970-75 (Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers, 1974), pp. 222-23.

[21]Wendell H. Pierce, "Time for the Educational Superboard?" (Unpublished paper, September 20, 1973) (Mimeographed).

[22]Ibid.

[23]Dean M. Schwieckhard, "The Role and Policy-Making Activities of State Boards of Education" (Report of a Special Study Project of Title V, Section 505, of Public Law 89-10, September, 1967), p. 53.

[24]T. M. Stinnett, "Teacher Education, Certification, and Accreditation," in Fuller and Pearson, op. cit., II, pp. 401-402.

[25]Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Minnesota, (Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, February, 1974), pp. 105-120.

[26]Features are briefly described in "1973 State Education Legislation and Activity: General Governance and Administration, A Survey of the States," Vol. 2, No. 3 (A research brief prepared by the Education Commission of the States, April, 1974), p. 100.

[27]The Common, (June, 1974), p. 9.

[28]"MEA Legislative Objectives, 1971" (Minnesota Education Association, 1971), p. 2.

[29]Robert Jennings, "Politics and Planning for Education: The Mix at the State Level" Planning and Changing (Fall, 1972), p. 5.

[30]Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[31]D. Gene Watson, "Alternatives for Educational Governance at State Levels" in David T. Tronsgard (ed.), Six Crucial Issues in Education (Denver: NASBE, 1972), p. 53.

[32]Written communication from Gerald Sroufe, March 16, 1973.

CHAPTER IV

PREFERENCES WITH REGARD TO ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES*

As one of several approaches to the development of alternative models for the state governance of education, it seemed desirable to ascertain the preferences of informed persons regarding this matter. Thus, in 1973 a survey was conducted to determine the distribution of preferences regarding alternative ways in which the formal policy-making structure of state governance of education might be organized. Eight alternative structures, outlined in Figure I, were presented to respondents for their evaluation. In addition, respondents were asked their opinion regarding individual components of the structure of educational governance, using the questions listed in Appendix B. Results of the survey, together with an analysis of factors associated with respondents' choices, are presented in this chapter.

The survey was conducted among persons attending selected meetings of national organizations concerned with educational governance, and participants in a series of regional meetings organized by the Educational Governance Project as follows:

	Respondents
1. Staff Meetings of the United States Office of Education, held in February, 1973	15
2. Annual Meetings held in Summer, 1973 of:	
Education Commission of the States	115
State Directors of School Board Associations	24
National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration	66
3. Regional Meetings organized by the Educational Governance Project, Fall, 1973 in:	
Denver	47
Chicago	66
New York	51
Atlanta	55

*This chapter was prepared by David W. O'Shea.

	Respondents
4. Participants in above meetings who returned questionnaires by mail	26
TOTAL	465

While limiting respondents to conferees at a highly selective series of meetings leaves problematic the generalizability of the findings, it is not unreasonable to assume that the meetings utilized drew together a representative cross-section of opinion leaders in state educational affairs. Support for this assumption is provided by the fact that the distribution of responses from the 205 persons attending annual meetings of their organizations in the summer of 1973 paralleled rather closely the responses from the 219 who attended later regional meetings organized by the Educational Governance Project. Selected comparisons are presented in Appendix A. Stability of responses between these two sets of meetings points to the existence of established opinions on the topics raised, and also to the reliability of the survey instrument in ascertaining those opinions.

Two areas of concern shaped the content of the survey questionnaire. Of prime interest was the problem of determining the distribution of preferences among persons involved with state government with regard to alternative models for the formal policy-making structure of state educational agencies. Secondarily, preferences were sought regarding the components or characteristics of the state board of education and relationships between the board and other areas of state government. Similarly, preferences were also sought with regard to selected components or characteristics of the office of chief state school officer and relationships between this position and other divisions of state government. Finally, the questionnaire elicited responses regarding another set of components--the extent to which the state education agency should be allowed policy-making authority over ten separate areas of educational activity, and higher education.

The Alternative Models

The eight alternative models presented to respondents are displayed in Figure 1. Above each model is a brief description of its dominant characteristics. Respondents were asked to view these models and then, taking each in turn, to indicate whether (a) they personally found it acceptable or not and (b) whether they thought it acceptable politically in their own state. Having evaluated each of the models, respondents were then asked to choose from among all eight:

1. The model most closely approximating the existing structure of educational governance in their own state.
2. The one model preferred personally by the respondent.
3. The model most acceptable politically in the respondent's state.

The most important findings of the survey are reflected in the data presented in column 3 of Table 4-1.

TABLE 4-1

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS REGARDING EIGHT ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF THE POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURE OF STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES

Model Number (1)	Model which Respondents Judged to be Closest to their State's Structure (2)	Model Preferred by Respondents (3)	Model Most Likely to be Politically Acceptable (4)
1	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%
2	9.9	6.3	7.8
3	27.9	28.5	24.9
4	24.8	4.6	18.1
5	7.7	23.8	15.2
6	0.7	6.5	2.4
7	19.0	21.8	20.9
8	5.3	4.2	6.4
N	416.0	432.0	421.0

The Preferred Models

The data in Table 4-1 show that when respondents were asked to select the one model which they preferred personally, most choices were distributed among

MODEL 1

Chief State School Officer is an appointed member of the Governor's cabinet. CSSO is responsible to the Governor for implementing educational policies, authority for which remains with the Governor.



MODEL 2

As in Model 1, CSSO is appointed by the Governor, in whose cabinet he serves. In addition, the Governor appoints a State Board of Education. The Board has limited policy-making power; for example, with regard to teacher certification.



MODEL 3

Governor appoints the State Board which, in turn, selects the CSSO who serves as the Board's chief executive. The Board has considerable policy-making authority.



MODEL 4

As in Model 3, the Governor appoints the State Board, but the CSSO is elected, and as a constitutional officer shares authority for educational policy-making with the Board.



MODEL 5

Appointment to the State Board is determined by the Governor and/or leaders of the legislature.

Appointees are selected from among persons nominated by a blue ribbon committee and are expected to serve lengthy terms (eight years or more).

Again, the State Board appoints the CSSO and has considerable policy-making authority.



MODEL 6

Similar to Model 5 except that:

(a) Nominations to the State Board are made by a committee representing groups of professional educators.

(b) Board membership is restricted to professional educators, such as teachers, administrators, and persons from Colleges of Education.



MODEL 7

This model parallels the typical local school board structure; a Board with considerable policy-making authority whose members achieve office through non-partisan elections, and are not compensated for service. The Board appoints its own CSSO.



MODEL 8

Similar to Model 7, with the exception that members of the State Board achieve office through regionally based partisan elections, and receive attractive compensation for their services.



Fig. 1. - Alternative Models for the Formal Policy-making Structure of State Education Agencies.

three alternatives; Models 3, 5, and 7. Further, as indicated by comparing data in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4-1, though Model 4 approximates the existing structure in the home states of about one-fourth of the respondents, it attracted little support. This discrepancy between an existing and preferred structure points to dissatisfaction among educational leaders in some states with regard to educational governance, a topic pursued later in this report.

The pattern of preferences evident in Table 4-1 relates to specific characteristics of the alternative models. For example, the attractive feature of Model 3 is the fact that the board, appointed by the governor, has the prerogative of naming its own chief state school officer. Models 1 and 2 lack this possibility, each having a CSSO appointed by the governor, a feature found generally unacceptable. Unacceptable also is the option of an elected CSSO, as indicated by the small proportion expressing preference for Model 4. Apparently most respondents feel that state boards should have unambiguous authority, whether elected or appointed, and that the structure of educational governance should not allow the state board's chief executive an independent base of power from which he might challenge board decisions, rather than implement them.

Model 5, the second to receive substantial support as being the personal preference of respondents, parallels Model 3 in having an appointed board which, in turn, appoints the CSSO. However, differentiating this structure from Model 3 is the fact that input to the process of board selection is broadened to include both legislators and leading citizens. Clearly this broadening of participation in board selection is approved by many respondents.

Model 6, which attracted little support, is differentiated from Model 5 only by the composition of the nominating committee. In Model 6, committee membership would be restricted to representatives of educational organizations,

allowing professional domination of the selection of state boards, an option which has little attraction for respondents. Response to Model 7 reflects the presence of strong, though minority, sentiment for state boards elected on a non-partisan basis. Model 8 is differentiated from Model 7 in allowing for partisan election of the state board, an option drawing little support.

In general, therefore, Models 3, 5, and 7, are the ones most favored. However, among these three, and especially between Models 3 and 5 on the one hand and Model 7 on the other, there are major differentiating characteristics. Given these differences, the question arises as to whether each model may be drawing support from distinctive, and different, groups among the persons completing the questionnaires, a possibility explored next.

Differential Support for Alternative Models

The existence of distinctive patterns of support for alternative models receives confirmation from the pattern of intercorrelations among respondents' choices, shown in Table 4-2. While data in Table 4-1 are derived from respondents' selection of one model from among all eight, correlations in Table 4-2 are generated by respondents appraisal of models separately. Respondents were given the option of checking each as very acceptable, acceptable, unacceptable, or very unacceptable.

One fact which becomes apparent from the pattern of intercorrelations in Table 4-2 is presence of division between persons favoring appointed as compared with elected state boards, reflected in the negative correlations between Model 7, incorporating non-partisan election, and Models 1, 2, and 3, those most unambiguously appointive in terms of state boards.

The substantively interesting relationships, of course, are those between Models 3, 5, and 7; the only ones to receive a majority of favorable choices from respondents, as shown in Part II of Appendix B. While Models 3 and 7

TABLE 4-2

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG RESPONDENTS' PREFERENCES FOR EACH OF EIGHT ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF THE STRUCTURE OF STATE GOVERNANCE OF EDUCATION[a]

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1		0.72	0.16	0.16	*	0.16	-0.17	*
2			0.16	*	*	*	-0.28	*
3				*	0.24	*	-0.20	*
4					*	0.14[b]	*	0.16
5						*	*	*
6							*	0.18
7								0.42
8								

[a]Correlations omitted did not reach 0.01 level. In fact, all but one of those shown were significant at the 0.001 level; all N's greater than 400.

[b]Significant at 0.002 level.

generate one of the strongest negative associations in Table 4-2, reflecting a tendency for persons choosing the one to reject the other, Models 3 and 5 are linked positively, indicating that the same respondents were likely to opt for both.

Apart from the interrelationships among the three most favored models, two other correlations are worth noting; those between Models 1 and 2, and between Models 7 and 8. The former correlation, 0.72, is by far the highest between any pair of models, though its importance is in doubt. As shown by data in Table 4-3, the correlation reflects the fact that a high <u>proportion</u> of persons finding Model 1 acceptable also opt for Model 2. However, the actual <u>number</u> of persons accepting either model is relatively small. The great majority of respondents rejected both.

TABLE 4-3

DISTRIBUTION OF CHOICES REGARDING ACCEPTABILITY OF MODELS 1 AND 2[a]

MODEL 1	MODEL 2		TOTAL
	Acceptable	Unacceptable	
Acceptable	67	46	113
Unacceptable	18	292	310
TOTAL	85	338	423

[a]Acceptable combines questionnaire items "very acceptable" and "acceptable"; unacceptable similarly combines "very unacceptable" and "unacceptable."

The next highest correlation, 0.42, is found between Models 7 and 8 both of which incorporate an elected state board. The actual distribution of responses to both models is displayed in Table 4.

TABLE 4-4

DISTRIBUTION OF CHOICES REGARDING ACCEPTABILITY OF MODELS 7 and 8[a]

MODEL 7	MODEL 8		TOTAL
	Acceptable	Unacceptable	
Acceptable	74	140	214
Unacceptable	18	190	208
TOTAL	92	330	422

[a]See footnote under Table 4-3.

Again, the importance of the association between Models 7 and 8 is limited by the fact that relatively few respondents actually found the latter acceptable, though of those who did, most opted also for Model 7, generating the positive correlation.

In summary, therefore, the pattern of responses displayed in Table 4-2 confirms that respondents tend to separate into distinctive groups with regard

to preferences for alternative models of educational governance. The main distinction lies between those persons opting for models characterized by appointed versus elected state boards, with a majority opting for appointment, either exclusively by the governor (Model 3) or by the governor with added input from legislators and prominent citizens (Model 5). Further insight into these differential sources of support is gained by exploring the background characteristics of respondents favoring the alternative models.

Background of Respondents

When responses were analyzed in relation to background characteristics of persons completing the questionnaire, most proved to be unrelated to preferences. Among such background factors were occupation, state of residence, experience as a professional educator, and type of area in which respondents resided; whether rural, suburban, or urban. One characteristic, though, did emerge as influential; current position in state or local government, a factor closely related to whether respondents were politicians or not. The relevant data are displayed in Table 4-5 showing the distribution of choices between the three most preferred models, 3, 5, and 7, by respondents' current position in state and local government.

Data presented in Table 4-5 show that educational governance based upon appointed boards, exemplified by Models 3 and 5, attracts majority support from persons in each of the three current position categories. However, among these categories, state level politicians expressed strongest support for the two appointive models and, conversely, gave relatively weak endorsement to Model 7, a structure characterized by an elected board.

These differential orientations to the recruitment of state board members are confirmed by data presented later, in Table 4-11, showing the pattern of response to the first question in the survey instrument. Instead of seeking

TABLE 4-5

DISTRIBUTION OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE CHOICES BETWEEN THE THREE MOST PREFERRED MODELS BY RESPONDENT'S CURRENT POSITION IN STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Current Position in State or Local Government	Model Number 3	5	7	Other Models	N
Governor's Office, Legislator, or Legislative Aide	32.9%	26.0%	8.2%	32.9%	73
CSSO, State Board Member, or State Department Employee	27.1	27.1	25.4	20.4	59
Other State Employee, or Local Board of Education Members	34.9	20.9	24.4	19.8	86
None of the Above, and No Response	24.8	23.4	24.3	27.5	214

preferences among alternative models, this question asked whether respondents preferred an elected or appointed state board, presenting three alternative modes of appointment, and three types of election. Again, respondents holding political office in state government showed strongest approval of appointment, 82 per cent opting for this procedure compared to 62 per cent of respondents in the other two current position categories. Attractiveness of gubernatorial appointment among all respondents may be due to the fact that, whatever its defects, it is seen as maximizing the probability of a good working relationship between the state board and the chief executive. Among persons holding current positions in state government, strong support for appointive boards reflects respondents' feelings that they should be in direct control of appointments to key positions in educational governance, a service for which they are ultimately responsible in any case. Respondents in the category of current position in state government included the four

state governors who returned questionnaires, 14 persons employed in governors' offices, and 56 members of state legislatures.

Influence of Existing Governance Structures

While respondents' current position in state government, and their attitude regarding elected versus appointed state boards, both influence their choice of preferred model, another potential source of influence upon choice is the existing structure of educational governance in respondents' states. People may prefer what they are used to. Actually what the data reveal is that while there is a positive association between existing and preferred models, it is not substantial. What is strong, by contrast, is the association between existing models and those judged to be politically possible in each state.

The correlation between respondents' choice of model as approximating the existing structure in their state, and their preferred models, is 0.29, as measured by Gamma.[1] While positive, this degree of association is not sufficient to give one much confidence in existing models as a basis for predicting those that are preferred.

By contrast, the association between respondents designation of the model which approximates existing state structure and the model they judge most politically possible is 0.60.[2] Clearly, existing structures are a relatively good basis for predicting respondents estimates of what is politically possible. These findings suggest that while a majority of respondents assume that the structure of educational governance in their state is, in fact, the one most likely to be possible politically, only a minority find their existing model to be the one they prefer, a conclusion which bears upon the question of levels of satisfaction with existing governmental arrangements, a topic discussed later.

To explore the actual pattern of relationships between existing and preferred models data were examined in the form presented in Table 4-6.

TABLE 4-6

PROPORTION OF PERSONS SELECTING AS THEIR ONE PREFERRED MODEL THE SAME MODEL THEY CITE AS APPROXIMATING THE EXISTING STRUCTURE IN THEIR STATE, AND PROPORTIONS SELECTING MODELS 3, 5, AND 7

Existing Model	Preferred Model 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	N
1	20.0%		25.0%		15.0%		20.0%		20
2		20.5	30.8		23.1		17.9		39
3			49.1		21.9		10.5		114
4			23.8	9.9	17.8		27.7		101
5			6.6		61.3		9.7		31
6			0.0		66.7	33.3	0.0		3
7			7.9		21.1		46.1		76
8			45.5		13.6		4.5	13.6	22
Per Cent Preferring Each Model	4.4	6.7	28.3	4.4	23.4	6.4	22.2	3.9	406

It is evident from the data in Table 4-6 that two factors result in the degree of association between existing and preferred models being relatively low. One is that while the three most popular Models 3, 5, and 7, were strongly preferred by respondents from states in which these same models approximate existing structures, only in one case, that of Model 5, did more than 50 per cent of the persons citing this as their existing structure proceed also to choose it as their single most preferred structure. Model 3 received 49 per cent of the choices of those for whom it is the existing model; Model 7 received 46 per cent.

The other factor reducing the degree of association between existing and preferred models is that respondents from states which do not use structures approximating Models 3, 5, and 7 distribute more than half their preference choices among these three models anyway, tending to reject their existing state structures.

As with Table 4-1, data in Table 4-6 again show Model 4, characterized by an elected CSSO, as the structure most obviously rejected. While cited by 101 respondents as the model approximating the existing structure in their state, only 9.9 per cent checked Model 4 as their personally preferred structure. The great majority distributed their choices between Models 3, 5, and 7.

In contrast to the pattern of relationships between existing and preferred models, shown in Table 4-6, the more substantial association between existing and politically possible models is displayed in Table 4-7.

The most obvious finding presented in Table 4-7 is evident from the diagonal percentages showing the proportion of persons selcting as the model most politically possible in their state the same model cited as actually existing. In contrast to Table 4-6, all but two of the eight diagonal proportions in Table 4-7 exceed 50 per cent. This is true even for Model 4. Despite being held in relatively low esteem in terms of preference, 60 per cent of respondents in states characterized by Model 4 type governance structure judge this to be the most politically possible. This discrepancy between preferred and possible models raises the question of the degree of satisfaction among respondents with regard to existing models, an issue discussed next.

Correlates of Dissatisfaction

Respondents were asked, "In general, how do you feel about the present structure for educational governance in your state?" Of the 454 persons checking this question, 57.4 per cent expressed satisfaction, 42.5 per cent

TABLE 4-7

PROPORTION OF PERSONS SELECTING AS THE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE MODEL FOR THEIR STATE THE SAME MODEL THEY CITE AS APPROXIMATING THE EXISTING STRUCTURE AND PROPORTIONS CITING MODELS 3, 5, AND 7

Existing Model	Most Politically Possible Model								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	N
1	45.0%		25.0%		0.0%		20.0%		20
2		60.0	10.0		10.0		5.0		40
3			61.3		15.3		9.9		111
4			16.3	60.2	3.1		11.2		98
5			0.0		75.0		9.4		32
6			0.0		66.7	0.0	0.0		3
7			9.1		11.7		66.2		77
8			20.0		0.0		15.0	55.0	20
Per Cent Citing Each Model	4.5	8.2	25.9	17.5	14.7	1.7	21.2	6.2	401

were dissatisfied. In seeking correlates of dissatisfaction three factors appear important; the existing structure of educational governance in a state, the current position in state government held by respondents, and whether respondents are employed as teachers, at either the elementary, secondary or college levels.

The pattern of association between satisfaction of respondents and the characteristics of their existing structures of state educational governance is outlined in Table 4-8.

From Table 4-8, a relatively clear pattern of satisfaction emerges, reinforcing findings presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-6. If one ignores Model 6, checked by only three respondents, Models 3 and 5 evoke the highest levels

TABLE 4-8

PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH THE MODEL OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE THEY CITE AS EXISTING IN THEIR OWN STATE

	Model Approximating Existing State Structure								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total[a]
Satisfied Respondents	45.0%	46.3%	76.3%	43.4%	75.0%	100.0%	56.5%	59.9%	59.2%
N	20	41	114	99	32	3	76	22	407

[a]Based upon respondents who checked existing models, as well as replying to the satisfaction question.

of satisfaction. The response to these two models emphasizes again the popularity of governance structures allowing for appointed state boards, which in turn appoint their chief state school officers. Model 4, by contrast, generates the least satisfaction, reflecting dislike among the respondents, all of whom are persons well informed about state school educational affairs, with the practice of electing chief state school officers. Also evoking relatively low satisfaction are Models 1 and 2, neither of which allows state boards to appoint their own chief executives, a problematic aspect of Model 4.

In summary, therefore, data in Table 4-8 show that respondents are most content with Models 3 and 5; most discontent with Models 1, 2, and 4, and about equally divided between satisfied and dissatisfied with Models 7 and 8.

Looking at other correlates of dissatisfaction, while some existing models are liked a good deal more than others, creating between-model variance in satisfaction, there is also variance in response to individual models, generating within-state differences in levels of satisfaction. Both types of variance become apparent when one analyzes satisfaction with existing structures in terms of respondents current position in state government, which as shown in Table 4-5, is one individual background factor related to

respondents' choice of preferred model. Specifically, as shown in Table 4-9, satisfaction with existing structures is highest among persons actually working within such structures; state board members, chief state school officers, and state department employees. This suggests that pressures for structural change are more likely to come from outside, rather than from within, existing state educational agencies.

The actual pattern of satisfaction among respondents located in different current positions in state government is displayed in Table 4-9, and becomes most apparent if one compares the data for "all respondents" in column 5 with that in the other four columns. First of all, looking across the top row of Table 4-9, the data show that 73.3 per cent of persons involved directly in state educational governance (column 1) are satisfied with existing structures, compared to 57.4 per cent of all respondents. By contrast, among persons not holding governmental positions (column 4) less than half express satisfaction.

Persons in the remaining two categories of current position in local government, politicians (column 2) and persons in positions outside the state education agency (column 3) generate proportions of satisfied respondents at about the same level as for all respondents (column 5).

While there is a definite pattern of association between current position and satisfaction with existing governance structures, of course these findings could be spurious, in that they may reflect a disproportionate distribution of respondents in relation to existing models. For example, if respondents in column 1 included a disproportionate number of persons who identified their existing state structure as approximating Models 3 and 5, which are highly favored, then the whole group of respondents in that category would show higher than average levels of satisfaction. In practice, however, the distribution across models in each category of Table 4-9 is quite close

TABLE 4-9

PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH EXISTING STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE BY CURRENT POSITIONS IN STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND BY MODEL OF EXISTING STATE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Existing Models	State Board Member, CSSO, State Dept. Employee (1)	Governor's Office Legislator, Legislative Aide (2)	Dept. of Admin. and/or Finance, Local Board of Education, Other (3)	No Current Position in State or Local Government (4)	Respondents (All) (5)
ALL	73.3% (60)	59.0% (78)	58.2% (91)	48.2% (139)	57.4% (454)
1, 2, 6	60.0% (5)	55.5% (11)	41.6% (12)	41.7% (24)	48.4% (64)
3, 5	90.0 (22)	75.0 (28)	71.0 (31)	67.4 (43)	76.0 (146)
4	46.1 (13)	53.3 (15)	42.1 (19)	42.4 (33)	43.4 (99)
7, 8	70.5 (17)	58.8 (17)	65.0 (20)	41.3 (24)	57.1 (98)

to that for all respondents, data on which are provided in Table 4-1. For example, in Table 4-1, Models 3 and 5 are identified as approximating existing state structures by 35.6 per cent of all respondents. Therefore, if the 60 respondents directly involved in state educational governance (column 1, Table 4-9) were distributed between models in the same proportion as all respondents there should be 21 who identified models 3 and 5 as approximating their existing state structures, a figure quite close to the actual 22. Similarly, for Models 7 and 8 the expected number of respondents is 15 compared to the actual 17; for Model 4, one of the least favored models, the expected figure is 15 while the actual is 13, again quite close. A larger departure from the expected figure occurs for respondents in column 1 who identified either Models 1, 2, or 6, as the structure in their home state. Here the expected number is 9 which is larger than the actual 5, but would

not substantially alter the aggregate proportion of satisfied respondents for all cases in column 1. The relatively close relationship between expected and actual numbers of cases holds for each of the other columns in Table 4-9.

While the distribution of respondents between models is not sufficiently disproportionate to produce the observed differences in percentage of satisfied respondents between categories of current position, when one disaggregates the data in row 1, responses to individual models take on an interesting pattern.

To facilitate disaggregation of the data in a meaningful way, models have been grouped in Table 4-9 on the basis of three criteria: their intercorrelations as shown in Table 4-2; the proportion of respondents expressing satisfaction with the model, as shown in Table 4-8; and specific characteristics unique to each model.

First of all, Models, 1, 2, and 6 are placed together. Models 1 and 2 have the highest intercorrelation of any pair, as preferred choices, and both evoke relatively low levels of satisfaction. Model 6, though empirically trivial, being named by less than 1 per cent of respondents, is included with Models 1 and 2, being positively correlated with the former.

Models 3 and 5 are much more interesting. Characterized by appointed state boards, these two are positively correlated as preferred models. Together they were identified as existing structures by 35.6 per cent of respondents, and among these same respondents over 75 per cent expressed satisfaction. Model 4 is treated separately, being unique in having an elected CSSO. While identified as an existing structure by 25 per cent of respondents, only 43.4 per cent expressed satisfaction. Models 7 and 8 are characterized by elected state boards, and are highly correlated as preferred models. They were identified as existing structures by 24 per cent of respondents, over half of whom indicated satisfaction.

Referring back to Table 4-9, first of all it is evident that, as in the first row, where all models are combined, in three of the four lower rows the proportion of satisfied respondents again ranges between the high values of column 1 and the lows of column 4, with column 5 falling in a mid-position. The exception is the row for Model 4, in which relatively low proportions of persons in each category of current position express satisfaction, reinforcing the point made previously that structures with an elected CSSO are generally in disfavor among respondents. By contrast, Models 3 and 5, whose appointed boards appoint their own CSSOs, are again associated with the highest proportion of satisfied respondents in each current position category, ranging from 90 per cent for persons participating directly in state educational governance through 67.4 per cent of persons without any governmental position, and averaging 76.0 per cent across all respondents.

In summary, therefore, persons participating most directly in educational governance are the most satisfied with the existing structures, those least involved are also least satisfied. Respondents directly involved in areas of state or local government other than education generate a proportion satisfied that falls between the two extremes. Further, Models 3 and 5 attract most satisfaction, Model 4 the least.

As noted earlier, the fact that persons least involved in state governance of education also are least satisfied suggests that pressures for change are most likely to emerge from outside, rather than from within, existing state educational agencies. One clue as to a possible source of pressure for change lies in the differential distribution of dissatisfaction among respondents according to their occupations. Among the more than twenty categories into which respondents' occupations were coded, in only three such categories did a majority of respondents record dissatisfaction with the existing pattern of educational governance in their state; these

categories were governor's staff, teachers (elementary and secondary), and college faculty. As shown in Table 4-10, the proportion dissatisfied in these three occupations contrast strongly with the 42.6 per cent overall level of dissatisfaction, though only for college faculty is the number of respondents sufficiently large for one to have much confidence in the findings.

Of particular interest is the fact that among all occupational groups, teachers, whether at the elementary, secondary, or college levels, are the most dissatisfied. Reasons for this are not ascertainable from the survey data, but one may hypothesize that at issue is the problem of economic resources. Teachers are increasingly dependent upon the state educational agency for access to resources, both for their salaries, and for services needed to facilitate their instructional activities. Certainly there is growing militancy among teachers, and some of their dissatisfaction is evidently directed toward the state. Interestingly, persons working for the state educational agency are the most satisfied, as described earlier, a condition which predicts tension between state officials on the one hand, and front-line personnel, the teaching staffs, on the other. Some insight into the changes in structure which might be sought in the future is derived from the earlier analysis of the distribution of preferences among alternative models. While 3, 5, and 7 are the most frequently chosen, among existing models, 2 and 4 are those most commonly rejected. Further information on possible directions for future developments in state education agencies is provided by responses to a variety of specific questions included in the survey instrument regarding components of the policy-making structure of educational governance.

TABLE 4-10

PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH EXISTING STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THEIR STATE BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONS

Respondents' Occupation	Respondents' Satisfaction		N
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	
Governor's Staff	28.5	71.5	7
Teacher (Elementary and Secondary)	41.1	58.9	17
College Faculty	47.2	52.8	91
Other Occupations	61.4	38.6	311
All Respondents	57.4	42.6	454

Alternative Components

As a second task, the survey sought preferences with respect to a number of specific components or characteristics of state structures for the governance of education. The structure and tasks of state boards of education were the main concerns of the first set of survey questions, all of which are reproduced in Appendix B. The first question addressed the issue of board member selection, offering respondents six choices; three related to appointment by the governor, and three covering alternative modes of election. Results are displayed in Table 4-11.

Data in Table 4-11 show that for all categories of respondents a majority favor appointment of state board members. As might be expected, politicians most strongly favor appointment, their responses in column 1 across the three types summing to 82.4 per cent, compared to an average of 65.0 per cent for each of the remaining columns. Further, politicians especially favor appointment by the governor subject to approval of the legislature. It is also of interest that persons in this same category, who are themselves elected to office, show least support for the election

TABLE 4-11

DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES FOR ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF SELECTING STATE SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS

Method of Board Selection	Current Position in State or Local Government				All Respondents
	Governor's Office Legislator Legislative Aide (1)	State Board Member, CSSO, State Dept. Employee (2)	Dept. of Admin. and/or Finance Local Board of Education Other (3)	No Current Position in State or Local Government (4)	(5)
Appt. by Governor	27.9%	16.6%	16.5%	11.4%	17.0%
Appt. by Governor subject to Legislature	40.6	33.2	27.5	24.8	30.2
Appt. by Governor from citizen committee list	13.9	15.0	19.8	26.9	20.5
Non-Partisan election	12.7	25.0	25.2	29.0	24.0
Partisan election	3.7	3.3	2.2	4.4	3.5
Election by local school board members	1.2	6.6	8.8	3.5	4.6
N	79	60	91	141	455

of board members. This finding parallels the data in Table 4-5 which show that Model 7, in which the board is elected, on a non-partisan ballot, receives least support from politicians relative to Models 3 and 5, both of which allow for appointed boards.

Regarding election, among those respondents favoring this option the great majority chose the non-partisan approach, an orientation reflected in the preference among respondents for Model 7 as compared to Model 8. Respondents who do not hold positions in state or local government (column 4 of Table 4-11) give strongest support to an elected board, though still providing a majority in favor of appointment.

Regarding the models, data in Table 4-11 suggest that the one structure which, in fact, would receive greatest support was not offered as an alternative. This would be a structure like Model 5, but omitting the citizens committee, allowing only for legislators' approval of the governor's nominees. Overall, such a model is the most favored among the appointive options of Table 4-11, and is especially attractive to politicians (column 1). Among persons holding no position in state government (column 4), the citizens committee is somewhat more attractive. Both procedures, the citizens committee and approval of the governor's appointments by the legislature, are combined in Model 5, one of the three most preferred structures.

Confirmation of the pattern of responses to the preference survey is provided by data from an earlier study which also sought respondents' opinions on governance structure.

Comparison with 1971 Survey

It is interesting to compare the findings in Table 4-11 with those from a 1971 survey conducted by Lindman.[3] In a questionnaire addressed to an audience similar to the one which received the 1973 preference survey, respondents were asked to check whether they favored the appointment of state boards, or their election. Comparability between responses to the two surveys is restricted by the fact that Lindman presented respondents with only one type of appointment; by the governor acting alone. However, Lindman's respondents were allowed to select between the same three modes of election as in the 1973 study; non-partisan, partisan, or by local school board members. Results are presented in Table 4-12.

Perhaps the most interesting finding presented in Table 4-12 is that, as with comparable data from the more recent study presented in Table 4-11, elected politicians (column 1) again gave priority to the appointment of

state board members by the governor, while other categories of respondents were relatively more favorable toward elected boards. Comparisons between Tables 4-11 and 4-12 also show stronger support for elected boards among respondents to the 1971 survey. This difference, however, is due to the nature of the options provided by the two surveys and indicates the importance of adding to the structure of educational governance elements which allow for broadened public participation. In contrast to Lindman's questionnaire, the more recent preference survey added two options to simple appointment by the governor; appointment subject to approval of the legislature, or appointment from among persons recommended by a citizens nominating committee. Of the three modes of appointment, that allowing for the governor's nominees to be subject to approval by the legislature proved to be especially attractive, as shown in Table 4-11.

Inclusion of the legislature in the appointment process is presumably a major reason why respondents to the preference survey, in comparison to those replying to Lindman's questionnaire, were drawn away from the option of an elected board.

Other State Board Characteristics

Returning to the questionnaire section of the preference survey, when respondents were asked about length of service on the state board, 54.5 per cent chose four years, and gave overwhelming support for periods of service to overlap between members. In terms of size, 52.6 per cent of respondents opted for eight to eleven members, 22.6 per cent suggested five to seven, and 20.7 per cent chose twelve to fifteen members. These members should be compensated for attendance at board meetings in the view of 97.6 per cent of respondents, though opinion varied as to amount. 37.5 per cent chose $25.00 to $50.00 per diem, plus expenses, though a close second, chosen by 34.5 per cent, was that board members should only receive expenses.

TABLE 4-12

DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES AMONG RESPONDENTS TO 1971 EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES SURVEY REGARDING METHODS OF SELECTING STATE SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS[a]

Methods of Board Selection	State Governors and Legislators	CSSO's and State Board Members	Presidents of State Assn.'s of School Boards	Other Respon-dents[d]	All
Appointment by governor	66.3%	43.0%	57.1%	40.0%	51.2%
Election on non-partisan ballot	23.9	39.3	32.1	47.6	36.4
Election on partisan ballot	7.0	7.6	7.2	2.2	5.2
Election by local board members	2.8	10.1	3.6	9.6	7.2
N	113	79	28	130	350

[a]Data from Erick Lindman, "Intergovernmental Relations and the Governance of Education." Report to President's Commission on School Finance from Education Commission of the States: Denver, Colorado, 1971.

[b]Other categories used were Presidents of State Associations of School Administrators, PTA leaders, Presidents of State Teachers' Associations and Federal officials.

A more complex aspect of the structure of state boards of education is the question as to legally required categories of membership. Offered eight separate categories, only one, representation of different geographic regions, attracted more than 50 per cent of affirmative responses. The other options for legally required memberships, all attracting considerably less than 50 per cent support from respondents were, in rank order:

Minority group members	29.6%
Local school board members	26.1
Teachers	24.0
School administrators	23.8
Representatives of major political parties	23.2
Students	21.5
Representatives of non-public schools	20.5

All N's above 426

A final structural component of state boards for which preferences were sought was whether the board, for its own staff services, should rely upon personnel from the state department, or also have an independent staff, exempt from civil service. Sentiment ran close on this issue, with 54.8 per cent of respondents approving board reliance upon state department personnel.

Regarding the role of state boards in relation to the legislature and the governor, respondents were asked how important a role the state board should play. Results are presented in Table 4-13.

TABLE 4-13

PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS SELECTING AMONG ALTERNATIVE DEGREES TO WHICH STATE BOARDS SHOULD BE A SOURCE OF ADVICE TO THE LEGISLATURE AND THE GOVERNOR

	Not a Source	A Minor Source	A Major Source	The Most Important Source	N
As a source of advice to the legislature	0.4	6.1	71.8	21.7	461
As a source of advice to the governor	0.7	5.0	71.2	23.1	459

The data presented in Table 4-13 show that respondents consider the state boards as very important sources of advice to policy-makers, over 20 per cent proposing that they be the most important source.

The Chief State School Officer

A second set of questions in the survey instrument addressed the specifics of the role and function of the chief state school officer. The first of these questions sought to elicit preferences regarding the CSSO's

role in policy making. Responses are distributed as follows:

The CSSO should:

Be solely an administrative officer	6.9%
Be an administrative officer and help with the formulation of policy	57.6
Share formal policy-making authority with the State Board of Education	33.1
Exercise formal policy-making authority in his own right	2.4
(N=463)	

Evidently, therefore, the priority preference is the second, in which the CSSO would primarily focus upon administration and help with, rather than formulate policy.

A related question asked how much direction should the state board give to the CSSO in connection with his administrative duties. Responses were:

No direction	6.9%
Some general direction	50.3
Much general direction	38.2
Specific and detailed instructions	4.5
(N=463)	

Most of the questions discussed elicited rather consistent responses across various categories of respondents when subjected to analysis. However, in response to the above question, again those persons whose current position in state government was a party office had a distinctive viewpoint. These respondents, working in the governor's office, the legislature, or as legislative aides, responded as follows:

No direction	4.9%
Some general direction	39.5
Much general direction	45.7
Specific and detailed instructions	9.9
(N=81)	

In contrast to other respondents, those involved directly in partisan politics opted more frequently for the state board playing a very directive role in relation to the CSSO.

Variation between groups holding different positions in state government was also apparent regarding the next question, soliciting preferences regarding ways in which the CSSO should be selected. The data generated are presented in Table 4-14.

TABLE 4-14

PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS OPTING FOR DIFFERENT MODES OF SELECTING CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, BY CURRENT POSITION IN STATE GOVERNMENT

Selection of CSSO	Current Position			
	Governor's Office Legislator Legislative Aide	State Board Member CSSO, State Department Employee	Dept. of Adm. or Finance Local Board of Education or Other	No position in State Government No reply
Appointed by governor	16.0	0.0	4.4	3.0
Appointed by governor subject to approval of legislature	17.3	6.7	9.9	12.1
Appointment by State Board of Education	53.1	80.0	81.3	70.6
Non-partisan election	8.6	11.7	4.4	11.7
Partisan election	4.9	1.7	0.0	2.6
N	81	60	91	231

From Table 4-14 it is apparent that while a majority of respondents in all four groupings favor CSSO's being appointed by state board's, this procedure receives relatively less support from politicians; persons in the governor's office, legislators and legislative aides. Among persons in this category of current position, a substantial minority, 33.3 per cent, are attracted to the option of the CSSO being appointed by the governor. Overall, election to the office of CSSO draws relatively little support, confirming the earlier findings regarding the lack of support for Model 4.

On the question of whether or not there should be legal requirements for the position of CSSO, 75 per cent of 417 respondents said yes. For the three requirements specified, responses were as follows:

Legal residence in the state	64.2% (293)
Professional educator	85.9 (306)
Experience as a school district superintendent	43.5 (262)

The final question relating to the role of the CSSO asked how important this officer should be as a source of advice to the legislature and the governor on educational matters. Findings replicated those for the same question regarding the role of the state board, with over 70 per cent of respondents agreeing that the CSSO should be a major source of advice to both the governor and legislature, and close to 20 per cent proposing that he should be the most important source.

Having covered alternative characteristics and functions of state boards, and possible variations in recruitment practices and job characteristics for chief state school officers, the survey instrument sought preferences regarding the degree of policy-making authority which should be accorded the state education agency for selected tasks.

Policy Role of the State Education Agency

Respondents were provided the following list of areas of activity and invited to indicate how much policy-making authority at the state level should be given by the legislature to the state education agency in relation to each area. Responses to the "All" and "Nearly All" options were aggregated and are presented here, ranked according to the proportion of affirmative responses.

Professional certification	81.6% (458)
Planning and Research	76.4 (457)
Federal aid and federal assistance programs	68.8 (458)

Curriculum and course study	67.1	(459)
Assessment of pupil performance	62.7	(458)
School district organization and reorganization	60.4	(452)
School desegregation	54.0	(448)
Buildings and sites	52.8	(459)
School Finance, including the state foundation programs	49.7	(455)
Levying statewide taxes for public school finances	24.0	(454)

The rank order of responses to the above list of activities exhibits an interesting distribution. At the one extreme very strong approval is granted to the proposal that state education agencies take over all, or nearly all, policy-making authority in relation to the certification of professionals in education, a personnel function. As activities move closer to financial affairs, involving problems of resource allocation within the state, respondents become increasingly reluctant to pass all authority to the education agency, evidently strongly disapproving the granting of taxing authority

Finally, with regard to areas over which state education agencies should have authority, the survey questionnaire sought respondents' views as to whether these agencies should extend their responsibility beyond elementary and secondary levels to include higher education.

A majority, 59.0 per cent of 434 persons responding, favored state education agencies taking responsibility for community colleges. However, only 36.1 per cent favored these agencies extending their authority to cover four-year colleges and universities.

Analysis of these responses shows some variation between persons in different current positions in state government. Interestingly, the group most favorable toward state education agencies overseeing community colleges was that which included state board members, CSSO's, and state department of education employees. Of the 58 persons from this group who responded, 65.5 per cent, or 6.5 per cent above the average, favored community colleges

coming under the state education agency. At the other extreme, only 48.6 per cent of 74 respondents in partisan political positions; governor's office, legislators, and legislative aides, favored extending state education agency responsibility to community colleges. These differing orientations within state government, between those directly involved in educational governance and those concerned with overall governmental problems, indicates a possible area of tension in some states.

Conclusions

Several conclusions emerge from the findings presented here. First of all, among persons informed about educational governance at the state level, existing structures evoke varying levels of satisfaction. Specifically, Models 3 and 5 stand out as eliciting most approval, while Models 1, 2, and 4 were evaluated as satisfactory by less than half of the respondents. Dissatisfaction with Model 4 has important policy implications as this type of structure, characterized by an elected CSSO, presently exists in at least nineteen states. As shown by data in Table 4-6, most respondents from these states would actually prefer Models 3, 5 and 7, which suggests the probable direction of future efforts at changing existing governance structures.

A second major conclusion relates to the question of preferred models. From the findings it is evident that Models 3, 5, and 7 are preferred by respondents generally, not only by those from states with elected CSSO's. Models 3 and 5 are characterized by appointed boards, which in turn appoint their chief executive officers. The two models differ in that Model 5 admits the legislature and a blue ribbon nominating committee into the selection of board members. Model 7 contrasts to 3 and 5 in that it allows for non-partisan election of board members, paralleling the typical structure of local school district governance.

Implicit in the reasons why Models 3, 5, and 7 attract the support of the respondents are the arguments against the other alternatives. Model 1 has no state board. Model 2 creates an ambiguous relationship between the state board and CSSO, both being appointed by the governor. From the findings it is evident that respondents want the CSSO to be appointed by the board. Even when the CSSO is elected, as in Model 4, this procedure is largely unacceptable.

Model 6 found little support, presumably because it differs in a rather crucial respect from the strongly favored Model 5. In Model 6 the nominating committee for state board members is composed of representatives of educational organizations, throwing control to the professionals, a generally unwelcomed option. Finally, Model 8 drew little support because of sentiment against partisan election of state board members.

Models 3 and 5, which represent variants of a structure in which the governor appoints state board members, together attracted the preference of 52.3 per cent of respondents, compared to 21.8 per cent opting for Model 7, with an elected state board. This result is surprising in view of the prevalence of Model 7 type structures at the local school district level. Apparently, among persons informed about state governance of education, there is a relatively high level of consensus that as the governor, and legislature, have ultimate responsibility for education, they should also be allowed control over key positions in the structure of educational governance. In fact, of all feasible models, one that data in Table 4-11 suggest would attract support from the single largest proportion of all respondents would be a structure similar to Model 5, but without the blue ribbon nominating committee. Appointment to the state board would be made by the governor, subject to approval by the legislature.

A third set of conclusions relates to the backgrounds of respondents. Findings demonstrate that bearing upon expressed preferences were respondents' current position in state government, and whether or not respondents were teachers, especially at the college level. For example, while no more than 25 per cent of respondents in any category of current position in state government selected as their most preferred choice Model 7, which allows for an elected state board, among politicians support for this model dropped to only 8.2 per cent. Conversely, politicians showed relatively strong support for Model 3, in which the board is appointed by the governor.

In addition to being associated with variation in choice of preferred model, current governmental position of respondents was also related to satisfaction with the existing model in their own state. In general, persons employed directly in educational governance were the most satisfied; those without any current governmental position were the most dissatisfied.

This finding indicates that pressure for change in the structure of educational governance is most likely to come from external sources, rather than to emerge internally. One specific source of demands for change is likely to be faculty members at colleges and universities. Among respondents, persons from this occupational group were especially dissatisfied with existing educational governance structures.

Finally, preferences for specific components of the structure and functions of the state board and the chief state school officer were most nonproblematic, and elaborate upon the findings detailed with regard to alternative models. Particularly interesting, of course, is the finding, that an additional structure, similar to Model 5 but omitting the nominating committee, would have proved especially attractive to respondents. This has obvious policy implications, as do the findings regarding the distribution of opinion concerning the jurisdiction of state boards over higher

education. While a majority of respondents in all categories of current position in state government rejected state boards controlling four year colleges and universities, only politicians produced a majority against state boards extending jurisdiction over community colleges. Other groups of respondents favored this development, especially persons engaged directly within state education agencies. It appears, therefore, that in some states tensions exist within the government itself regarding who should have jurisdiction over community colleges, a topic worth further investigation.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

[1] Crosstabulation of choices for existing and preferred model generates a Chi Square of 181 (56 D.F.) which is significant beyond the 0.001 level.

[2] Crosstabulation of choices for existing model and politically preferred model generates a Chi Square of 735 (49 D.F.) which is significant beyond the 0.001 level.

[3] Erick L. Lindman. "Intergovernmental Relations and the Governance of Education." Unpublished report to the President's Commission on School Finance. Denver, Colorado: Education Commission of the States, 1971.

CHAPTER V

MAKING USE OF THE MODELS

Introduction

Let us recall what we have done to this point. In Chapter I we depicted briefly the structural components of the state education agency as it now exists in each of the 50 states. We gave some attention to the historical development of the agency, noted that these agencies are still undergoing reorganization, and actually described recent changes in Maine, Kansas, and Illinois. We then suggested some of the recurring issues which emerge when changes in these agencies are contemplated. These issues center around the nature of the state board of education and the scope of the board's jurisdiction, the role ascribed to the CSSO and his relationship to the board and to other actors in the policy system, and finally the power placed in the governor's office to influence policy making for education.

In Chapter II we explicated three classes of structural arrangements or models for the governance of elementary and secondary education at the state level. The first class included three models and these were designated centralized executive models. The second class also included three models and these were designated separate agency models. The last class was composed of one model only and was called simply the combination model. For each class and indeed for some of the individual models the competing values were elaborated. For instance, the centralized executive models allocate more power to the governor, the separate agency models allocate more power to the state education agency, and the combination model is an attempt to balance the power between the governor's office and the state education agency. Where our research or the research of other investigators seemed to bear directly upon any of these alternative arrangements that research was treated.

An attempt was made to keep the basic features of any model simple. For instance, in the centralized executive models the governor appoints the CSSO, and the SBE if there is one; in the separate agency models that board is elected either by the legislature or the public, and the CSSO is appointed by the board or in one case publicly elected; and in the combination model the board is appointed by the governor with legislative approval and the board selects the chief. At the same time it was recognized that a number of options which might be made a part of one or more models should receive some treatment. That treatment was the purpose of Chapter III.

Chapter IV represented still another approach to the problem. It focused on the preferences of informed persons with regard to the structural arrangements at the state level for the governance of public education. In all, 465 persons rather broadly representative of political and educational actors and of all 50 states expressed such preferences. Of the models described in Chapters II and III, the arrangements selected most frequently were as follows: the governor/legislature elected board which selects its own chief, the publicly elected board which selects its own chief, and the governor appointed board which selects its own chief.

In this chapter we suggest rather explicitly how any person or group of persons concerned with appraising the structural arrangements for the governance of public education in any state may start such a task. To aid in that process, we have selected three of the seven models described in Chapter II, one from each class, for a comparative analysis. We have also selected for each of the models certain options discussed in Chapter III. We do not necessarily recommend any one of these models. We do suggest that each model emphasizes a particular set of values and those who would reform the structure in any state should obviously decide which values they wish to maximize. Finally, we

suggest in this chapter some of the limitations which pertain in modifying structural arrangements.

Three Points of Departure

We hope the content of the previous chapters will assist citizens to examine productively their state structure for educational governance and that those who are working to improve this structure will find our report to be helpful in their deliberations. With this end in mind, we have decided to conclude the report by providing some additional structural description of three models, one drawn from each class. In doing so we have three purposes. First, we want to illustrate how models can be elaborated beyond the basic variables treated in Chapter II by an inclusion of the options discussed in Chapter III. Second, by using a comparative perspective we want to place in sharp relief the many alternatives that require consideration. Third, and most important, we want to set forth models that appear to be particularly useful as points of departure for those who are thinking about changes in their governance structure.

The first model that is explicated has as its defining characteristic a governor-appointed secretary of education, an official who sits as a member of the governor's cabinet, and whose responsibilities embrace the full spectrum of a state's educational and cultural programs. Such a centralized approach has long been propounded by political scientists and governmental reformers. And the growing costs, visibility, and politicalization of education, phenomena that receive attention in our comparative analysis,[1] have created a press in many states to reduce the structural autonomy of the education agency and to extend executive control over its activities. Although this thrust has varied manifestations, the one that has attracted the most attention in the past few years is the secretary of education model. This model, as

was observed in Chapter II, has itself been implemented quite differently in the four states currently employing it. And the "strong" version that we present is most closely approximated in Pennsylvania. Our choices of structural options for this model were made primarily on the basis of consistency with the underlying philosophy of the secretary approach.

Despite, or perhaps because of, politicizing forces, the opinion leaders who responded to our preference survey indicated little enthusiasm for the centralized executive doctrine being extended to education. Only some 10 per cent, as shown in Chapter IV, named either of the two models in which the governor appointed the CSSO as the one they personally most preferred. And neither of these models was found to be even acceptable by anywhere near a majority of these respondents (just 27.4 per cent for Model 1 and 20.6 per cent for Model 2). Correspondingly, both of the centralized models evoked a much higher than average level of dissatisfaction.

In marked contrast, the second model presented here, the combination approach that we have called the "governor-appointed authoritative board model" in which the governor appoints the state board but that body appoints the CSSO, attracted the most support from survey respondents. Nearly two-thirds indicated that this model was acceptable to them and 28.5 per cent checked it as the one they most preferred. And of those who saw this structure as existing in their state, 76.3 per cent expressed satisfaction, the highest figure for any alternative. For these reasons, and because the governor-appointed board approach has been widely recommended by students of state school administration, this structural arrangement is included among the three models described in this section. Decisions about the options for this model were made by selecting, whenever possible, the ones most frequently named by our preference survey respondents.

The final model to be presented in some structural detail is characterized by an elected state board and a board-appointed CSSO. This structural pattern is not only supported by long tradition in local school governance, but also represented the choice of many survey respondents. Nearly 22 per cent opted for a nonpartisan elected board model as their most preferred alternative and an additional four per cent checked the model based on a partisan election. While an independent regents model also attracted widespread approval (Model 5 was personally most preferred by 23.8 per cent), such a structure is found only in New York and even in that state it is subject to mounting criticism. As for the other model in the separate agency classification, the one having an elected CSSO as its central feature, this model is found in many states. But that number has steadily declined in the twentieth century and the model evoked far more dissatisfaction from our survey respondents than any other. Indeed, O'Shea found that while the elected chief model, Model 4 in the survey reported in Chapter IV, was "cited by 101 respondents as the model approximating the existing structure in their state, only 9.9 per cent checked Model 4 as their personally preferred structure."

The elected board structure, then, is the one described in this concluding section. As we elaborated this model, we took into account recent criticisms of the policy-making performance of state boards, and included several options intended to make these bodies more broadly representative and more actively involved in the policy process. We also added the linkage option of establishing a Governor's Advisory Council on Education. These options, we well realize, are at odds with both established practice, and judging from our survey respondents, prevailing sentiment. Still, research findings of the sort discussed in Chapter II of this report give concern to those who

believe that governing boards should play an influential role as the public's representative and advocate in education policy making.[2] And we think that options directed toward this end warrant consideration along with the more customary recommendations, recommendations that as we have said are included in the explication of the governor-appointed authoritative board model.

To describe structurally the three models, we first present in Figure 1 a diagrammatic representation and brief statement of key authority relationships. This is followed by the various options relating to state board and CSSO characteristics. Finally, we indicate some choices having to do with the scope of authority of the state education agency and the linkages between this agency and general governance institutions.

But, to repeat an earlier statement, in considering a governance arrangement it is necessary to think about not only what the structure is, but also what its consequences are and for whom it works. Any structure tends to encourage some values and not others, and makes it easier for some actors rather than others to exert influence. Assessment of such consequences is always speculative, and our efforts, as reported in Chapter II, to identify structural effects did not reveal many sizable correlations. Nonetheless, there are some tendencies that we would associate with the adoption of each model.

Notwithstanding the presence of a policy-making state board, centralization is the dynamic of the secretary of education approach and it stresses such values as decisional efficiency, coordination among state programs, comprehensive policy making, political accountability, and access to gubernatorial resources. On the other hand, the elected state board model is intended to foster such values as educational program advocacy, insulation from partisan politics, policy-making continuity, "lay control," and the

	Secretary of Education Model	Elected State Board Model	Governor-Appointed Authoritative Board Model
STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT			
			
KEY AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS	The Secretary of Education is an appointed member of the Governor's Cabinet. The Secretary exercises the prerogatives of the CSSO and the responsibilities of this office embrace the full range of state educational and cultural programs, as well as K-12 schools. The Secretary is also chief executive authority for a Governor-appointed State Board, a body that does have, by statute, some policy-making authority.	The State Education Agency has a semi-autonomous governmental status. It is governed by a State Board whose members achieve office through election. The Board appoints the CSSO to serve as its chief executive. The State Board has both constitutional and statutory authority, and has considerable policy-making authority for K-12 and vocational education, but not for higher education.	While the State Education Agency does have a special governmental status, there is direct linkage to the Governor through his appointment subject to legislative approval, of Board members. They, in turn, select the CSSO who serves as the Board's chief executive. The State Board has both constitutional and statutory foundation, and has considerable policy-making authority for K-12 and vocational education, but not for higher education.
STATE BOARD CHARACTERISTICS			
Selection	Appointed by the Governor	Elected from districts on either partisan or non-partisan ballot.	Appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Legislature.
Term of Office	4 years; overlapping	4 years; overlapping	4 years; overlapping
Size	Medium (7-11)	Large (12-15)	Medium (7-11)
Service/Compensation	Part-time; compensation for expenses and small per diem allowance.	Part-time but more Board service (e.g., several meetings per month) than usual; expenses plus attractive per diem.	Part-time; compensation for expenses and small per diem allowance.
Staff Information Resources	Department for Research, Planning and Evaluation in the Governor's Office, as well as such units in the State Department of Education.	Small staff directly responsible to Board in addition to staff resources provided by the State Department of Education.	Staff resources made available by the State Department of Education.

FIGURE 1. THREE DIFFERENT MODELS FOR STATE GOVERNANCE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

CSSO CHARACTERISTICS			
Authority	Statutory authority for Cabinet-level responsibilities and CSSO administrative duties; directly responsible to Governor	Statutory authority for administrative duties; directly responsible to the State Board	Statutory authority for administrative duties; directly responsible to the State Board
Selection	Appointed by the Governor	Appointed by the State Board	Appointed by the State Board
Statutory Qualifications	None	None	Professional educator
Term in Office	Pleasure of the Governor	4 year contract; renewable	4 year contract; renewable
Compensation	Comparable to those of other Cabinet posit ons with similar responsibilities	Comparable to those paid local school superintendents in the largest districts	Comparable to those paid local school superintendents in the largest districts
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY			
Higher Education	Included under the authority of the Secretary and State Board	Not included under State Board jurisdiction; a separate board for higher education	Not included under State Board jurisdiction; a separate board for higher education
Vocational Education	Included under the authority of the Secretary and State Board	Included under the authority of the State Board	Included under the authority of the State Board
Preparation/Teacher Certification	Included under the authority of the Secretary and State Board	Included under the authority of the State Board	Included under the authority of the State Board
SEA-GENERAL GOVERNANCE LINKAGES			
SEA-State Planning Agency	To Agency through Cabinet structure, as well as informal liaison	Informal liaison only	Informal liaison only
Linkages to Governor/ Legislature	To Governor through Cabinet structure	Through formally established Governor's Advisory Council on Education	Informal relationships and legal requirement for State Board/CSSO to report to Governor/Legislature

FIGURE 1. (continued) THREE DIFFERENT MODELS FOR STATE GOVERNANCE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

utilization of professional expertise. It is difficult to say to what degree these two different arrangements are successful in realizing their respective value emphases, especially in the absence of well-established secretary models. Yet we do think that most of the values associated with each probably exist as tendencies, albeit our data do cast doubt on some--for example, the extent to which "lay control" is promoted in the typical board structure.

As for the governor-appointed authoritative board model, we have some doubt that it really represents a balance between the two sets of competing values, as some proponents argue. In the light of our finding that governor-appointed boards are perceived as having even less contact and influence with the chief executive than elected boards we suspect that the typical appointed board structure has much the same value emphasis in operation as the elected board structure. Both tend to work toward the values inherent in separation rather than those advanced by centralization. There are some indications in our data that appointed boards are less responsive to external constituents, less prone to conflictual decision making, and more likely to confront volatile issues. None of these findings, though, is compelling enough to persuade us that appointed boards differ much from their elected counterparts in their behavior, at least as they are constituted at the present time.

Clearly, the secretary of education model works to strengthen the role of the governor, and those who have access to this office, in state education policy making. And, based on our study of the Tennessee structure in which the governor appoints both the state board and the commissioner, we suspect that the secretary model weakens the influence of state boards and state department administrators in this process. Conversely, the elected state board model enhances the role of agency officials and their educator clients at the expense of the chief executive. But whether, even in a separate

agency approach, the state board is an influential policy actor depends on the resources available to this body--that is, such things as legal authority, time, staffing, and expertise--and the board's willingness to utilize these resources to affect policy making. The elected board model described in this chapter deliberately augments the influence resources of the state board. Whether expectations for an active policy role emerge is, of course, another matter.

Again, we think that the governor-appointed board structure is more like the elected board structure in its impact on policy-making influence than it is like the secretary model. Governors in our sample were as little involved with appointed boards as with elected boards; indeed, they were even less so. And neither kind of board had much influence with the chief executive or other political leaders. The option of a Governor's Advisory Council in Education, included in the elected board model, is one structural response to this situation.

A Final Word

We hope that a consideration of the models shown above, combined with reference back to earlier sections of this report, will have provided a place to begin for those who wish to consider the structure for the governance of public education in a particular state. If none of the three models explicated above seems to quite provide such a beginning, many other combinations of models and options can be developed and possibly a home grown model will then become the place of beginning. In any case, we are convinced that very soon in the examination of state structures that state-specific conditions must be brought to bear by the people who understand them and will be affected by any changes proposed.

We emphasize once again that models, by their very nature, must deal with structural arrangements. But a change in structural arrangements alone may not

alter appreciably the process of policy making within a state. In other words, there are limitations in what may be expected from changes in state structure. These limitations seem to derive from a number of conditions. For instance, structure usually pertains to formal arrangements; it seldom deals with the informal arrangements such as "kitchen cabinets" and other extra-legal devices employed in policy making. Then, too, formal structure may or may not be adequately related to the context in which policy making goes forward, as for instance the political culture of a state. Perhaps most important of all, people make a difference. In several of the state case studies conducted by the EGP it became entirely clear that a new incumbent, particularly a new CSSO, could, within the same structure, alter both the process and the substantive content of policy making. In short, in the governance of public education there are a great many variables of which formal structure is but one.

Despite these limitations structure does seem to make some difference. For instance, in the study we made of state boards of education in ten states, the legal authority of the board to appoint its own CSSO was positively related to the policy making influence of the board (phi = .65).[4] This rather strong relationship does suggest that there is an association between active boards in the sense of policy influence and their power to exercise control over the appointment of their own executive. It was also found that a board which appoints its own executive officer tends to be more willing to give that executive a free hand in appointing his subordinates than is the board which has its chief executive thrust upon them. As another instance, in the study of CSSOs in twelve states there was a moderate relationship (r_s = .56) between the formal power of the office of the CSSO (a composite measure made up of the legal basis for the office, formal status of chief with the board, formal requirements for reporting to the governor and legislature, and terms of office

arrangements) and the policy-making influence of the CSSO with the governor and the legislature.[5] More formal power of office seemed to go with greater policy-making influence in the legislative arena.

We reiterate our two major concerns: (1) formal structure must be seen as one of many variables in any plan for the reorganization of state governance for education, but undue reliance cannot be placed on structure alone, and (2) at the same time there should be a recognition that structure can make some difference. As to our first concern, it is quite clear that how people choose to work within a structure makes a difference. As to our second concern, it seems that formal structure may permit, may actually encourage, certain kinds of behavior on the part of policy makers. Even if changing structure cannot guarantee desirable changes in behavior, the possible encouragement of such behavior seems to be sufficient reason for attending to structural arrangements.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

[1]Edward R. Hines, "Education Policy Role of the Governor's Office," in Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., (Editors) State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1974, Chapter 5.

[2]Gerald R. Sroufe, "State School Board Members and the State Education Policy System," Planning and Changing (April, 1971), 15-23.

[3]For instance, see JAlan Aufderheide, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of California. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, 1974.

[4]Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., (Editors) State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis. Educational Governance Project, The Ohio State University, 1974, Chapter 2.

[5]Ibid., Chapter 3.

APPENDIX A (CHAPTER IV)

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

To check whether models used in the questionnaire elicited accurate responses, presented here is the distribution of respondents, by state, who selected Model 4 as approximating the existing structure in their state. Model 4 is characterized by an elected CSSO.

The data in Table 4-15 show that of the 116 respondents from states with elected CSSOs 91, or 79 per cent, chose Model 4 as approximating their existing governance structure. Of 288 respondents from states with appointed CSSOs only 4 chose Model 4. These results demonstrate relatively high validity for the models.

A check on the reliability of responses to the survey questionnaire is provided by comparing distribution of responses at different points in time. In the summer of 1973 questionnaires were completed by 205 respondents attending annual meetings of the Education Commission of the States, Directors of State School Board Associations, and the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration. Responses from these groups, whose members represent a cross-section of opinion leaders in the field of state governance of education, may be compared with the responses from 219 persons attending regional conferences in the fall of 1973, organized by the Educational Governance Project staff. These meetings, held in Denver, Chicago, New York, and Atlanta, were attended by invited participants. Invitees were, again, persons actively interested in educational governance at the state level, and included politicians, state board members, education department personnel, and other involved citizens.

As shown in Table 4-16 the distribution of preferences among the eight alternative models of the structure of educational governance was

quite similar for both groups of respondents, attesting to the reliability of the survey instrument.

TABLE 4-15

DISTRIBUTION OF CHOICES OF MODEL 4 AS APPROXIMATING THE EXISTING STATE EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE BY RESPONDENTS FROM STATES IN WHICH CSSO IS ELECTED AND BY STATES IN WHICH CSSO IS APPOINTED[a]

	Number of Respondents Choosing		
	Model 4	Other Models	Total
Elected CSSO			
Arizona	5	0	5
California	12	2	14
Florida	4	1	5
Georgia	8	1	9
Idaho	6	1	7
Indiana	3	1	4
Kentucky	12	1	13
Louisiana	1	1	2
Mississippi	1	0	1
Montana	1	1	2
North Carolina	5	2	7
North Dakota	6	0	6
Oklahoma	2	0	2
Oregon	6	0	6
South Carolina	2	0	2
South Dakota	5	5	10
Washington	3	3	6
Wisconsin	4	3	7
Wyoming	5	3	8
Total	91	25	116
Appointed CSSO			
Arkansas	1	7	8
Nebraska	1	12	13
New Jersey	1	6	7
Vermont	1	4	5
Other States	0	255	255
Total	4	284	288

[a]Data on states with elected CSSOs obtained from Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 76-77.

TABLE 4-16

DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES AMONG EIGHT ALTERNATIVE MODELS BY RESPONDENTS AT NATIONAL MEETINGS AND AT LATER REGIONAL CONFERENCES

	Respondents Attending	
Models	National Meetings[a]	Regional Conferences[b]
1	5.0%	4.2%
2	8.8	5.2
3	27.6	30.2
4	6.6	3.3
5	24.3	24.1
6	5.5	7.5
7	19.3	20.8
8	2.8	4.2
N	(181)	(212)

[a]National meetings, held in the summer of 1973, were those of the Education Commission of the States; Directors of State School Board Associations, and National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration.

[b]Regional Conferences, organized by the Educational Governance Project, were held in the fall of 1973 in Denver, Chicago, New York, and Atlanta.

APPENDIX B (CHAPTER IV)

RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I. ALTERNATIVE COMPONENTS OF THE FORMAL POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURE OF STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES

1. Members of the State Board of Education should be: (Check one)

1.	Appointed by the Governor	15.9%
2.	Appointed by the Governor, subject to approval by the legislature	30.7
3.	Appointed by the Governor, but from a short list of names prepared by a blue ribbon committee	21.4
4.	Elected on a non-partisan ballot	24.0
5.	Elected on a partisan ballot	3.5
6.	Elected by local school board members	4.6

(N = 459)

2. Members of the State Board of Education should serve for a period of: (Check one)

2 years	2.6%
4 years	54.5
6 years	35.8
8 years	5.0
10 years	2.2

(N = 464)

3. Terms of individual State Board members should be: (Check one)

1.	Overlapping	96.6
2.	Concurrent with that of the Governor	3.4

(N = 464)

4. Size of the membership of State Boards should be: (Check one)

1.	Five to seven members	22.6%
2.	Eight to eleven members	52.6
3.	Twelve to fifteen members	20.7
4.	Sixteen or more members	4.1
		(N = 464)

5. Compensation for State Board members should be: (Check one)

1.	None	2.4%
2.	Expenses for attendance at Board meetings	34.5
3.	$25 to $50 per diem, plus expenses	37.5
4.	$50 to $100 per diem, plus expenses	20.3
5.	Regular salary, part or full time	5.4
		(N = 464)

6. Should it be stipulated in law that membership of the State Board should include: (Check Yes or No for each item)

		Yes	No	N
1.	Local school board members	26.1%	73.7%	(441)
2.	Students	21.5	78.5	(428)
3.	Teachers	24.0	76.0	(434)
4.	School Administrators	23.8	76.2	(428)
5.	Minority group members	29.6	70.4	(429)
6.	Representation of different geographic sections	68.5	31.5	(454)
7.	Representatives of the major political parties	23.2	76.8	(426)
8.	Representatives of non-public schools	20.5	79.5	(429)

7. With regard to its own staff services, should the State Board rely upon help from personnel assigned to it by the State Department of Education, or should the Board have its own independent staff, members of which would be exempt from civil service? (Check one)

1.	Board should rely upon State Department personnel	54.8%
2.	Board should also have its own independent staff	45.2
		(N = 456)

8. In relation to the legislature and the Governor, how important should be the State Board of Education as a source of advice on educational legislation, including school finance? (Circle one number for each item)

1. As a source of advice to the legislature, State Board should be:

1.	Not a source	0.4%
2.	A minor source	6.1
3.	A major source	71.8
4.	The most important source	21.7
		(N = 461)

2. As a source of advice to the Governor, State Board should be:

1.	Not a source	0.7%
2.	A minor source	5.0
3.	A major source	71.2
4.	The most important source	23.1
		(N = 459)

9. With regard to policy-making authority, the Chief State School Officer should:

1.	Be solely an administrative officer	6.9%
2.	Be an administrative officer and help with the formulation of policy	57.6
3.	Share formal policy-making authority with the State Board of Education	33.1

4.	Exercise formal policy-making authority in his own right	2.4

(N = 462)

10. In relation to the administrative duties of the Chief State School Officer, how much direction should be given by the State Board of Education?

1.	No direction	6.9%
2.	Some general direction	50.3
3.	Much general direction	38.2
4.	Specific and detailed instructions	4.5

(N = 463)

11. The selection of a Chief State School Officer should be achieved through: (Check one)

1.	Appointment by the Governor	5.2%
2.	Appointment by the Governor, subject to approval by the legislature	11.9
3.	Appointment by the State Board of Education	70.8
4.	Non-partisan election	9.7
5.	Partisan election	2.4

(N = 463)

12. (a) Should there be specific legal requirements for the position of Chief State School Officer? (Check one)

Yes	75.8%
No	24.2

(N = 417)

12. (b) If Yes, legal requirements for the office should include: (Check Yes or No for each item)

		Yes	No	N
1.	Legal residence in the state	64.2%	35.8%	(293)
2.	Professional educator	85.9	14.1	(306)
3.	Experience as a school district superintendent	43.5	56.1	(262)
4.	Other	54.9	42.3	(71)

13. In relation to the legislature and the Governor, how important should be the Chief State School Officer as a source of advice on educational matters?

1. As a source of advice to the legislature, the Chief State School Officer should be:

1.	Not a source	0.7%
2.	A minor source	4.8
3.	A major source	75.9
4.	The most important source	18.6

(N = 419)

2. As a source of advice to the Governor, the Chief State School Officer should be:

1.	Not a source	0.7%
2.	A minor source	3.9
3.	A major source	70.8
4.	The most important source	24.6

(N = 415)

14. In general, how do you feel about the present structure for educational governance in your state? (Check one)

1.	Very satisfied	5.9%
2.	Satisfied	51.5
3.	Dissatisfied	35.9
4.	Very dissatisfied	6.6

(N = 454)

15. How much policy-making authority at the state level should be given by the legislature to the State Education Agency (State Board, CSSO, and Department of Education) in relation to each of the following areas? (Circle one number for each item)

		N	All	Nearly All	Some	None
1.	Curriculum and course of study	(459)	31.4%	35.7%	28.3%	4.6%
2.	Professional certification	(458)	43.0	38.6	14.6	3.7
3.	School district organization & reorganization	(452)	17.7	42.7	36.3	3.3
4.	Federal aid and federal assistance programs	(458)	26.9	41.9	28.6	2.6
5.	Buildings & sites	(457)	23.0	29.8	37.6	9.6
6.	School finance, including the state foundation program	(455)	11.2	38.5	45.7	4.6
7.	School desegregation	(448)	15.6	38.4	39.5	6.5
8.	Assessment of pupil performance	(458)	34.3	28.4	27.9	9.4
9.	Planning and research	(457)	29.1	47.3	21.9	1.8
10.	Levying state-wide taxes for public school finances	(454)	9.1	15.9	29.7	46.3

PART II. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE FORMAL POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURE OF THE STATE EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES

1. Distribution of responses to questions regarding acceptability of alternative models for the formal policy-making structure of State Education Agencies. (See diagram of models in Figure 1 of main text.)

How acceptable would you <u>personally</u> find each model for your own state?

Model No.	Very Accept-able	Accept-able	Un-Accept-able	Very Un-Accept-able	N
1	7.4%	20.0%	36.3%	36.3%	(430)
2	6.1	14.5	44.3	35.1	(427)
3.	29.6	35.3	25.5	9.6	(439)
4	4.4	17.4	44.2	34.0	(432)
5	17.6	40.6	32.9	8.9	(438)
6	5.6	12.9	42.8	38.6	(425)
7	18.1	33.1	32.6	16.2	(426)
8	4.7	17.0	45.8	32.5	(424)

How <u>politically</u> acceptable do you think each model would be in your state?

Model No.	Very Accept-able	Accept-able	Un-Accept-able	Very Un-Accept-able	N
1	4.0%	28.5%	42.7%	24.8%	(424)
2	4.0	24.5	48.9	22.6	(421)
3	16.6	47.6	27.7	8.2	(429)
4	8.7	33.3	39.4	18.6	(424)
5	7.0	43.7	40.4	8.9	(428)
6	1.4	11.9	45.6	41.1	(421)
7	11.9	46.3	29.9	11.9	(421)
8	3.4	26.9	48.6	21.2	(416)

2. Please consider all eight of the models (see Figure 1 in the main text) and indicate:

   1. The model which in your view most closely approximates the existing structure of educational governance in your state.

   2. Of all eight models, the one which personally you would prefer most if educational governance was reorganized in your state.

   3. Of all eight models, the one which you think would be most acceptable politically in your state.

Model No.	Approximates Existing State Structure	Model Personally Prefer	Model Most Politically Acceptable in State
1	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%
2	9.9	6.3	7.8
3	27.9	28.5	24.9
4	24.8	4.6	18.1
5	7.7	23.8	15.2
6	0.7	6.5	2.4
7	19.0	21.8	20.9
8	5.3	4.2	6.4
N	(416)	(432)	(421)

3. In addition to elementary and secondary education, should the State Board have responsibility for: (Check Yes or No for each item)

	Yes	No	N
(a) Two-year community colleges	59.0%	41.0%	(434)
(b) Four-year colleges and universities	36.1	63.9	(429)

4. If responsibility of the State Board included some part of higher education:

   1. Which model would you <u>personally</u> find most acceptable for your state?

   2. Which model do you think would be most acceptable <u>politically</u> in your state?

Model No.	Personally Acceptable for Your State	Politically Acceptable in Your State
1	3.6%	2.9%
2	4.3	10.3
3	26.2	18.7
4	5.0	13.9
5	28.0	20.1
6	7.2	3.3
7	22.2	23.8
8	3.2	7.0
N	(279)	(273)

PART III. RESPONDENTS BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

1. Distribution of Respondents by Occupation

Politicians	(52)
Governor	4
Governor's staff	7
Legislators	41
Educators	(285)
Chief State School Officer	9
Chief State School Officer's staff	17
Chancellor for higher education	2
Educational administration	29
Teacher (elementary or secondary)	18
College faculty	91
College president or administrator	14
Executive of state-wide educational organization	29
Federal government	2
Executive Director, School Board Association	20
Staff, County Office of Education	1
School District Superintendent	37
Assistant Principal	2
U. S. Office of Education	12
Principal	2
Business Executives, Professionals (other than Educators) and Others	(97)
Business executive	18
Lawyer	2
Lobbyist	4
Researcher	9
Housewife	13
Miscellaneous	24
Other Professions	27
Total Responses	434

2. Distribution of Respondents by State

Alabama	3
Alaska	5
Arizona	7
Arkansas	10
California	14
Colorado	18
Connecticut	7
Delaware	10
Florida	13
Georgia	9
Hawaii	1
Idaho	7
Illinois	27
Indiana	4
Iowa	10
Kansas	10
Kentucky	14
Louisiana	3
Maine	2
Maryland	31
Massachusetts	9
Michigan	14
Minnesota	12
Mississippi	1
Missouri	3
Montana	2
Nebraska	13
Nevada	4
New Hampshire	2
New Jersey	8
New Mexico	7
New York	25
North Carolina	7
North Dakota	6
Ohio	12
Oklahoma	3
Oregon	6
Pennsylvania	4
Rhode Island	1
South Carolina	3
South Dakota	11
Tennessee	14
Texas	13
Utah	8
Vermont	5
Virginia	15
Washington	7
West Virginia	5
Wisconsin	10
Wyoming	8
Virgin Islands	1
Washington, D. C.	1
Valid Observations	445

3. Your experience, if any, as a professional educator. (Check all that apply)

1.	No experience as a professional educator	81
2.	Taught school at one time	291
3.	Presently teaching	82
4.	A school principal	147
5.	Local district superintendent	128
6.	Employed by a State Department of Education	73
7.	Employed by the U.S. Office of Education	31
8.	Other professional experience	161

4. Your current position, if any, in state or local government. (Check one)

			N
1.	Governor's office	4.8%	(18)
2.	Legislator	14.9	(56)
3.	Legislative aide	1.9	(7)
4.	Member of State Board of Education	7.5	(28)
5.	Chief State School Officer	2.9	(11)
6.	State Department of Education	7.5	(21)
7.	Department of Administration and/or Finance	1.6	(6)
8.	Local Board of Education	4.3	(16)
9.	Other	18.7	(70)
10.	None	37.9	(142)
			(375)

5. Your past experience, if any, in state or local government. (Check all that apply)

1.	Governor's office	13
2.	Legislator	38

3.	Legislative aide	19
4.	Member of State Board of Education	10
5.	Chief State School Officer	9
6.	State Department of Education	48
7.	Department of Administration and/or Finance	12
8.	Local Board of Education	55
9.	Other	60
10.	None	158

6. Education-related organizations in which you currently hold membership. (Check your primary affiliation)

1.	Administrator organization	231
2.	Teachers' Association	160
3.	Teachers' Union	8
4.	School Board Association	81
5.	Non-public school organization	44
6.	Other	74
7.	None	54

7. Your current position, if any, as an official spokesman for: (Check all that apply)

1.	Administrator organization	44
2.	Teachers' Association	33
3.	Teachers' Union	5
4.	School Board Association	50
5.	Non-public school organization	16
6.	Other	48
7.	None	181

8. What is the approximate size of the town or city where you permanently reside? (Check one)

1.	Less than 2,500	6.0%
2.	2,501 to 10,000	9.1
3.	10,001 to 50,000	31.9
4.	50,001 to 100,000	14.6
5.	100,001 to 250,000	12.4
6.	250,001 to 500,000	10.4
7.	over 500,000	15.7
		(N = 452)

9. How would you characterize the area where you reside? (Check one)

1.	Rural	19.3%
2.	Suburban	41.0
3.	Urban	39.5
		(N = 451)